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BOOK REVIEWS
f

General

Michael Adas. Dominance by Design: Technological Imperatives and America’s Civilizing
Mission. 542 pp., illus., notes, index. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006.
$29.95 (cloth).
With Dominance by Design, Michael Adas provides us with an impressive and broadly written
study that documents American attitudes toward
colonial expansion, imperialism, and overseas
intervention from the seventeenth century to the
present. Adas successfully brings together these
disparate literatures in American history through
a sustained focus on technology. He describes
the role that American technological prowess
played in this nation’s take on the “white man’s
burden,” which in turn justified everything from
the historical treatment of Native Americans to
our latest interventions in Iraq. Lucidly written,
this book, which appears as a Belknap imprint,
is designed for a broad historical audience. It
demonstrates as well the relevance of the history
of technology to the broadest currents in American history. As is typical of works in this
genre—think of Civil War or Cold War histories—Dominance by Design is written with a
political purpose. The book is an unabashed plea
to recognize that present-day foreign policies
have deep roots in American attitudes and experience and that our insistence on exporting
capitalism and democracy through technological
and military strategies is bound only to fuel
global tensions.
The book itself has a highly linear, if not
teleological, design that aims to describe the
successive articulations of the “civilizing mission” that derived from a sense of technological
progress and social superiority that were integral
to the American experience. It opens with an
account of Commodore Perry’s infamous “black
ships” that contributed to the opening of Japan.
In carefully documenting the attention Perry
paid to making technology an instrument of diplomacy, Adas is able to cast the event in a
synecdochic relation to the book as a whole. He
then goes on to describe the origins of the American faith in technology and the commitment to
internal improvement— of nature and of other
races—in the religious and racial attitudes of the
early settlers. Adas next documents the transmutation of the Protestant doctrine of internal improvement under the ruthless logic of Manifest

Destiny, its subsequent translation into a formula for foreign development in the Philippines,
the further extension and articulation of this
formula in Panama and elsewhere (including
China and Japan), and its reincarnation as official development discourse during the early
Cold War era. The chapter that follows documents how these development policies, when
merged with Cold War fears, orientalism, and a
technocratic mind-set, produced the human tragedy in Vietnam. Next comes a chapter on the
“technowar” of the first Gulf War. Although
Adas applauds the multilateralism of George
H. W. Bush and accepts the Gulf War’s hightech weaponry as a successful manifestation of
the technologies that had failed during Vietnam,
he nevertheless points to the limitations of a
predominantly militarized approach to foreign
intervention. This is followed by an “epilogue”
that casts the current War on Terrorism as a
predictable retrenchment of U.S. foreign policy
into an older unilateralist position, one still
backed by a faith in technology and democratic
institutions that has little bearing on the experience of other nations and other cultures.
Before proceeding any further, it is necessary
for me to remark that I am a specialist neither in
American history nor in imperialism and postcolonial history and theory, and therefore it is
difficult for me to judge to what extent Adas
offers important correctives to established interpretations of American expansionism, writ
large. This said, the book offers substantial evidence of the social and ideological continuities
that exist between the American experiences of
colonialism, westward expansion, imperialism,
international development policy, foreign policy, and military strategy, all of which, as noted
above, tend to be treated as separate subjects in
American history. In terms of the history of
technology, Adas’s references to and integration
of the literature are quite impressive. He includes Carolyn Merchant and William Cronon’s
work on Western and colonial attitudes toward
natural improvements; the early economic historical studies on U.S. resource advantages; a
deft reapplication of Leo Marx’s metaphor of
the machine in the garden; the literature on the
American system of manufactures; and more
recent literatures on consumer culture, gender
and technology, and Cold War technologies.
From the standpoint of the history of science,
some readers will find the book to contain unopened doors and missed opportunities. For example, in discussing the U.S. imperialist expan-
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sion into the Philippines, Adas touches on the
influence of eugenics movements and social
Darwinist thought, but he draws only marginally
on the vast literature on this subject. Likewise,
although Adas draws attention to the substantial
influence of Walt Rostow’s “take-off ” model,
he does not attempt to describe the dissenting
views that must have existed during this period.
At minimum, I would have expected contemporary developmental economists to have recognized the risks of overcapacity that would have
resulted from a uniform policy of accelerated
industrial development. On the other hand, the
fact that the “trickle-down” theory in economics
persisted during the Reagan era despite substantial scholarly opposition suggests that Adas is
right to focus on the body of ideas that influenced those in power.
Still, it could be said that the book’s major
strengths are also its major weaknesses. Adas,
for the most part, brackets out indigenous experience on the basis of the argument that how
America understood its “civilizing mission”
provides the best historical window into U.S.
actions, both past and present. Yet in privileging
a specific thread in the history of ideas—albeit
with a justifiable motive—Dominance by Design frequently grates against broader social historical sensibilities. One is left wondering, for
instance, whether Japan’s shift to modernity
might have had more to do with conflicts internal to the Tokugawa Bakufu. And although
American actions may indeed be best accounted
for through a focus on American ideas and ideologies, a U.S.-centric interpretation nevertheless winds up reinscribing the very set of myths
that Adas sets out to deconstruct. This is somewhat ironic, given the book’s aims. There are
also passages in the book where Adas’s interpretations appear too facile, especially in dealing with issues of race, gender, and difference.
My suspicion is that the same history, written
with the most recent insights from subaltern
studies and postcolonial and feminist theory,
might reveal the more subtle causes for the
haunting experiences that Adas so aptly describes. In both respects, this book could have
benefited from a more reflexive stance toward
the knowledge claims of history itself, especially as applied to the interpretive limitations of
a broadly written historical narrative.
But these remain scholarly quibbles about a
book that sets out—and quite successfully—to
explain the historical origins of present-day U.S.
foreign policies to a very large and diverse historical audience. Dominance by Design is likely
to find a serious following among general U.S.
history enthusiasts, as well as among public
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officials, makers of foreign policy, and military
strategists. It should also receive broad recognition among academic historians and will be valued as an advanced undergraduate and graduate
text in U.S. history and the history of technology.
ATSUSHI AKERA
Clifford D. Conner. A People’s History of Science: Miners, Midwives, and “Low Mechanicks.” xiii ⫹ 554 pp., bibl., index. New York:
Nation Books, 2005. $17.95 (paper).
Clifford Conner’s book takes as its premise that
science was not necessarily the product of geniuses asking transcendental questions, but was
often the product of knowledge gained by workers, the “low mechanicks” of his title. In a generally chronological fashion, the eight chapters
of A People’s History of Science take us from
our hunter-gatherer ancestors to the birth of the
internet. Most of the book is presented as vignettes looking at topics such as Chinese biology or the work of Leeuwenhoek. Readers will
find much of interest, but the book must be read
with some reservations in mind. Presentism is a
concern, since many of the examples work only
if the knowledge of the people can be linked to
modern ideas.
A number of reviews have compared Conner’s work with Howard Zinn’s A People’s History of the United States (HarperCollins, 2005);
and it does bear some relation, with its focus on
the largely unacknowledged or even deliberately
ignored people in history and its socialist perspective. Yet in many ways it is closer to James
W. Loewen’s Lies My Teacher Told Me: Everything Your American History Textbook Got
Wrong (Touchstone, 1996). After briefly establishing in Chapter 1 what he means by “science”
and “the people,” Conner attempts to correct the
many historical fallacies he sees in the history of
science.
He starts with the knowledge base of prehistoric people in Chapter 2, “Prehistory: Were
Hunter-Gatherers Stupid?” This is a bit of a
straw man, since it would be difficult to find any
historian today who would hold that our ancestors were our inferiors. Conner is perhaps arguing with an earlier generation of scholars. In
particular, the section on the navigation skills of
the people of the South Pacific would make a
perfect reply to Jacob Bronowski’s argument in
The Ascent of Man (Little, Brown, 1973) that
most of the people of the ancient world lacked
some essential idea that could have led them to
“science.”
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An illustration of smelting methods from
Agricola’s De re metallica (taken from Conner,
A People’s History of Science).

Conner moves from the prehistoric world to
question the idea that the foundation of science came from Greece. In Chapter 3, “What
‘Greek Miracle’?” he points—à la Martin Bernal and Black Athena (Rutgers, 1987), to the
pre- and non-Greek origins of “Greek” natural
philosophy and mathematics and the importance of contemporary centers of learning that
have not received due credit. Chapters 2 and 3
offer some useful information to balance the
Eurocentrism that tends to creep into the history of science.
Having established the idea that the people’s knowledge was at the heart of the systematic study of nature, Conner then gets to
the heart of his work, looking at the early
modern era and the scientific revolution in
Chapters 4 – 6. These chapters contain the
bulk of his work and his main arguments
about the misrepresentation of the history of
science. They are also the most controversial
of Conner’s material because they depend the

most on interpretation. Here is Conner on Bacon, for example: “We need not concern ourselves with how typical or aberrant Bacon’s
willingness to utilize torture was in the context of his time; it is sufficient to note that he
viewed ‘mankind’ through the lens of the
dominant social class. His claim that the new
science he advocated would benefit ‘the whole
race of man’ must be evaluated in this light.
The Baconian call for scholars to learn from
craftsmen can thus be seen not as a benevolent
program of knowledge-sharing, but rather as
an appropriation of working people’s knowledge in the interest of the ruling class” (p.
363).
Chapters 7 and 8, on Victorian and twentiethcentury science, are brief, mostly just passing
notes. Darwinism gets five pages, but Darwin
himself gets about five paragraphs. One has the
impression that there might be a companion
book in the future that looks at science in the age
of the lab coat.
The idea of putting class in the forefront of
the history of science is not new, but it has rarely
been so forcefully done, especially in a book
aimed at a mass audience. Conner belatedly tips
his hat to the Zilsel thesis: “No contribution to a
people’s history of science is more important
than the one made by Edgar Zilsel” (p. 281).
Zilsel should have been introduced at the start, if
only to give the reader a theoretical foundation
for what was to follow.
Conner’s best sections explore the importance
of practical skills, such as navigation, as the
foundation for the developments of modern science. He argues that such knowledge has been
vastly undervalued. And there is certainly reason to accept his position, as the growing number of scholars looking at the significance of
skilled workers and mathematical practitioners
shows. The less satisfactory sections are the
ones that interpret history as class war or part of
an antiproletarian conspiracy. Conner’s examination of Galileo’s tidal theory, for example, is
presented as an elitist rejection of mariners’
knowledge and gives no hint that any other issue
was at stake.
This is a thought-provoking and useful book
for any historian of science, but it picks careful
examples and does not make a sustained argument other than to elevate the “low mechanicks.” The problem is that for every navigator
who linked the moon to the tides, there was a
host of people who held ideas that did not survive; and thus, even for Conner, some low
mechanicks are more equal than others.
ANDREW EDE
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Michael Hagner. Der Geist bei der Arbeit: Historische Untersuchungen zur Hirnforschung.
284 pp., figs., bibl., index. Göttingen: Wallstein
Press, 2006. €28 (cloth).
Michael Hagner’s Der Geist bei der Arbeit
(probably best translated as “The Mind at
Work”) is not what it at first glance appears to
be. Although the preliminary matter states that
the book “concludes his trilogy on the history of
the modern brain,” this volume by no means
stands on the same level as his earlier Homo
cerebralis and Geniale Gehirne. Apart from the
introduction, every chapter was previously published in German-language edited volumes (see
p. 261 ff.), and some of them were coauthored
with other historians of the life sciences, such as
Cornelius Borck and Margarete Vöhringer.
Thus readers who anticipated that this volume
would be the cornerstone of Hagner’s trilogy on
the modern brain might be disappointed. A
closer look, however, reveals that the reprinted
essays form a unified selection and effectively
convey Hagner’s message that the euphoric
rhetoric of neuroscientists about deciphering the
working brain is completely misleading (p. 7).
The chapters cover themes like “Brave Neuro
Worlds,” “War Brains,” and “The Mind at
Work” and analyze the pervasive neuroscientific
intention to represent cognitive brain processes
as visually evoked perceptions at the interface of
science and fiction. The historiographical narrative covers the late nineteenth century, World
War I, the Weimar period, the late 1950s, and
present-day developments. Hagner’s collection
is wittily written, learned, and well illustrated
with thirty-nine figures.
The author’s main historical interest concerns
the self-enlightenment of the sciences: he asks
how we are to understand the intricate relation
between human minds and their technological
and scientific products. But unlike his two earlier monographs—which focus on their subject
along specific time axes—this volume scrutinizes the epistemic, the cultural, and the social
entanglements between the modern brain and its
contexts in disparate historical periods. Because
the “cerebralization of man” should not be discussed only in restricted academic circles, Hagner wants to see his views disseminated through
various representational spaces (“unterschiedlichen Repräsentationsraeumen”; p. 10). This
volume is hence a popularization of science
studies in the best sense of the word.
With regard to the more distant historical subjects—for example, the history of migraine
since early modern times or debates on the
structure and function of speech around 1800 —
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Hagner delineates close relations between scientific innovations and their respective milieus.
From the two hundred years of brain research
covered by the nine chapters of the book, it
becomes clear how neuroscientists’ theories on
the faculties of thought, imagination, or emotion
have been determined by cultural, social, and
political circumstances. The project of the “cerebralization of man” thus shows itself to have
inherited a “proleptical structure”—that is, an
unchanging set of research problems that manifest themselves in existing terrains of knowledge production. Understanding the workings of
the mind and solving the last riddle of mankind
(“das letzte grosse Rätsel der Menschheit”) appears to be the unfinished project of modernity
(p. 36).
Even where Hagner’s essays impinge on
more recent subjects, such as neuroimaging or
cognitive localization, he shows how they are
rooted in historical conundrums. For example,
he draws a direct genealogical line from the
early nineteenth-century approaches of the organologists Franz Joseph Gall and Caspar
Spurzheim to such visualization techniques as
CT, fMRI, or SPECT when describing our
modern-day efforts in terms of a cyberphrenology (pp. 182–187). And it is at this point
that the neuroscientific research program of cortical localization takes on an empiricist, if not to
say positivist, stance, which Hagner describes in
terms of a transition by which “science has now
yielded to philosophy” (p. 185). But whether the
technological and representational advances
provide us with the answers so urgently needed
for the self-understanding of (post)modern man
remains a question not to be answered by images of the brain.
Der Geist bei der Arbeit is intended for a
general readership interested in the development
of modern-day neuroscience. For those who are
not acquainted with his earlier work, it provides
good access to the wide range of Hagner’s historical perspectives. For the specialist, however,
there won’t be any news here apart from the
ten-page introduction. Let’s then consider its
explicit agenda: the volume aims at dismantling
the rhetoric of so many influential neuroscientists, who lock modern anthropological thought
in a “stranglehold of transmitters, synapses, impulses, and neuronal wiring” (p. 260). And for
that very reason, I would wish that this powerful
stranglehold was challenged by new examples
of Hagner’s pointed writing—putting the mind
back to work in dissecting the hidden agendas of
present-day neuroscientific discourse.
FRANK W. STAHNISCH
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Michael Hoskin. The History of Astronomy: A
Very Short Introduction. x ⫹ 123 pp., figs.,
apps., index. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2003. $9.95 (paper).
Michael Hoskin remarks in The History of Astronomy: A Very Short Introduction that Johannes Kepler “is no fit subject for any sort of
Introduction, let alone a Very Short one” (p. 54).
Nonetheless, Hoskin has succeeded here in the
still more difficult task of distilling several millennia of the history of Western astronomy into
a pocket-sized book of no more than 125 pages.
Drawing on two related volumes that he edited
for Cambridge University Press (The Cambridge Illustrated History of Astronomy [1997]
and The Cambridge Concise History of Astronomy [1999]), Hoskin offers a highly readable
account of some of the major conceptual developments of Western astronomy.
The book begins with a fascinating but alltoo-short chapter on prehistoric astronomy, raising important questions about what we can learn
from cultures that did not use traditional texts.
Chapter 2 provides an efficient study of astronomy in ancient Mesopotamia, Egypt, and
Greece that is conventional in its attention to the
intersection of cosmological concerns with the
mathematical techniques designed to “save the
appearances” of celestial phenomena. Chapter 3
treats astronomy in the Middle Ages with an
overt awareness of broader social motivations,
describing the theories and practices of medieval Islamic astronomy and the merger of these
with the surviving traditions of the Latin West.
Two further chapters deal primarily with the
achievements of the canonical figures Tycho
Brahe, Galileo, Kepler, and Newton, describing
the challenges of crafting and recrafting a new
physics in light of the new astronomies of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The sixth
and final chapter, on stellar astronomy in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, is excellent
in weaving together the related concerns with
stellar brightnesses, motions, and distances and
the broader goal of understanding the structure
of the stellar system. The narrative ends circa
1850, but a brief epilogue outlines the astrophysics that would exemplify much of the twentieth century.
There are minor instances when the story
looks forward in ways that seem ahistorical,
notably a digression on Kepler’s laws in the
midst of a discussion of Ptolemy’s equant (pp.
1–20). However, Hoskin also provides careful
analysis of issues ranging from the rationality of
astrology, to a historiographical critique of the
so-called Olber’s Paradox, to the just but subtle

placement of Nicolaus Copernicus as the culmination of the ancient astronomical tradition. A
reader for whom this book is his or her initiation
into the scholarship should come away with a
nuanced understanding of many familiar stories
and perhaps be persuaded to rethink some common assumptions.
Although there is no shortage of introductions
to the history of astronomy, none are as accessible in terms of price, length, and readability as
this one. For the casual book buyer Hoskin’s
work is superb. The history of science teacher,
though, might wish for a slightly more expansive bibliography in order to provide students
with more pathways into the wider literature.
The fact that the volume excludes details of the
conceptual developments of the last 150 years
also restricts its use as a comprehensive introductory text. Neither these points nor the inherent difficulty of striking an appropriate balance
in a work of this kind (why not more on nonWestern astronomy, for instance, or on astronomy and social values?) should obscure the
character of Hoskin’s achievement. This book
ought to be admired and utilized as a succinct
and lucid introduction to the history of astronomy by one of its leading scholars.
PETER J. SUSALLA
Max Jammer. Concepts of Simultaneity: From
Antiquity to Einstein and Beyond. ix ⫹ 308 pp.,
illus., figs., index. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2006. $49.95 (paper).
As you read this sentence, the moon is circling
the earth at a particular location. Einstein taught
us, however, that for someone moving with respect to you, your reading that sentence was
simultaneous with the moon being located at
some quite distinct position. Simultaneity is relative to inertial frame. But is it also conventional? That is, is there a fact of the matter, even
given an inertial frame, whether two distant
events are simultaneous? Famously, Einstein
thought not; and his thinking so was crucial to
his discovery of special relativity.
Recall that in 1905 Einstein postulated that
the speed of light propagates at the same speed
in all directions. This stipulation suggests and is
suggested by a natural synchronization procedure. Let Alice be an inertial observer (say, in a
spacecraft) and Bob be a distinct observer at rest
with respect to Alice. Bob conveniently happens
to be holding a mirror oriented toward Alice,
and Alice reflects light off Bob’s mirror, directing it back to herself. The synchronization pro-
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cedure holds that an event on Alice’s worldline
is synchronous with one on Bob’s just in case

t2 ⫽

t1 ⫹ t3
,
2

where t1 is the time Alice reckons she sent the
light signal, t2 the time on Bob’s worldline of the
reflection, and t3 the time Alice receives the
return signal. By assuming that all observers
also use this method of synchronization, Einstein derived the Lorentz transformations, the
heart of relativity. Could Einstein have used a
different synchronization procedure— one making the speed of light variable while keeping the
average round-trip speed constant—and still arrived at a consistent theory? This question exercised Einstein, Reichenbach, and scores of
philosophers of science and physicists in the
twentieth century. Concepts of Simultaneity is a
history of our grappling with the important concept of simultaneity, from antiquity to now, but
the centerpiece is a detailed history of the conventionality thesis. Think of this book as the
prequel and sequel to the celebrated synchronization procedures of Poincaré and Einstein.
Written by the eminent historian and philosopher of physics Max Jammer, the book
consists of fifteen chapters. After terminological preliminaries in the first chapter, the next
five chapters trace the notion of simultaneity
from antiquity through classical physics. The
next three introduce relativity, its impact, and
the conventionality thesis. The remaining six
chapters focus on this thesis: its promulgation,
its clarification, and scores of arguments (old
and recent, for and against). Here the reader
encounters the debates among Adolf Grünbaum, Brian Ellis, Wesley Salmon, Allen Janis, John Winnie, David Malament, and others
involving clock transport synchrony and more
recent geometric arguments. This episode in
the intellectual history of relativity is a worthwhile one to document, and Jammer’s discussion of this material is well informed and
authoritative. Moreover, it is fascinating to
see the twists and turns the debate has taken
through the twentieth century.
For myself, I particularly enjoyed the early
history of simultaneity. Virtually everyone is
discussed (Aristotle, Avicenna, Aquinas, Barrow, Leibniz, Newton, Kant, . . .), and experts
will find much to quibble about in these short
treatments. However, the novelty of organizing
these thinkers around the topic of simultaneity
more than compensates for the quibbles. In one
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chapter we meet Sextus Empiricus’s critique of
astrology based on the Chaldean method of determining distant simultaneity (sound transmission via gong). Later we discover that Alexander
of Aphrodisias was perhaps the first to define a
worldwide standard time by defining time via
the motion of the outmost fastest celestial
sphere. Jammer then highlights Ole Roemer’s
discovery of the finite speed of light and what
that meant for the “visual simultaneity thesis”—
namely, the claim that all events one sees together are simultaneous. Anyone interested in
time in science will take pleasure in this material.
Because many readers will be familiar with
the author and his distinctive style, perhaps the
most useful description I can give of this book is
that it’s very much like his others. I consider this
high praise. Jammer’s books on force, space,
quantum mechanics, and mass occupy a central
place in the history and philosophy of science.
The present book has the same strengths and
weaknesses as the others. The weakness is that
the depth of analysis is occasionally uneven.
The author will sometimes build up material in
exhaustive detail and at other times abruptly
drop a topic without resolution. The strength
is—as always—Jammer’s almost unimaginable
erudition. The author is as much at ease writing of
the concept “now” and cognates in Egyptian, ancient Hebrew, ancient Greek, medieval Latin, and
contemporary German as navigating through hairy
tensor algebra in general relativity. As a result,
even an expert in the field will come away having
learned something new.
Although I highly recommend the book, I
did find one critical omission troubling. When
treating the prerelativistic period, Jammer often measures developments against Einstein’s
later operationalism of simultaneity via synchronization—for example, “That a rigorous
definition of simultaneity cannot be obtained
without specification of a physical operational
procedure was never recognized in antiquity”
(p. 41). Even if we don’t mind history spun
this way, should we regard the synchronization procedure as the gold standard in the
history of simultaneity? I think the answer is
no. Granted, an operationalist procedure was
important for the development of Einstein’s
ideas. But one doesn’t require the synchronization postulate to derive or understand relativity. And after Quine’s famous critique of
the analytic/synthetic distinction (not mentioned), it’s not clear that the idea of some
parts of a theory being conventional and other
parts being empirical makes much sense.
Hence the question of rival synchronization
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procedures takes on less importance. If any
question remains, it is whether Einstein’s
choice was reasonable; but as we learn from
the anticonventionalists, clearly Einstein’s
choice was the simplest and most natural one
given the rest of his theory. A critical appraisal of this entire intellectual episode
would have been welcome.
CRAIG CALLENDER
Mark Monmonier. Rhumb Lines and Map
Wars: A Social History of the Mercator Projection. xiv ⫹ 242 pp., illus., bibl., index. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2004. $25 (cloth).
In 1566 Gerard Mercator published his famous
world map “ad usum navigantium,” which
showed lines of constant compass direction
(rhumb lines or loxodromes) as straight lines.
The map according to Mercator’s projection has
become a standard representation of the world.
Quite undeservedly so. For navigators intent on
plotting a course, the map is indeed extremely
useful. For other purposes, however, it has severe defects. In particular, Mercator’s world
map exaggerates the size of countries situated
far to the north or south compared to those in the
tropics. For this reason, it has been attacked in
recent decades for having an imperialist bias,
downsizing the importance of the third world.
There is a story to be told here, and Mark
Monmonier is certainly the person to tell it. He
does so with gusto. The book can be divided in
three parts. In the first, Monmonier describes
early sea charts, Mercator’s innovation, and the
mathematical elaboration of his work by Edward Wright and Johann Heinrich Lambert. Despite the book’s title, there is not much “social
history” here. The cartographic problems are
explained in a clear way, but it is evident that
Monmonier is not really at home in sixteenthcentury history. These chapters rely almost exclusively on secondary sources, ignoring most
work in languages other than English.
The second part shows how, in the nineteenth
century and later, Mercator’s map became popular as an all-purpose map. This part contains
much useful information. Interestingly, among
the most fervent propagandists for Mercator’s
projection was the military. Loxodromes are
useful not just for navigation, but also for calculating the trajectories of long-range artillery.
It was the French who first realized the use of
Mercator’s projection for aiming cannons. The
main part of Monmonier’s story, however, deals
with the United States. He writes about the
adoption and use of the Mercator projection by

such bodies as the U.S. Geological Survey, the
U.S. Army Map Service, and the U.S. Coast and
Geodetic Survey. It is clear that this is an area
wherein the author is very much at home. But
one would like to know how the developments
in the United States tally with the general story.
Mercator’s map, after all, is a world map, and its
adoption was not limited to America.
The final part of Rhumb Lines and Map Wars
deals with the attacks on Mercator’s projection
in recent years, especially by propagandists for
the so-called Peters projection. Monmonier
clearly has an ax to grind here. As he shows in
detail, Mercator’s critics are generally driven by
ideological motives rather than by any real
knowledge of the characteristics of map projections. Many alternatives to Mercator’s projection have been proposed over time, and the one
propagated by Arno Peters is among the worst.
One of the book’s aims appears to be to dispel
misunderstanding and prejudice about the Peters
projection. As such, it explains the “correct”
principles of cartography and map projection,
rather than presenting an impartial description
of the social factors that promote this or that
picture of the world.
Although the book does offer new information, it cannot be deemed thoroughly researched,
nor does it present a balanced historical view of
the subject. However, Monmonier’s personal involvement with the subject makes the volume
excellent reading. Rhumb Lines and Map Wars
will be relished by a general audience; and although it is not a real social history, it certainly
shows the social relevance of history of science.
RIENK VERMIJ
Marco Piccolino. Lo zufolo e la cicala: Divagazioni galileiane tra la scienza e la sua storia.
(Saggi Scienze.) 359 pp., figs., bibl., index.
Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2005. €26 (paper).
Marco Piccolino’s book includes an introductory section, seven chapters, a concluding section, a bibliography, and an index of names. The
book treats a bundle of loosely connected topics,
ranging from Galileo Galilei (1564 –1642) and
seventeenth-century astronomy to contemporary
biochemistry and physiology. The first chapter
focuses on Galileo. The second is mostly about
Galileo and Lazzaro Spallanzani (1729 –1799),
in particular the biological and geological researches of the latter. The third concerns John
Walsh (1726 –1795) and his experiments on the
torpedo, or electric ray, conducted in 1772 at La
Rochelle and l’Ile de Ré, in France. The fourth
is devoted to Marcello Malpighi (1628 –1694),
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the history of medicine, and contemporary biochemistry. The fifth concerns science and literature, from Helmholtz to Proust. The sixth is
about vision and perception. The seventh deals
with color vision, from Galileo and Newton to
Goethe and Thomas Young (1773–1829).
As the reader will have gathered, Lo zufolo e
la cicala: Divagazioni galileiane tra la scienza e
la sua storia is almost impossible to categorize.
As the title suggests, the book is indeed made up
of “digressions” (divagazioni), which, however,
have been assembled in a rather confusing fashion, in part from earlier research by the author
himself, and apparently with no clear plan in
mind. The introductory section does not state
the objectives of the book. All the reader is told
is that it was inspired by Piccolino’s felicitous
teaching experience as a university professor
and that he, in turn, wishes to instill the passion
for science in the reader. The intended audience
seems to be the general public rather than professional scholars of the history of science and
its allied disciplines, but again this is not explicitly stated.
The historiographical framework of Piccolino’s book is the history of ideas. In his chapters
scientific episodes, generally unrelated to one
another, tell us stories about ideas that need not
be placed in relevant contexts—social, philosophical, or political—and that can be wholly
understood in terms of internal intellectual developments. Piccolino is interested in what he
calls the “pathos” of science, an emotional attitude that, in his view, characterizes the process
of discovery in the age of science (which, he
holds, began in early modern Europe, with Galileo and the so-called scientific revolution).
I will not discuss the contents of the loosely
connected chapters in detail, since the fragmentary nature of the book makes it impossible to
give a fair summary. All the chapters have
strengths and weaknesses, which I will try to
address succinctly. The author is fascinated by
the figure of Galileo and makes a great effort to
see Galilean motives at all the crucial junctures
of the discussion. This approach has serious
drawbacks, though. Piccolino seems not to be
aware of recent developments in the historiography of early modern science—and specifically
in the field of Galileo studies. Thus—as the
subtitle of the book might suggest—Galileo is
presented in a wholly naive way. Little is said,
for instance, about the complex social, mathematical, and philosophical contexts in which
recent scholars have placed Galileo and early
modern science more generally. This perhaps
comes as no surprise, since Piccolino is a physiologist by profession, not a historian or a phi-
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losopher of science. At some points in the book
there are critical remarks about philosophers of
science and their supposedly erroneous reconstructions of the history of science. I suspect,
however, that these sparse remarks will not engage professional philosophers of science.
The chapter I find the most convincing is that on
John Walsh and his experiments. It is a genuine
piece of original research on animal electricity,
based on primary materials that Piccolino has investigated thoroughly, after discovering a manuscript by Walsh preserved in the archives of the
Royal Society. In my view, however, the value of
this piece arises from the contact with hitherto
little-known documents, not from the naive historiographical framework of the book.
Finally, I find it puzzling that Piccolino, in
trying to convey his fascination with the practice
of science—which seems to be the underlying
theme of Lo zufolo e la cicala— has chosen not
to rely on his firsthand experience as a professional physiologist. Rather, he has ventured to
frame narratives that will inevitably appear naive to professional students of the historical and
philosophical dimensions of the sciences. Hence
the significance of this book for the history of
science is modest.
PAOLO PALMIERI
Carroll Pursell. The Machine in America: A
Social History of Technology. xvi ⫹ 398 pp.,
illus., notes, index. Second edition. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007. $22.95
(paper).
The Machine in America’s modest preface fails
to acknowledge the magnitude of the task undertaken by Carroll Pursell, an acclaimed historian of technology. He describes this undergraduate history of technology textbook as a “brief
introduction” that is “necessarily selective” (p.
xi), but it stands as a synthetic overview of the
technologies, systems, and networks devised
throughout America’s history, with explicit emphasis on their societal context. This book succeeds in achieving Pursell’s goals: his many
narratives “de-mythologize technology” (p. xii)
by explaining the development, deployment, adaptation, and social impact of major technologies from colonial times to the present.
The Machine in America uses a chronological
approach to break American history into fifteen
fairly sequential chapters (with some necessary
overlaps) focusing on the technological systems
in each time period. Chapters such as “Importing the Industrial Revolution,” “Creating an Urban Environment,” “The Coming of Science and
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Systems,” and “Our (Un)Wired World” organize and focus the overarching narrative structure by suggesting larger topics that unite the
many smaller stories. Early chapters highlight
how Americans imported European tools and
methods, adapted them to unique American circumstances, and established transportation,
manufacturing, and agricultural infrastructures
that used natural resources first for survival, then
to advance their economies, and finally to compete
with the “Old World.” Later chapters detail America’s development of large, hierarchical, and centralized technological systems that enabled population growth, urbanization, westward expansion,
and an increased American role on the global
stage. The final chapters explore events in the late
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, with an
eye toward the interplay between America’s evergrowing industrial supersystems, national policies,
and the often-decentralized global culture. Science
plays an understandably small role in early parts of
the text, corresponding to America’s initial emphasis on practical technologies resulting from
field experience, but becomes more prominent
when the narrative details the rise of industrial
research and the growing importance of American
universities. Topical coverage throughout The Machine in America is quite remarkable, even in comparison to some of the main texts in this field, and
this second edition covers events up to the present.
The volume’s chronological approach emphasizes the connection and explanation of many
smaller narratives. In Pursell’s masterful hands the
chapters flow in a very readable manner, with
different contemporary technologies juxtaposed
and connected to one another without needless
complexity. Pursell provides minimal detail on the
historical context of each period: relevant wellknown events such as depressions and wars are
briefly mentioned in light of the technologies they
inspired or altered but play a supporting role as
Pursell spotlights the technological narratives. One
of the book’s greatest strengths is the plethora of
gripping images, captions, and quotations that immerse the reader in advertisements, propaganda,
firsthand descriptions, or responses to the technologies of each time period. The microanalyses of
each technology’s development and impact avoid
the pitfalls of oversimplification, whig history, and
technological determinism. Pursell connects technologies to the people who make and use them, as
well as to prevailing ideologies or social movements, often invoking multiple perspectives to illustrate how participants from different ethnic
groups, social or economic classes, and genders
react to the same developments.
The focus on smaller narratives de-emphasizes
major interpretive frameworks or explicit themes

that might suggest connections between the topics
and conclusions in different chapters and help the
nonexpert target audience. The text does flag longterm issues such as America’s ongoing struggle to
define intellectual property policies, problematic
recurring attempts to paint science and technology
as value free and neutral, the role of the state in
technological development, and the changing role
of engineers in societal planning and management;
but these themes would have more resonance if
they received a longer and more coherent treatment or built on existing concepts such as Thomas
Hughes’s theory of large technological systems.
The closest counterpart to The Machine in
America, Ruth Schwartz Cowan’s A Social History of American Technology (Oxford, 1996),
explores fewer technological systems in greater
detail, taking a more thematic and deeper approach at the cost of some content. Merritt Roe
Smith and Gregory Clancey’s Major Problems
in the History of American Technology (Houghton Mifflin, 1997) also covers fewer technologies but offers an array of lengthy primary
sources and scholarly essays on the topics it
does cover. And texts such as James McClellan
and Harold Dorn’s Science and Technology in
World History (Johns Hopkins, 2006) use a
global approach that gives science added emphasis but sacrifices depth of study to achieve
this greater breadth. The Machine in America
splits the difference between these texts: it confines the scope to America, emphasizes technological rather than scientific narratives, and covers a wide span of content at the cost of some
depth.
The Machine in America is tailor-made for
undergraduate history of technology courses,
though it might also serve to broaden the scope
of history of science or general American history courses if instructors are interested in drawing connections between other fields and the
technological and social narratives in this thorough and organized work.
ROBERT MARTELLO
Juan José Saldaña (Editor). Science in Latin
America: A History. Translated by Bernabé
Madrigal. vi ⫹ 256 pp. Austin: University of
Texas Press, 2006.
Until the 1980s, little work on the history of
science in Latin America was available in
English. With the publication of this book, the
editor and contributors hope to bring the historical study of Latin American science to a
wider audience and out of obscurity, to end its
“hidden” or “secret” status (p. 5). Science in
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Latin America: A History, originally published in Spanish in 1996, is edited by Juan
José Saldaña, a prominent historian of science
in Mexico. With essays by renowned scholars
from both sides of the Atlantic, the volume is
organized around an implicit and explicit
challenge to the master narrative of centralized scientific production that privileges European and North Atlantic science, a view
increasingly taken up by historians and social
scientists; but though there is now a significant amount of high-quality scholarship on the
history of science, medicine, and technology
in Latin America, there are still few good
overviews of the subject as a whole. For that
reason alone, the translation and publication
of Science in Latin America: A History is a
good thing for the field. Moreover, its appearance is well timed, given growing interest in
the Atlantic perspective in the history of science and in the circulation of scientific ideas
in general.
The goal of this volume, according to the
editor’s introduction, is not just to make clear
the diverse and vast experience of Latin
American science, but also to recognize how
much is at stake, politically and economically,
for the region. The more people, both inside
and outside of Latin America, who understand
the region’s scientific potential (and often
squandered resources), the more that potential
can be harnessed to the benefit of ordinary
Latin Americans. A concern for the present
and future of Latin America underlies the volume’s scholarly work. Clearly motivated by
this concern, Saldaña states in his introduction, “It is now when scientific efforts must be
increased considerably in order to respond to
the enormous challenges resulting from the
nation’s underdevelopment. This step is necessary for forming a regional or local scientific culture and for continuing to build the
‘ecological niche’ that the science of Latin
America needs. . . . The history of science
must be written to allow the construction of
national scientific capability” (p. 20).
The nine chapters of the volume collectively
emphasize the commonalities in scientific
events and achievements in Latin America
across time and space, but also address the differences in timing, cultural factors, religion, and
policy decisions. The book is somewhat skewed
chronologically toward the early phases of Latin
American science, with an emphasis on the
complex and tense intellectual and political relationships between Spain and its colonies.
(There is also an emphasis on continental Spanish America, with relatively little material on
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Brazil and the Caribbean.) Thus the first five
chapters focus on the colonial period, independence, and the new republics. The remaining
chapters consist of overviews of scientific trends
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The
final chapter, a brief but thought-provoking essay by Regis Cabral, serves as a conclusion.
These essays have been edited so that they are
uniform in quality, though they vary in format.
A provocative chapter by Xavier Lozoya excavates indigenous medical concepts of the sixteenth century. Saldaña provides a chapter on
the unique features of libraries, journals, universities, gardens, and other scientific institutions in
Enlightenment-era Spanish America. Luis Carlos Arboleda and Diana Soto Arango look at the
reception of Copernican and Newtonian theories
in Latin America. Antonio Lafuente and Leoncio López-Ocón explore unknown scientific expeditions in eighteenth-century Spanish America, especially those sponsored by the church
and local governing bodies. In a chapter on
independence, Saldaña offers an analysis of
the critical role of science and technology in
creating nationalist consciousness. A chapter
by Emilio Quevedo and Francisco Gutiérrez
documents the influence of French, Dutch, and
other non-Iberian medical schools in the creation of public health systems in Latin America
in the nineteenth century. Hebe M. C. Vessuri
provides an overview of the rapid professionalization and institutionalization of science in the
century after 1880. Marcos Cueto then offers a
chapter on twentieth-century biomedical science, a version of his well-known work on “excellence in the periphery”—a theory that has
forced historians of science to rethink the nature
of scientific production. Finally, Cabral’s concluding essay ties this broadly conceived volume together by asking questions that really
matter, such as how we should envision the
future of Latin American science. He concludes
that the region will be free to develop science—
and itself—“only if Latin America controls its
own past, its own history, the necessary tool for
equal relations” (p. 253).
On the whole, Science in Latin America: A
History is more concerned with the history of
ideas and institutions than with a cultural and
social analysis of science. While the book
provides valuable information (and is a vital
reference text, given the scarcity of published
work on the topic), its emphasis on institutional history means that it is removed from
the actual outcomes of scientific activity. It
also means that the book does not take advantage of much of the cutting-edge research on
the history of science, medicine, and technol-
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ogy in Latin America of the last ten to fifteen
years, especially that which incorporates
questions of social and cultural history. Thus,
factors such as gender and, to a lesser extent,
race and class are largely absent from these
essays. Nonetheless, the book remains indispensable for students and scholars interested
in learning more about the complex, fascinating, and underappreciated history of Latin
American science.
JULIA RODRIGUEZ
Raffaella Simili (Editor). Scienza a due voci.
(Biblioteca di Nuncius, 50.) xix ⫹ 372 pp., figs.,
index. Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 2006. €38 (paper).
Valeria P. Babini; Raffaella Simili (Editors).
More Than Pupils: Italian Women in Science at
the Turn of the Twentieth Century. (Biblioteca
di Nuncius, 63.) xviii ⫹ 216 pp. Florence: Leo
S. Olschki, 2007. €24 (cloth).
“Notwithstanding all the dreams of theorists,
there is a sex in minds.” So opens Scienza a due
voci [The Two Voices of Science] (p. vii), a
collection of biographical essays that grew out
of a series of seminars and workshops organized
by the University of Bologna several years ago
under the direction of the science historian Raffaella Simili. The aim of this book, as Simili
announces in her introduction, is to enhance the
visibility of a number of women astronomers,
mathematicians, chemists, and engineers whose
contributions were mostly unsung in their time
and in some instances have remained so. Taken
together, these fourteen essays cover a wide
swath of European cultural and social history
and a rich range of topics relating to the relationship between women and the pursuit of science from the mid-seventeenth to the midtwentieth century, with an emphasis on Italy,
France, and England. The contributors include
Alan Cook, Massimo Mazzotti, Marta Cavazza,
Marco Beretta, Kathryn Neeley, Soraya Boudia,
Joan Mason, and Sandra Pàttaro, and there is an
essay by Paola Govoni surveying the extensive
literature relating to the history of women in
science both in America and elsewhere.
Several of the essays profile women who
worked in collaboration with members of their
family: the astronomers Elizabeth Hevelius
(1647–1693) and her husband, Johann Hevelius;
the mathematicians Grace Young (1868 –1944)
and her husband, William Henry Young; the
criminal anthropologists Gina LombrosoFerrero (1872–1944) and her father, Cesare

Lombroso. Others examine the absence of a
support group, as in the case of the physical
chemist and crystallographer Rosalind Franklin;
or the reverse, as exemplified by the significant
population of women researchers in the Curie
Laboratory of the Radium Institute of the University of Paris between 1904 and 1934. (Soraya
Boudia points out in her essay on the Curie
Laboratory that the relative abundance of
women there is explained by the fact that work
on radioactivity was new and less institutionalized
and therefore the field was more accessible.)
In all instances, the biographical essays follow the development of these women as scientists in parallel with their personal histories,
which were often troubled and constrained by
official rules and conventional ways of thinking.
All had curious minds; for them, science was a
calling, not a hobby or a way to fill up free time.
It was a passion, for which they had real gifts
and substantive abilities, as Simili’s extended
essay on Mary Somerville, the Scottish science
writer and polymath (and the target of the line
from William Whewell quoted at the beginning
of this review), makes abundantly clear. Often
they were steered to science by an unusual education, with the crucial help of enlightened
family members who favored their studies. And
just as often they were supported in their careers
by male figures, such as fathers or husbands.
Their value was sometimes recognized—although never at the level of their male colleagues— by the scientific community and by
open-minded public figures of their time; for
example, Pope Benedict XIV recognized the
talent of the eighteenth-century mathematician
Maria Gaetana Agnesi by appointing her an
honorary lecturer at the University of Bologna.
However, more formal honors, such as memberships in the most prestigious scientific societies,
often eluded them.
Male dominance in these women’s environments often meant that they had to fill atypical
roles and spaces, and indeed they showed creativity and pragmatism in carving out niches of
their own where they could express themselves.
In prerevolutionary France, Marie Anne PaulzeLavoisier learned English and German in order
to translate important scientific treatises for her
celebrated chemist husband; she also assisted
him in the laboratory, keeping the records of his
experiments. Scholars have only recently begun
to study her extensive archive of correspondence and documents.
The exhaustive footnotes listing primary
sources and key secondary publications on the
subject of women in science add to this book’s
value as a reference volume.
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More Than Pupils: Italian Women in Science at the Turn of the Twentieth Century is a
collection of writings on female science students and their teachers, a theme that allows
the nine essayists considerable latitude in telling the stories and experiences of a handful of
exceptional women who battled their families,
the climate of opinion, and the Italian academic system to gain professional acceptance,
autonomy, and in some cases a tenured academic position. Simili views More Than Pupils as a work in progress that “seeks to fill a
gap in the history of Italian women scientists,
and still empty spaces in [Italy’s] scientific
and academic institutions” (p. xii). Her coeditor, Valeria Babini, a historian of the human
sciences, is more interested “in the dynamics
of power between man and woman” and the
psychology underpinning “the growth, intellectual and scientific emancipation of women
in the entourage of a male teacher” (p. xv).
Ambitious and thought-provoking essays follow. Roberta Passione writes about the pathologist Giuseppina Cattani, who graduated cum
laude in medicine from Bologna in 1884, competed unsuccessfully for several university
chairs, and wound up instead, in 1897, as head
of the radiology, morbid anatomy, and bacteriology laboratory at a hospital in Imola, near
Bologna. C. Silvia Roero introduces us to the
mathematician Giuseppe Peano’s clutch of
women students at Turin between 1914 and
1932. Miriam Focaccia analyzes the pupil–
teacher relationship between Cornelia Fabri,
who graduated in mathematics from Pisa in
1891 (the first woman in Italy to graduate in this
field), and Vito Volterra, one of the finest mathematicians Italy has ever produced. True to her
research agenda, Babini contributes a paper on
Gina Lombroso-Ferrero and her father, who is
considered the founder of the science of criminology. Sandra Linguerri considers the case of
the malariologist Giovanni Battista Grassi, of
the University of Rome, and his pupil Anna Foà,
who went on to do research on the grape phylloxera parasite and the silkworm and became a
full professor at the Portici Agricultural College
in 1924. Simili writes about the fiery antiFascist histologist Giuseppe Levi, who held the
chair of human anatomy at Turin from 1919
until 1938 (when the racial laws deprived him of
his university position), and his equally famous
student, the Nobel laureate Rita Levi Montalicini. The spectroscopist Antonio Garbasso
(1871–1933), of the University of Florence, and
his pupil Rita Brunetti share center stage in
Sonia Camprini and Giovanni Gottardi’s essay;
and the story of the freshwater biologist Rina
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Monti-Stella, a professor of zoology and comparative anatomy at Sassari from 1907 to
1915—she was the first woman to obtain a university chair in Italy—is recounted by Ariane
Dröscher. Enrico A. Giannetto tries hard to
make the case that Volterra’s writings between
1915 and 1940 owe much to “the reading, judgments, translations and frequent corrections
made by [Elena] Freda” (p. 113), a mathematical physicist who taught at the University of
Rome from 1924 until her retirement in 1959.
Barred from attending universities in Italy
before 1877, Italian women scientists have generally gotten short shrift from Italian historians
of any ilk, let alone scholars abroad. These two
volumes go a long way toward plugging that
particular gender gap.
JUDITH R. GOODSTEIN
Fred Watson. Stargazer: The Life and Times of
the Telescope. x ⫹ 342 pp., bibl., index. Cambridge, Mass.: Da Capo Press, 2004. $24 (cloth).
As the four hundredth anniversary of the telescope’s invention approaches in 2008, we expect to see numerous articles, books, Web sites,
and activities commemorating its origins, its
evolution, and the discoveries telescopes have
enabled. Many interested readers will profitably
begin with Henry King’s classic The History of
the Telescope (long available as a Dover reprint), but the most important technical source
will be the upcoming English translation of Rolf
Riekher’s Fernrohre und ihre Meister (to appear
as Telescopes and Their Masters, Translated,
Expanded, and Updated, by Thomas Dobbins;
published by Willmann-Bell), an extraordinary
volume that will now reach readers beyond the
former Eastern bloc and the most devoted telescope specialists.
Such references may seem an odd way to
begin a laudatory review of an apparent competitor in the telescope history sweepstakes, but
I do so because Fred Watson’s Stargazer takes a
rather different approach, one complementary to
these (and other) more detail-oriented volumes.
To be sure, Stargazer also includes clear and
accurate descriptions of telescope optics, their
limitations, their improvements, and their increasing size and complexity. Beginners will
find everything necessary to understand how a
telescope works and will enjoy practical examples that illustrate fundamental principles, such
as how the currency of resolution—milliarcseconds— can be understood as the apparent size of
a U.S. quarter (or British pound or Australian
dollar) seen at a distance of 5 kilometers. These
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and other down-to-earth examples, and clear
illustrations, provide helpful ways to understand
basic and more complex concepts.
Stargazer differs from these other volumes in
that Watson has chosen to focus on why telescopes have changed the way they did. His answer: curiosity about the universe (and about
instrumentation itself ) and professional competitiveness have played equally important roles in
pushing the telescope to larger optical elements
that probe ever more deeply into space. Stories
about Tycho Brahe, Galileo, William Herschel,
Joseph Fraunhofer, and other famous figures are
complemented by tales of lesser-known characters and developments associated with them. In
each case, contextual details provide interesting
insights about their motivations, their innovations, and the roles their telescopes played.
The most obvious absence in the volume is
any significant treatment of telescopes made after about 1930. Although more recent telescopes
and their designers make appearances in the first
few pages and once again in the final pages,
those discussions are rather disconnected from
the main story line about the telescopes of the
more distant past. For example, Watson mentions only in passing the topics of segmented
mirrors and mirror arrays or the astonishing,
nearly magical technique of adaptive optics. By
necessity, the types of stories told about recent telescopes would look rather different:
whereas the earlier stories involve individuals
(or partnerships), twentieth-century telescopes involve teams. Telling those later stories would have provided an instructive contrast to the previous ones and shed much light
on the changing technical and social practices
of astronomy. While my personal interests are
certainly served by the stories included, it
does seem a lost opportunity. One can dare to
hope that Watson will tackle the twentieth
century and beyond and tell the rest of the
story he has so nicely started.
Nonetheless, for an engaging introduction
to historical telescopes, I know of no better
place to start. Indeed, Stargazer is the book I
regularly recommend as the best narrative introduction to the history of the telescope.
Watson tells his stories with enthusiasm, supplies sketches when needed, and avoids excessive or unnecessary detail. And all but the
most informed and sophisticated readers will
learn new stories and details. Watson also
includes a good bibliography so that readers
can continue their exploration; some of the
texts he lists are classics (such as the King and
Riekher volumes, where readers can find more
technical details), many are readily available,

and a few will challenge most readers to track
them down. Stargazer will not only engage
readers with diverse levels of interest and
knowledge about telescopes; it may even inspire some of them to make the additional,
and worthwhile, effort to take a look through
one.
MARVIN BOLT
f

Antiquity

James Evans; J. Lennart Berggren. Geminos’s Introduction to the Phenomena: A Translation and Study of a Hellenistic Survey of Astronomy. xviii ⫹ 325 pp., illus., apps., bibl.,
index. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 2006. $49.50 (cloth).
We have from James Evans and J. Lennart Berggren the first English translation of one of the
very few astronomical texts surviving from the
period between Hipparchus of Rhodes (second
century B.C.) and Ptolemy (second century A.D.).
This makes the content of Geminus’s Introduction important for our understanding of a particular period in Greek astronomy. But, as Evans
and Berggren point out in their introduction to
this volume, the form of Geminus’s text is also
interesting: it is essentially a textbook meant to
introduce students to what was for Geminus
contemporary astronomy. While its introductory
nature has for the most part given Geminus
something of a sideline role in modern research
into serious Greek astronomy, Evans and Berggren make a convincing case for why we should
take him more seriously. On the one hand, he is
our best—in some cases our only—source for
some important topics in the history of ancient
astronomy (lunisolar cycles, for example). On
the other, why should we not look at textbooks
more closely? A grand theoretical synthesis like
Ptolemy’s Almagest gives us insight into the
highest levels of astronomical theory, but what
is everyone else up to? How is astronomy
taught? What will more general ancient readers
be interested in? What phenomena, what technical or philosophical concepts can Geminus
take for granted? What does he need to explain?
What myths or errors does he need to dispel, and
how does he go about it? The answers to these
and other questions will give us considerably
more insight into the place of astronomy in
wider Greek culture than we could ever get from
a Ptolemy, and this fact makes Geminus an
interesting and important read.
Evans and Berggren’s book comes in two
parts: a meaty, 110-page introduction to the
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Geminus text and its astronomy, followed by a
translation of the text itself. The astronomical
explanations in Evans and Berggren’s introductory section are exemplary: clear as can be,
thorough, and detailed. They laudably do not
shy away from mathematical explanations
whenever necessary, but their discussion is accessible enough to be useful even to those who
might normally tend to avoid the more technical
ends of ancient astronomy. Specialists will find
much in it that is interesting, and, as Geminus
had intended with his own text, this book will be
a very useful teaching tool (though even more
useful should it come out in an affordable paperback edition). If I had to cavil, my complaint
would be that I have a number of points of
disagreement with Evans and Berggren’s treatment of the ancient astronomical weather “calendars” known as parapegmata— but then these
texts and instruments are perhaps a little too
close to my own heart for me to be fully objective. I do, however, worry that the repetition in
this volume of some of Albert Rehm’s and B. L.
van der Waerden’s mistakes will give them a
second life. I am thinking particularly of the
relationships claimed between parapegmata,
lunisolar cycles, and civil calendars, where
lunisolar cycles are said, for example, to have
been used to “regulate” parapegmata. This simply misunderstands how a parapegma works. So
also the claim (again based on Rehm) that
parapegmata are in the first instance observation
based and essentially theory free (Evans and
Berggren use the word “prescientific”) is dubious. This gripe is perhaps a little too fine tuned
to be a representative comment on their work,
however; and to be perfectly fair, I should say
that there are quite a number of topics handled
in their introduction from which my own book
would have benefited immeasurably.
Two points of particular interest in the introduction are Evans and Berggren’s discussion of
genres of ancient mathematical writing (p. 43 f.)
and their detailed look at issues of what we now
call realism and instrumentalism as applied to
ancient astronomy. They give us a helpful survey of the kinds of topics ancient mathematical
writers took on, in both pure and applied mathematics (though they perhaps have a tendency to
stretch the meaning of the word “genre”). Finally, they give us a welcome and very clearly
argued case for realism in Geminus, with some
interesting and useful discussion of other authors often mistakenly taken for instrumentalists
(Ptolemy, most prominently).
The translation of Geminus’s text is richly
illustrated, interestingly using photographs of
manuscript diagrams as often as possible. It is
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clear and accurate, though it does have a tendency to prefer accuracy over idiom such that
the wording is perhaps more complex than
Geminus’s Greek. A sentence that begins “Said
to be in syzygy are signs that rise from the same
place . . . ” (p. 132) is certainly true to the Greek
word order, but the inverted English reads more
like the highbrow prose of a Ptolemy than the
bare simplicity of Geminus to me. This is not to
say that the translation is not accessible. It certainly is very readable, just perhaps more academic in places than Geminus himself is. But
this “true-to-the-style-of ” question is a very minor quibble in the end. This is an excellent
volume that will broaden our understanding of
Hellenistic astronomy, its genres, its audiences,
and its contexts.
DARYN LEHOUX
David L. Thurmond. A Handbook of Food
Processing in Classical Rome: For Her Bounty
No Winter. (Technology and Change in History,
9.) x ⫹ 294 pp., illus., bibl., index. Leiden: Brill
Academic Publishers, 2006. $138 (cloth).
David Thurmond’s new book is the latest addition to Brill’s series on Technology and Change
in History and the second volume in it devoted
to food technology. While the earlier book was
my more broadly focused treatment, Ancient
Food Technology (Brill, 2001), Thurmond focuses on food processing in the Roman world
between the first century B.C. and the second
century A.D. He details the science of food processing, emphasizing not only the why and the
mechanics of how Romans processed their food
but also explaining the underlying scientific
principles in clear prose suitable for a broad
audience. His book is both a scientific commentary on the ancient sources—particularly the agricultural writers, Cato, Varro, and Columella—
and an illustration of, if not scientific
knowledge, then certainly the practical bent,
bordering on the ingenious, that Romans displayed in processing their foods for storage,
transportation, and later consumption.
In his brief introduction Thurmond discusses
microbes and their often deleterious effects on
foods, which necessitate processing. He defines
the goal of food processing as the creation of
microenvironments to provide biological stability in foods where it is lacking and to make
palatable many naturally stable foods that are,
nevertheless, otherwise indigestible (p. 10).
Thurmond organizes his book into six chapters,
each one devoted to food processes specific to a
particular category of food, beginning with the
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Mediterranean “triad” of cereals, olives, and
grapes and continuing with discussions of legumes, vegetables, and fruits, animal byproducts, and condiments. While most of his
choices of processes for discussion are clear,
some are not. So, for example, threshing of
cereals, harvesting of grapes and olives, cleaning of olives, and warehousing of olives prior to
processing have, I think, more to do with agriculture than with food processing. The bibliography, while helpful, has some prominent omissions, such as K. D. White’s Greek and Roman
Technology (Cornell, 1984) and Jean-Pierre
Brun’s four recent volumes on the archaeology
of wine and oil (Errance, 2003–2005). These
omissions point up one of the weaknesses of
Thurmond’s otherwise useful book. While providing full coverage of the literary sources for
food processing, he is less successful in integrating the archaeological material. So, for example,
he omits discussions of butchery of meat and
beer production, presumably because evidence
for them is almost entirely archaeological. He
augments his text with footnotes, an easy-to-use
index, and thirty-two figures of fair to very good
quality. A few photographs of at least some of
the processing equipment or physical remains
would have been helpful.
Thurmond is at his best in making sense of the
often complicated, vague, and frequently incomplete descriptions of food processing by ancient
writers and in explaining them in terms of modern
scientific knowledge. He frequently goes beyond
mere description both by fleshing out an ancient
author’s incomplete discussion with comparative
modern methods and by using modern scientific
knowledge to posit answers to questions raised by
the ancient source. So, for example, I found particularly interesting his hypothesis on the origin of
the apparent Roman aversion to crushing olive pits
in their mechanical crushers (p. 90) and his discussion of the use of gum arabic to seal the inside
of terracotta olive oil containers (p. 108). Occasionally he perhaps goes too far, as when— on the
basis of recent practice— he posits the fermentation of pickled olives, for which no ancient evidence exists (p. 182). On the whole, however, he is
careful and judicious in identifying modern parallels with ancient methods.
Thurmond can at times be inconsistent and
occasionally betrays some misconceptions. He
exhibits a certain chronological looseness, for
example, with his references—without comment—to works of ancient authors, such as Palladius and the author of the Geoponica, who
lived outside of his chosen chronological period;
and he misconstrues how one cooks with the
Roman clibanus (pp. 64 – 65). But these (and

others) are slight cavils about a work that has
much to commend it.
Thurmond makes a valuable contribution to a
much-neglected aspect of the ancient world. His
obvious delight in the subject matter comes
across on every page of a work that is clearly
and engagingly written for an audience of both
scholars and informed general readers.
ROBERT I. CURTIS
f

Middle Ages and Renaissance

H. L. L. Busard. Campanus of Novara and
Euclid’s Elements. 2 volumes. (Boethius, 51.)
768 pp., figs., bibl. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2005. €115 (cloth).
Between 1255 and 1259, Campanus of Novara
(b. first quarter of thirteenth century, d. 1296)
produced an edition with commentary of Euclid’s Elements, based largely on Adelard of
Bath’s translation from the Arabic as modified
in Robert of Chester’s version of the same.
Campanus’s reworking of Euclid had the distinction of being the most widely read rendition
of the Elements from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century (when printed editions were
made from the recovered Greek texts); it is also
the first printed edition of Euclid, put out by
Erhard Ratdold in Venice in 1482.
It is therefore surprising that this Euclidean
medieval text has remained unedited until now.
Fortunately, Hubertus L. L. Busard, the doyen
of editors of the medieval Euclid (he has edited
all three known Latin translations of the Elements from the Arabic and the direct translation
from the Greek, as well as other versions and
compilations of the work), has now accomplished this task in the two-volume work under
review. It is a credible, convincing job, of the
kind we have become accustomed to see from
this scholar from Venlo. Campanus’s commented edition of the Elements, extant in more
than 130 manuscripts—a fact that bears witness
to its great popularity—is, like other medieval
geometrical treatises, primarily concerned with
matters of logical consistency, the quality of the
argument (and not, chiefly, its content), the form
and character of the proofs of the various propositions, their mutual dependency (as corollaries
and converses, among other things), their place
in the Elements as a whole, and their appositeness in other areas of learning. Campanus’s definitions are those of the so-called Adelard II
version, now ascribed to Robert of Chester,
while his proofs seem to be independent of Robert’s. Campanus’s additions to the Euclidean
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text are meant to make the Elements as selfcontained as possible, striving to inscribe the
work into contemporary mathematics by drawing in his additiones on Jordanus’s Arithmetica,
Anaritius’s commentary on Euclid, and both Johannes de Tinemue’s version and the direct
translation of the Elements from the Greek.
Busard’s edition is presented in two volumes.
The first contains a short preface and an introduction, covering fifty-two pages, that surveys
the Arabic–Latin and Greek–Latin translations
and their derivatives and also contains a brief
biographical note, an inventory of the works
ascribed to Campanus, and a list of the manuscripts and of the editio princeps used in the
preparation of the text. This is followed by the
established text of the Elements. The second
volume is devoted to the notes and commentaries, bibliography, and critical apparatus.
Campanus of Novara and Euclid’s Elements
is, as already stated, a solid work of scholarship.
Still, it could be better. To begin with, from the
131 extant manuscripts of the work, Busard
chose, sensibly enough, the two oldest (F, a
Florence manuscript of 1259; and N, a Columbia University manuscript of uncertain date, perhaps as early as 1261 but possibly as late as
1300) and P, the editio princeps of 1482, which
he fully collated. (N was chosen because it may
be the copy handed over by Campanus to
Jacques Pantaléon, the future Pope Urban IV.)
He also occasionally consulted eight further
manuscripts. No attempt was made, however, to
establish a stemma codicum. Dismissing the
need for a stemma, somewhat cavalierly, with
the remark that “131 manuscripts of Campanus’
version in [sic] Euclid’s Elements are known.
Thus it was impossible to collate them” (p. 46)
is too expedient an answer to be acceptable. The
same kind of approach is displayed in dealing
with the diagrams: “It was not possible to give
variants of the figures in the various redactions
[!]. The figures in the text are based on those in
F, but I have drawn the figures more in conformity with the text” (p. 51). Historians of mathematics (e.g., Reviel Netz) have recently begun
to pay increased attention to the role and evolution of the diagrams in mathematical texts, an
attention that pays off nicely in a better understanding of the character and transmission of the
texts. Also, Busard’s criteria for inclusion of
variants in the critical apparatus are, to my taste,
too lenient, as too many potentially significant
readings are therewith excluded. Finally, the
rather lean introduction, which is otherwise
competent and up to date, contains a number of
what seem to me arbitrary, unjustified assertions: “I doubt whether the assumption of John
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Murdoch that a single translator [from the
Greek] has made the version of the Elements is
correct” (p. 31); Why? “It is plausible to suppose that Campanus derived the following enunciations from either Jordanus or from Anaritius”
(p. 33); Why plausible? Did he or did he not
derive them from either of the two? These examples should suffice. Moreover, the English of
the introduction is sometimes stilted, though, as
a rule, it is correct.
To sum up, Busard’s Campanus of Novara
and Euclid’s Elements fulfills a long-standing
desideratum for a scholarly edition—though,
alas, not a fully critical one— of the most important medieval and early Renaissance Euclidean text. For this, historians of mathematics are
in Busard’s debt.
SABETAI UNGURU
Piero Falchetta. Fra Mauro’s World Map.
(Terrarum Orbis: History of the Representation
of Space in Text and Image, 5.) 829 pp., illus.,
apps., bibls., CD-ROM. Turnhout, Belgium:
Brepols Publishers, 2006. €110 (cloth).
Fra Mauro’s world map, one of the most valuable pieces now held in the Biblioteca Marciana
in Venice, is a depiction of the known world of
its time, annotated with a vast assortment of
information. It was composed in the middle of
the fifteenth century by Fra Mauro, a monk with
a great reputation as a man of science, who lived
and worked in the monastery of St. Michele of
Murano in the Venetian lagoon.
Fra Mauro’s World Map, a bulky volume
dedicated to this monument of cartography, is
organized into several sections. After an introduction by Marino Zorzi, the director of the
Biblioteca Marciana, the first part presents an
in-depth discussion of historical, scientific, and
philological issues related to the map, mainly as
they pertain to interpretation of text and inscriptions, and of its more significant innovations.
This critical section concludes with a complementary essay about the pictorial decoration of
the planisphere, written by Susy Marcon, that
offers new arguments in favor of a possible
attribution of the corner scene of the earthly
Paradise to Leonardo Bellini.
The central part of the volume (560 pages)
provides a complete transcription of the map’s
inscriptions (nearly three thousand in number)
in the original Italian, as well as offering an
English translation and a commentary. The three
appendixes that follow present a comparison
with the inscriptions on the Borgia Map, an
index to the key words on the map, and an index
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of the rivers on the map. Finally, after bibliographies listing manuscript and printed sources, a
few pages present the operating instructions for
the CD-ROM that accompanies the book, which
allows for cross-consultation of text and images.
The book’s intended readership is a very specialized one, although by making the rich information embodied in the inscriptions more generally available the volume may also invite
attention from a wider audience.
The reason for undertaking such a painstaking
enterprise is that Fra Mauro’s world map, although recognized as a work of primary importance—it is mentioned as such in all histories of
geography and has been widely reproduced in a
small format—is not very well known or understood. It has been thought of—and gazed at—
more as a monument in the history of cartography than as a work that would repay critical
attention. The first and only serious study of the
map, written by Placido Zurla and widely discussed by Falchetta, dates back to 1806.
Falchetta’s study aims to provide answers to a
number of questions concerning the content of
the pictures, the kind of geography the map
depicts, the knowledge on which it is based, and
its mastery and presentation of a huge amount of
information; finally—summing up all these
questions—Falchetta seeks to establish whether
Fra Mauro’s work is the mature fruit of a
centuries-old tradition of medieval geography or
heralds the advent of a new kind of geographical
knowledge.
In discussing its sources Falchetta dismantles the map, pointing out how it stands as an
innovative cultural compendium of different
streams of knowledge: cartographic models
the author reinterpreted; oral accounts and
written sources, explicitly quoted by the author himself or generally recognizable; and
even, more simply, the general geographical
information of the moment. Information inherited from the classical tradition is mingled
and integrated with new facts, and Fra Mauro
did not hesitate to contradict Ptolemy whenever he found contradictory evidence in the
new sources. There remains, however, the
question of how he had access to such masses
of data.
The cosmological notes that occupy the
space between the map itself and the borders
of the work deal with subjects like the number
of heavens and the distance of the stars; the
theory of tides and of the continental land
masses; the description of the earthly Paradise; and the theory of the elements and of the
inhabitability of the southern regions. Fal-

chetta points out that in this part of his work
Fra Mauro is very much a traditionalist, channelling his comments within the ideas of the
great classical and medieval auctoritates. In
Falchetta’s opinion, however, this contrast
serves to emphasize even more his experimental position as a geographer and a cartographer and the authentically innovative features
of the map, not bound by any ideological
considerations.
Falchetta’s long and patient work of transcription and interpretation has accomplished,
first, the valuable achievement of making every
single part of this complex artifact accessible to
scholars and future researchers. Just as important, drawing attention to this “neglected” (in
terms of the scarcity of scholarly studies) document serves to refute once again a notion that
still persists, though the age of scientific positivism has passed: that the history of geography,
and of cartography, should be understood as the
development from a primitive, prescientific
stage to a scientific stage, based on mathematical models, in which the “exact” and the “measurable” are the pertinent features. From the
point of view of the ideology of scientific
progress, historic maps are subjected to positive
or negative judgments, depending on the degree
to which they approach modern standards; those
that fail to meet such criteria are dismissed as
works of slight scientific significance and acknowledged only—though perhaps with due
reverence—as documents of the more primitive
phase.
It is a mistake to apply modern categories to
Fra Mauro’s map. Falchetta asserts that ancient
maps existed as “autonomous texts in their own
right; due to the synthesis operating within
them, they themselves generated knowledge and
skills. And such knowledge and skills were not
merely the synthesis of components that might
exist independently of each other; their most
efficient manifestation—sometimes their sole
manifestation—lay in their expression within
works of cartography” (p. 22).
The sort of critical-philological approach
adopted by Falchetta seems, at the moment, the
one best suited to the reading and interpretation
of ancient maps. Its limitation is, of course, that
Falchetta has deconstructed Fra Mauro’s map
without providing a new synthesis—if such a
thing is possible. For the synthesis that was
possible in Fra Mauro’s culture, and in his mind,
is forever lost.
LUCIA NUTI

This content downloaded from 132.177.229.130 on February 16, 2018 08:24:25 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

BOOK REVIEWS—ISIS, 99 : 1 (2008)

Chiara Frugoni. Books, Banks, Buttons, and
Other Inventions from the Middle Ages. Translated by William McCuaig. xiv ⫹ 178 pp.,
illus., bibl., index. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003. $19 (paper).
This paperback edition of Books, Banks, Buttons, and Other Inventions from the Middle
Ages is a welcome addition for teaching about
medieval technology, although it may be better
suited for interested relatives than for students.
The work itself is neither groundbreaking in its
scholarship nor encyclopedic in its coverage,
but it does provide a profusely illustrated and
quite readable survey of common material culture deriving from the Middle Ages. When the
introduction rattles off nearly five dozen medieval inventions in just over a page, one might
fear that the volume will try to cover too much
in its mere 150 pages, not including notes. Chiara Frugoni has chosen to divide her book into
six chapters that appear to narrow the scope
somewhat; but then when one reads the chapters, it becomes a whirlwind and somewhat
stream-of-thought tour. What the book most reminded me of is a slimmed-down and heavily
illustrated version of Urban Tigner Holmes’s
densely scholarly look at the material culture of
the high Middle Ages, Daily Living in the
Twelfth Century (Wisconsin, 1952), that somehow got crossed with James Burke’s television
series Connections, where one thing led to another that led to another—and suddenly eyeglasses lead us to book cubicles, Arabic numerals, papermaking, and printing. I very much
appreciate both Holmes’s and Burke’s scholarship and approach, and they stand Frugoni in
good company, even if her book may not manage to be quite as successful in its brief foray
into the topic.
Frugoni’s six sections do not try to break new
ground in terms of textual scholarship, although
she seems fully aware of canonical primary and
secondary sources in her areas of study. The
prose is very fluid, and one would not know that
it was translated from the Italian except for the
preponderance of Italian sayings used to illustrate continuity in our way of interacting with
the world. If nothing else, these offer a welcome
pause for thought in which readers may wonder
how it is that in English we often have different
or even antiparallel embedded cultural references tied to our heritage technologies. Frugoni’s chapters, however, get progressively
shorter, as if her main thrust had been to examine eyeglasses and printing (that treatment runs
to 68 pages) and she then fleshed out what was
too short to be a book by itself with clocks (34
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pages), augmented that with clothing (14 pages),
glossed it all with eating utensils (14 pages), and
then merely garnished the top with military inventions and transport (12 and 6 pages, respectively). My culinary metaphor is purposeful
here, as it would also have been nice had she
included a section on the foods on our tables that
derive from the Middle Ages; regardless, it
would have been best if her later sections had
more evenly balanced the first.
The production of the book is quite lavish,
with approximately as much page space devoted
to large, full-color images of manuscripts, ivories, paintings, and occasional medieval artifacts
as to text. Some of these illustrations will be
familiar to the Anglo-American audience, but
many come from Mediterranean sources and
therefore offer interesting comparisons with
those that might be more familiar. Readers may
even find themselves attending to these images
in more detail than to the narrative, such as it is.
There are a few production flaws, with curiously
situated figure captions in a few places, text
running out of sync with its associated layout of
images, and at least one slightly awkward fullpage mirror image. And one might also quibble
with Frugoni’s willingness to use sixteenthcentury paintings to illustrate medieval material
culture. None of these flaws is damaging to the
work as a whole, but the index, which includes
only persons, omitting both artists and the subjects of illustrations, seems strangely terse in a
book about technology. Given that there are
only about 80 pages of text, it would not have
been that difficult to provide a more thorough
index. Given the somewhat erratic path the text
takes, such an index would certainly have
helped me find that choice fact or reference that
piques my interest as I read through the book.
On the whole, the book is a fast read, an enjoyable browse, and may offer some choice entrées
into source materials the reader could use for
lectures or for conversation. If nothing else, it
will be very useful to hand to relatives who get
that quizzical look when you tell them you teach
about “medieval technology,” which increasingly seems like an oxymoron to the modern
world.
STEVEN A. WALTON
Miguel Ángel Granada. La reivindicación de
la filosofı́a en Giordano Bruno. 285 pp., table,
bibl., index. Barcelona: Herder Editorial, 2005.
€17.79 (paper).
Miguel Ángel Granada’s book explores some
areas of the rich and complex thought of Gior-
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dano Bruno (Nola, 1548 –Rome, 1600), the Italian philosopher who divulged and defended the
Copernican theses and provided them with a
solid theoretical, epistemological, physical, ontological, and theological foundation. Bruno
also explored the consequences of Copernicanism—an infinite universe, material homogeneity
of the universe, innumerable worlds, a multiplicity of “synods” or solar systems like ours,
the existence of innumerable celestial bodies not
visible to simple sight, the habitability of other
worlds, and so on—thereby opening new routes,
and also polemics, for natural philosophy, astronomy, and metaphysics in the late sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries.
Granada is, without doubt, one of the most
important authorities on Bruno, thanks to his
Spanish translations of the Italian works, his
collaborations in the preparation of critical editions (particularly that of Les Belles Lettres),
and, especially, his studies on Bruno and the
cosmology of his era in general.
La reivindicación de la filosofı́a en Giordano
Bruno [The Vindication of Philosophy in Giordano Bruno] deals chiefly with Bruno’s understanding of moral conduct in relation to his
philosophy and, especially, his cosmology. Noting the varied origins of the essays included in
the book, Granada asserts: “all of them constitute, nevertheless, part of a reading and full
interpretation of Giordano Bruno’s work as a
conscious and polemical vindication of Philosophy, in the strong sense that this word possessed in the Greek origins and in the tradition
of the Islamic and Judaic Falsafa, which maintained the Greek idea of Philosophy in a more
strict way than the medieval philosophia in
Christian lands” (p. 45).
The book contains seven chapters (nine,
counting the appendixes). While it is true that all
of them touch the principal matter Granada
specifies, their content is heterogeneous because
of their varying provenance: papers for academic meetings, articles for specialized publications, an entry for the Enciclopedia Bruniana e
Campanelliana. However, the introductory text
and Chapter 1— both explicitly written for this
new publication— establish a common ground.
Some of the chapters are very specialized and
require a certain familiarity with Brunonian
thought for their proper appreciation.
Granada emphasizes several central aspects
of philosophy’s vindication: the specifically
philosophical feature of Brunonian theology,
which excludes dogma from revealed religions;
the moral foundation that necessarily supports
genuine philosophy; philosophy as a necessarily
free activity and the only way to access God; the

need to confront Aristotelian and anti-Christian
polemic (aspects Granada has long emphasized)
in order to purify philosophy of pedantic imposture (pp. 53, 55, 117, 141); and the revaluation
of the “heroic enthusiast” and the accompanying
freedom of the authentic philosopher (p. 223).
An important part of the work comments on
Epicurus, Lucretius, Saint Augustine, Averroës,
Maimonides, Dante, and Erasmus as antecedents of Bruno’s philosophy. Pascal is considered
in light of Bruno’s influence on his thought.
Granada’s treatment of Bruno’s selfassessment is worthwhile, but it might have
given consideration to The Ash Wednesday Supper, where Bruno’s self-valuation is said to be as
a “new sunrise,” or “Mercury,” announcing the
renaissance of genuine wisdom—though this
does not contradict Granada’s treatment of the
question (pp. 62, 107, 188, 224).
Finally, in my view, the most significant contribution of La reivindicación de la filosofı́a en
Giordano Bruno is its analysis of the general
notion of vicissitude (Ch. 7 and App. 1), demonstrating its main task as the explanation of the
motion and change of physical and social reality
(p. 249). This is a matter that has not received
the attention it deserves from other authorities
on Bruno.
ERNESTO SCHETTINO
Katharine Park. Secrets of Women: Gender,
Generation, and the Origins of Human Dissection. 499 pp., illus., bibl., index. New York:
Zone Books, 2006. $36.95 (cloth).
This book is about the religious, cultural, social,
and intellectual meanings of cutting open women’s bodies from the late thirteenth century to
the middle of the sixteenth century in Italy. The
practice of embalming by evisceration (for funerary rituals), the cult of relics, autopsies for
forensic and public health cases, and sectio in
mortua (Caesarean section) had become widespread in Italy by around 1300. What is somewhat surprising is that primary sources for the
dissection of male bodies are scarcer than those
for the dissection of female bodies. This was not
because fewer men were dissected but because it
was thought that there was something to be
gained from dissecting women’s bodies,
whereas male bodies tended to be more familiar
and not particularly interesting. For some, what
was to be gained was proof of sanctity; for
others, dissection was about legitimacy and the
preservation of offspring; and for still others, it
was increasingly about developing expert
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knowledge of the most opaque and difficult organ of the female body.
In the early fourteenth century, Chiara of
Montefalco was found with an image of the
cross in her heart; images of Mary and the Nativity were impressed on three stones found in
Margherita of Città di Castello’s heart. These
“feminized” (p. 68) the model of sanctity already embodied by St. Francis and his stigmata:
while Francis’s stigmata were exterior wounds,
visible from the outside, the proof of holiness
for a woman lay deep inside her body. Female
saints were dissected because women tended to
be associated with the body and men with the
soul or the mind, because women’s porous bodies were more susceptible as vessels of divine
grace, because male writers and confessors felt
the need to demonstrate visible marks of sanctity, and because of the fundamental identification of women’s bodies with the power of generation. Only a female saint could generate a
relic in her body.
In contrast, the majority of women were associated with “secrets,” as knowers (i.e., possessors of knowledge) and the known (i.e., objects of knowledge). Women’s knowledge of the
natural world was experiential (rather than
causal), concrete (as opposed to universal) snippets of therapeutic recipes that were transmitted
orally. Women themselves were also originally
regarded as experts regarding pregnancy and the
uterus, concealed deep inside the body. Lanfranco of Milan and Gugliemo of Saliceto would
concede that something worthwhile could be
learned from such secret knowledge possessed
by women, but they regarded it as ultimately
inferior to the knowledge offered by the newly
emerging academic discipline of medicine. The
latter developed out of an orally transmitted,
artisanal practice into a causal and universal
knowledge based in the studia; it was transmitted in Latin, openly and publicly, through writings. Following Galen, academic physicians believed that anatomy was best mastered through
autopsy and dissection. This anatomy was a
public affair, conducted in lecture halls and publicized in books. Johannes Ketham’s Fasciculo
de medicina (1494) includes the first Italian figure of an anatomized uterus drawn from nature
(“figura dela matrice dal natural”). The hand
gestures of the female figure in the Fasciculo
suggest a modicum of help and instruction from
women about the female body; but twenty-odd
years later, Jacopo Berengario da Carpi dismissed such a need. In his Commentaries on the
Anatomy of Mondino, in which he elevated the
practice of anatomy over and above textual authority, Berengario presented himself as the su-
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preme surgeon and dissector who could reveal
what even women themselves didn’t know
about their bodies.
In practice, also, physicians—now formally
trained and practicing in Italian cities—were
successful in developing their authority and expertise with regard to diseases of female genitals
and reproductive systems, such that they became expert witnesses in cases of contested virginity and legitimacy, while well-to-do women
began to request the presence of medical men in
cases of difficult birth and other gynecological
problems. Indeed, the belief that dissection conducted by a university-trained physician was the
best way to obtain knowledge about the body
was reflected in requests by dying mothers. Bartolomea Dietisalvi, for instance, asked to have
her body opened after her death in order to
determine whether she had consumption; if so,
she hoped that medicine could be given to her
daughters, who would be susceptible to the
same illness. Holy anatomy was also transformed. Instead of producing wonder-working
relics inside the body, female bodies offered up
anatomical evidence for interpretation and confirmation. The postmortem lactation of Elena
Duglioli and the empty stomach of Columba of
Rieti were now seemingly natural matters whose
supernatural causes were to be determined by
medical experts. Gendered associations were
thus removed from holy anatomies, and in the
sixteenth century holy men such as Ignatius
Loyola, Carlo Borromeo, and Filippo Neri began to be dissected.
Andreas Vesalius’s De humani corporis fabrica is an appropriate place to end a history of
“women’s secrets.” The frontispiece shows a
dissected uterus, the ultimate secret and difficult
object of anatomical inquiry. It was the uterus of
a criminal woman who was executed after feigning pregnancy, which midwives had declared
false. Vesalius, by means of dissection, made
the midwives’ conjectural, fleeting knowledge
certain, public, and permanent. Katharine Park
reads the frontispiece as a manifesto of Vesalius’s “imperial” ambitions (he sought, successfully, to curry imperial favor) as well as of his
intellectual program. Vesalius wanted to unify
hands-on dissection and the theoretical physica;
but he also presented himself as a transgressive,
heroic figure, symbolizing imperial domination
and violent control.
Secrets of Women decenters the story of the
rise of dissection and anatomy as an academic
discipline; it resists the simplified readings of
gender relations such as “male, active subjectivity vs. female, passive objectification”; it argues
that various models of generation coexisted; it
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shows the many ways in which the uterus was a
“social” organ (p. 264). It successfully and conclusively shows the centrality of gender analysis
for the history of anatomy, the science of bodies
(p. 38). This book should, once and for all, put
to rest the claim of nineteenth-century historiography (which also flattened the earth for this
period) that there was a widespread taboo in
medieval Europe—religiously or otherwise motivated—about cutting open human bodies.
Those who teach history of medicine, religion, the body, or gender will find this an excellent textbook for undergraduate courses. Its
suggestions, historiography, and methodology
are subtle and rich enough, however, that it
could be used profitably by graduate students as
well. In particular, I hope that our next generation of scholars will take as exemplary Park’s
meticulous and generous acknowledgments to
the work of other scholars, since generosity
never detracts from originality.
SACHIKO KUSUKAWA
Early Modern (Seventeenth and
Eighteenth Centuries)

f

Richard J. Blackwell. Behind the Scenes at
Galileo’s Trial: Including the First English
Translation of Melchior Inchofer’s Tractatus
syllepticus. xiii ⫹ 245 pp., index. Notre Dame,
Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006. $35
(cloth).
William R. Shea; Mariano Artigas. Galileo
Observed: Science and the Politics of Belief.
xi ⫹ 212 pp., figs., bibl., index. Sagamore
Beach, Mass.: Science History Publishing/USA,
2006. $30 (cloth).
More than twenty years ago, Pietro Redondi
lobbed his historiographical Molotov cocktail at
the shrine of the 1633 Galileo trial. Brilliant,
daring, and iconoclastic, Galileo eretico—recently reissued with a new introductory essay
(Einaudi, 2004)— has inspired and infuriated a
generation of historians of science. Redondi’s
central, fascinating, and intensely problematic
document, known as “G3,” was a previously
unknown anonymous denunciation of a virtuoso
passage in Galileo’s Assayer (1623). G3
claimed that Galileo’s atomic matter theory
threatened the Catholic Church’s description of
transubstantiation. Redondi’s reconstruction
maintained that the familiar account of the subject of the trial, whether construed as contradictory cosmoses or personality politics, was in fact
a mere smokescreen, successfully diverting at-

tention from a deeper and more dangerous
charge of eucharistic heresy.
The archives of the Holy Office (now known
as the Congregation for the Doctrine of the
Faith), where G3 resides, opened in the late
1990s; soon after, historians were allowed to
read the rest of volume “EE,” in which document G3 appears. Immediately preceding G3, on
folios 291r–v, is a related document, “EE 291,”
which repeats and develops the charges made in
G3. One of the most problematic aspects for
some readers of Redondi’s book was his attribution of G3’s anonymous denunciation to the
Jesuit Orazio Grassi. What is especially interesting about EE 291 is that, unlike G3, we know
for sure who wrote it.
The author was a Hungarian Jesuit called
Melchior Inchofer (1585–1648). Called to
Rome from teaching duties in Sicily in 1629 to
defend his first (nonscientific) publication before the Congregation of the Index, he seems to
have swiftly befriended powerful Jesuit professors in the Roman College and secured himself
an invitation onto the commission of consultors
to draw up reports in the early stages of Galileo’s trial (his report was the most hostile). At a
later stage he turned against his order, was found
guilty of authoring the infamous anti-Jesuit satire Monarchia solipsorum, was imprisoned, and
may even have been assassinated by his zealous
confreres (see Thomas Cerbu’s essay in Largo
campo di filosofare [Fundación Canaria Orotava
de Historia de la Ciencia, 2001]).
The paradoxical figure of Inchofer is central
to the two works under review. Richard Blackwell, who has previously provided us with excellent accounts of Galileo’s relationship with
Bellarmine and Campanella, here offers a fine
introduction to, and translation of, Inchofer’s
little-known Tractatus syllepticus of 1633.
While the Tractatus sheds little light on the trial
itself, it is a wonderful example of the way in
which some Roman intellectuals, especially Jesuits, sought to provide Urban VIII with an
authoritative statement of philosophical orthodoxy. Relevant sections of another book written
the same year, the Prodromus pro sole mobile,
by Galileo’s sunspot sparring-partner Christoph
Scheiner, S.J., are also included (though much
recent scholarship on Scheiner, especially that
of Franz Daxecker, is not mentioned). Blackwell
provides a concise and readable account of the
trial and Inchofer’s role in it. He clearly traces
the development of anti-Copernican biblical exegesis from Bellarmine to Inchofer, as well as
the hardening of disciplinary divisions and the
forging of interpretive positions (especially Inchofer’s interesting notion of “probable de fide
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truths”). The attempt to impose philosophical
orthodoxy within the Society of Jesus has been
impressively described by Ugo Baldini and Peter Dear; what is important in Behind the Scenes
at Galileo’s Trial is Blackwell’s insistence that
this trend provides us with a central key to
understanding the inner disputes of the Galileo
trial.
The key document EE 291— discovered and
published independently three times in 2001—
is, however, not discussed, and so an opportunity to revisit Redondi’s thesis through the figure of Inchofer is missed. While the relationship
between Inchofer’s antiatomism and his antiCopernicanism would make a fascinating study,
it is a characteristic mark of all Blackwell’s
contributions to the problem of the Galileo trial
that they generously provide the reader with
easy access to hitherto-unexplored contexts and
open up new fields of inquiry.
One of the discoverers of EE 291 was Mariano Artigas, who coauthored Galileo in Rome
(Oxford, 2003) with the distinguished Galilean
William Shea. Whereas that book sought to provide a new perspective on the Galileo trial by
privileging the viewpoint from the Eternal City,
their new collaboration attempts to “demystify”
the episode by taking a series of previous accounts to task. Galileo Observed, published with
the support of the Templeton Foundation, displays its own sympathies in a refreshingly clear
manner, asserting, for example: “In Galileo’s
day the challenge was to find room for a new
form of knowledge (what we call modern science) in a worldview shaped by another way of
knowing, namely religion. The challenge nowadays is to reintroduce this older kind of knowledge into an intellectual context structured by
science” (p. 197). Such conclusions in no way
necessarily follow from the Galileo trial.
The authors’ case studies range from the
works of the familiar nineteenth-century American polemicists John Draper and Andrew Dickson White to a varied yet predictable selection
of recent narratives by authors such as Dava
Sobel, Mario Biagioli, and Annibale Fantoli. On
the way, they take on, and put down, Bertolt
Brecht, Arthur Koestler, and, of course, Pietro
Redondi. Unfortunately, these critiques are, on
the whole, uninspired and repetitive. The historiography of the trial is complex and fraught and
has recently been exhaustively described (up to
and including Pope John Paul II’s “rehabilitation,” at any rate) in Maurice Finocchiaro’s balanced Retrying Galileo, 1633–1992 (California,
2005). Perhaps the most disappointing aspect of
the authors’ approach is their unconvincing attempt to explain away the problematic existence
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of EE 291 and G3 as irrelevant to understanding
the trial, even though the former document was
written by a central protagonist and begs a serious reexamination of Redondi’s hypothesis.
There is much still to understand about Galileo,
even more about Inchofer. The trial is over,
eppur si muove.
NICK WILDING
Neil Chambers. Joseph Banks and the British
Museum: The World of Collecting, 1770 –1830.
Foreword by Michael Dixon. xiv ⫹195 pp.,
figs., table, app., bibl., index. London: Pickering
& Chatto, 2006. $99.95 (cloth).
This work pursues in considerable detail the role
of Sir Joseph Banks in the development of the
collections of the British Museum between the
1770s and the final disposition of the Banks
collections in the years after his death in 1820. It
is informed by a detailed command of the manuscript evidence available from the Banks Papers
(of which Neil Chambers is the editor) and from
the archives of the museum itself.
The first substantive chapter provides an
overview of Banks’s career, especially his travels and his collecting activities, which sets out
the basis and terms of his relationship with the
British Museum—as donor, trustee, and what
Chambers calls “museum agent” (p. 28). Beyond making gifts to the museum from his own
collections, and beyond playing a role in the
management of the museum as a trustee, Banks
informally, but powerfully, shaped the development of the collections by putting his vast networks of contacts and influence at the service of
that task. Subsequent chapters trace the details
of this process for the collections in ethnography, natural history and zoology, the earth sciences, and libraries and antiquities. Those with
an interest in the detailed development of these
various types of collection in the British Museum will find much material of interest and
value.
Important broader themes, of wider interest to
historians of science, are also broached. The
chief of these is the transition from a museum
world built on private collections and private
influence to one in which the British Museum
became a genuinely public institution. This is
the main focus of concern with the “world of
collecting” of the subtitle. Yet, peculiarly, in the
development of this theme there is little substantive reference to, or use made of, the extensive
scholarship on it in recent years. This is true also
so far as interpretations of the career and influence of Sir Joseph Banks are concerned. Indeed,
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there is a strange defensiveness about the approach to Banks. The first words of the introduction state baldly: “No attempt has been made
in this work to enter into the historiography
surrounding Banks” (p. 1). This is both disappointing and also, in an important sense, misleading. The final paragraphs of the conclusion,
and sections littered through the book, do in fact
engage with Banksian historiography, largely
without mentioning names—though to be fair
the last footnote of the conclusion does refer to
Bruno Latour, who is described as a “French
geographer” (p. 170). The lack of direct engagement with what we might call the more adventurous interpretative work on Banks (including,
it must be said, my own) is unfortunate. Direct
engagement is replaced by occasional sniper attacks on unnamed targets. My Jugendwerk on
the “Banksian Learned Empire,” of which the
British Museum was a part, is ignored (except to
replace it by a remarkably similar analysis of
Banks’s ubiquity in what Chambers calls “London Learned Society” [p. 4]). An explicit discussion of differences in the conception and
interpretation of Banks’s networks implicated in
these terms might have been interesting and
productive. My later provocations in deploying
(and distorting) the work of the “French geographer” on “centers of calculation” by estimating the utility of treating Banks as a center in
himself are also ignored, even though much of
the analysis offered in this book appears to be an
argument against the position that I took there—
and, it must be said, an argument not without
point. My concern is not personal. It seems to
me that other writings are similarly treated. Although they do get a mention, the more subtle
interpretations of Banks offered by John Gascoigne, for example, are not thoroughly engaged
with. Such an approach is disappointing in that
an opportunity is missed to develop further the
historiography of the remarkable phenomenon
that was Sir Joseph Banks.
DAVID PHILIP MILLER
Annie Chassagne. La bibliothèque de
l’Académie royale des sciences au XVIIIe siècle.
303 pp., illus., bibl. Paris: Éditions du CTHS,
2007. €37 (paper).
The French Académie Royale des Sciences
(Paris, 1666 –1793) may well be the best-studied
institution in the historiography of science. With
the present work, Annie Chassagne, head conservator of the library collections of the Institut
de France, adds to this rich literature and gives

us pause to rethink how the academy saw its
mission.
Using inventories prepared in 1744, 1765,
and 1784, Chassagne shows that the academy’s
library hardly existed as such before S.-F. Morand began to serve as unofficial librarian in the
1740s. Even then, the academy seems to have
paid little attention to its holdings. Not counting
its own publications, in 1744 the academy’s
“library” held a mere 266 volumes; by 1765 the
total reached 1,000, and it rose to 1,200 in 1784
and then to 1,770 volumes by 1793. The personal libraries of individual academicians and
the libraries of other Parisian and provincial
institutions, discussed by Chassagne in revealing comparisons, greatly exceeded these low
numbers. Dortous de Mairan’s library, for example, held 3,367 volumes, while that of the
Bordeaux academy numbered an astounding
12,000 tomes. These figures raise the question
of what the academy thought of its repository of
books. The academy certainly seems to have
accorded greater importance and space to its
natural history collections and its collections of
machines. Chassagne suggests (p. 69) that the
academy per se did not consider books to be on
the cutting edge of science; but such a view is at
odds with the acknowledged role of the academy as the arbiter and judge of truth in science,
which judgments were then enshrined in its own
publications and those receiving its imprimatur.
This puzzling disjuncture, highlighted by this
volume, deserves further analysis.
Chassagne provides statistics on various aspects of the academy’s collections (scientific
subjects, places of publication, changes over
time) that show a surprising preponderance of
medical works (18 percent). The defining element of this volume is the author’s sustained
emphasis on images and the role of illustrations
in the books and manuscripts she surveys. Hers
is a meditation on the connections between contemporary science and art, and she discusses not
only engravings that accompanied scientific
texts but also design and decorative elements,
such as frontispieces, borders, and tailpieces,
that added to the aesthetic value of contemporary works of science. Necessarily, therefore, La
bibliothèque de l’Académie royale des sciences
au XVIIIe siècle is itself spectacularly illustrated, with ninety well-chosen images taken
from books held by the academy. (The high
production values of this work generally deserve
to be remarked upon.) Engravings were especially important to botanical works and those
concerning machines. The author documents a
tight link between illustration and text and a
movement toward less baroque engravings—
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ultimately recognized as best done from life by
authors themselves or at least under their supervision. In these considerations Chassagne is attentive to interactions between and among authors, artists, engravers, and printers, and she
opens up their world, an essential and too often
unheralded dimension of the production of
knowledge in the eighteenth century.
The second half of the book highlights fortyseven different books and manuscripts, across a
wide range of scientific disciplines, taken from
the academy’s collections. These include publications of the academy itself, those of other
French and European learned societies, translations, and works sent to the academy by its
correspondents or others seeking to ingratiate
themselves. In three or four pages each, using
published and archival sources, Chassagne describes authors, the work in question, its illustrations, the scientific background to the text,
and what is known of its reception within the
academy. Why she chose these texts and not
others is not explained, and what one is ultimately to make of this self-styled “miscellany”
is not clear. Yet the vignettes will be useful to
historians wanting to learn more about the texts
in question, and, more than that, they present a
marvelous tour d’horizon of eighteenth-century
science as it was likely experienced by contemporaries who saw one book appear after another,
without foreknowledge of the place we assign
them in the history of science.
Particularly for its focus on illustrations and
images, this book is a welcome addition to the
library shelf set aside for the Académie Royale
des Sciences, and the issues it raises should
stimulate yet further work and research.
JAMES E. MCCLELLAN III
Desmond M. Clarke. Descartes: A Biography.
xi ⫹ 507 pp., apps., figs., bibl., index. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. $40
(cloth).
Richard Watson, Cogito, Ergo Sum: The Life
of René Descartes. viii ⫹ 375 pp., figs., bibl.,
index. Boston: David R. Godine, 2002. $35
(cloth).
Descartes has been well served by biographers.
In the past sixteen years, besides these volumes
offered by Desmond Clarke and Richard
Watson, William R. Shea produced a scientific
biography (The Magic of Numbers and Motion:
The Scientific Career of René Descartes [Science History Publications, 1991]), Stephen
Gaukroger an intellectual biography (Descartes:
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An Intellectual Biography [Clarendon, 1995]),
and Geneviève Rodis-Lewis a general biography (Descartes: His Life and Thought, trans.
Jane Marie Todd [Cornell, 1995]). Watson, in
carving out a space for his efforts, classifies
previous biographies into a “French Catholic
apologetic” (p. 22) tradition (Rodis-Lewis) and
a “scientific apologetic” (p. 23) tradition (Gaukroger; Shea fits here as well). He would surely
place Clarke in the religious apologetic tradition. He describes his own work as a “skeptical”
biography, because he explodes various myths
about Descartes, such as that he penned a ballet
for Queen Christina of Sweden, La naissance de
la paix [The Birth of Peace]—a myth that goes
back to Adrien Baillet’s first biography of Descartes (1691). And whereas Rodis-Lewis and
Clarke seem intent on preserving Descartes’s
Catholicism in good faith, Watson treats Descartes as “cosmopolitan and pragmatist” (p.
150) about his religion and emphasizes his good
relations with and sympathy for Protestants (pp.
59 – 61).
Cogito, Ergo Sum: The Life of René Descartes is a general biography that pays about
equal attention to Descartes the philosopher and
Descartes the scientist and gives greatest attention to Descartes the man. Some of Watson’s
appreciation of Descartes’s life is conveyed by
recounting his own experiences of Poitou (the
region where Descartes was born and raised),
Ulm and Neuburg (where Descartes’s stoveheated room of 1619 may have been), the Alpine
pass of Mont-Cenis (through which Descartes
traveled to Italy), and towns and cities in Holland, Friesland, and Sweden (where Descartes
died). Like Rodis-Lewis and Clarke, Watson
covers Descartes’s whole life, paying attention
to his family, speculating about where he was
raised (in La Haye with his grandmother or in
Châttelerault with his great uncle), discussing
the suggestion that his relationship with Isaac
Beeckman was homoerotic, and doubting that
he was secretly married to the Dutch Protestant
Helena, the mother of his daughter, Francine. He
tracks settings and events as they interact with
Descartes’s projects and pursuits: his early travels, his later frequent moves within the United
Provinces (primarily the provinces of Holland
and Utrecht), his trips to France, encounters and
disputes with other intellectuals, anatomical observations and vivisections, efforts to ascertain
the Catholic orthodoxy of his metaphysics, the
birth and death of his daughter, quarrels with his
brother over managing his inheritance from their
father, trouble from Calvinist theologians, relations to Princess Elisabeth and Queen Christina,
and the composition and publication of his ma-
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jor works. The close descriptions of these episodes, based on published sources and Watson’s
trips to local libraries, archives, and residences,
are interspersed with Watson’s often entertaining commentary on the state of Descartes scholarship and the question of how to make sense of
this man. The central biographical chapters are
bracketed by Watson’s own philosophical appreciation of Descartes’s scientific and philosophical achievements, including the ways in
which Descartes’s thought continues to shape
debates about the place of the mind in nature. In
these philosophical discussions, Watson reveals
his respect for the Cartesian legacy and his sympathies on the side of materialism.
Descartes: A Biography, like Watson’s volume, is the product of sustained and fruitful research. Clarke characterizes his as the first biography in English to address “the full range of
Descartes’ interests in theology, philosophy, and
the sciences” (p. i). Clarke himself was trained in
Catholic theology, and he brings this knowledge to
bear on Descartes’s discussion of transubstantiation and of free will in relation to predestination
(Clarke finding Descartes’s answers unsatisfactory). Watson also covers Descartes’s engagements with theology, but with a different outlook:
Clarke takes Descartes to be directly interested in
proving the existence of God and the immortality
of the soul in order to fulfill the theological charge
of the Council of Trent to Catholic philosophers,
and he treats his other theological efforts seriously
and finds them wanting; whereas Watson (more
plausibly, in my view) has Descartes presenting
the arguments about God and the soul as a way of
securing foundations for his physics and sees his
other theological engagements as prudential (on
behalf of his metaphysics or defending against the
serious charge of atheism). Clarke’s book, however, is not primarily focused on theological matters, and he covers Descartes’s life and the circumstances of his philosophical and scientific
publications in great detail. He is less kind to
Descartes in some cases. Whereas Watson (as
Rodis-Lewis) believes that Descartes formed a
strong emotional attachment to his daughter and
was shaken by her death, Clarke paints a cooler
picture (p. 134). At the same time, he adds a new
fact to the story, revealing (courtesy of private
communication from Jeroen van de Ven) that Descartes later served as witness at Helena’s wedding
in 1644 and may have provided money to support
the marriage (pp. 135–136). Clarke portrays Descartes as “a reclusive, cantankerous, and oversensitive loner” (p. 180), a judgment with which
Watson only partly agrees (comparatively showing sympathy toward Descartes in his fallout with
Beeckman). No less than Watson, though perhaps

less openly, Clarke permits himself to speculate, as
when he suggests that Descartes’s discussion of
prenatal mental states (an extension of his detailed
theory of the passions or emotions) simply reflects
his own postnatal memories of his wet nurse rather
than “reliable medical research” (p. 10) or presents
as established fact that Descartes did not receive
the approbation of the Sorbonne (pp. 205–206), as
he asserted on the title page of the first edition of
the Meditations (1641). There are some odd
lapses, as when Clarke baldly states that there is no
indication prior to 1640 that Descartes “was remotely persuaded by skeptical doubts about the
possibility of knowledge” (p. 189). This is doubly
odd, for it appears to ignore the opening paragraphs of Part 4 of Descartes’s Discourse on the
Method (1637), which introduce skepticism based
on dreaming, and it suggests that Descartes actually was persuaded of a skeptical threat after 1640,
as opposed to his merely raising a more radical
doubt in the Meditations than he had in the Discourse so that he could make more metaphysical
hay through the instrument of his method of radical doubt. All said, Clarke’s careful and thorough
work is a welcome contribution.
Although each author describes the circumstances in which Descartes published his various
works and gives some characterization of their
contents and of Descartes’s aim in composing
them, neither enters into detail regarding their contents or results. For exposition of the scientific
content of Descartes’s works, especially, one
should turn to Shea or Gaukroger— or to more
specialized studies. Clarke provides a useful map
and table of where Descartes lived and when. Each
work has a modest but useful bibliography.
Clarke’s index is meager, Watson’s extensive. The
corrected paperback edition of Watson’s work
(which appeared in September 2007) is preferred.
Historians of science who are interested in
Descartes’s biography, as opposed to his scientific biography in particular, will be well served,
in different ways, by these two works. Clarke’s
is a more standard biography, Watson’s more
personal. There is much to learn from each.
GARY HATFIELD
Anne Ashley Davenport. Descartes’s Theory
of Action. (Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History, 142.) xvii ⫹ 310 pp., bibl., index. Leiden:
Brill Academic Publishers, 2006. $129 (cloth).
This is not the first book to deal with Descartes’s
religious convictions, but despite some limitations and questionable interpretations, it is one
of the best. Anne Davenport’s primary focus is
on Descartes’s development of the ego and its
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relation to God’s infinity. The action in the title
refers to the activities of mind and how the ego
must come to conceive itself through God.
The main limitation, and strength, is simply
that most of the book consists of an intensive
reading of Descartes’s Meditations. This reading is sandwiched between some quite provocative, insightful discussions of Descartes’s relation with Abbé Bérulle and his presumed
reliance on Francis of Sales (the latter motif
continues off and on, most usefully, through the
reading of the Meditations) and some limited
references to Descartes’s religious comments in
his letters to Elizabeth.
However, there are sparse references to Descartes’s later works, from the Principles of Philosophy (1644) onward. This makes one wonder
whether Descartes retained such religious convictions in his later life. The same themes do not
seem to play a large role in the Principles. This
raises the possibility that though he may have
been sincere in the Meditations, he later changed
his mind about the importance of such reflections; alternatively, he may have been constructing the Meditations in a quite deliberate way in
order to curry favor with the theologians.
I have one serious problem with Descartes’s
Theory of Action. Though the scholarship is
excellent and the reading is quite detailed and,
for the most part, a worthy interpretation of the
Meditations, I often could not tell when the
author is approving of Descartes’s arguments
and believes that they are good or even plausible
and when she is just reporting what his position
is. Her style is frustrating in this respect, especially when it comes to importing certain anachronisms as expository tools.
At times Davenport says the strangest things
as though they should be obvious to all her
readers. Consider, for example, “Incomprehensibility, in the limit when logical possibility is
infinite, necessary Truth necessarily exists” (p.
165). This is written toward the conclusion of
discussion of God’s infinity relating to the ego’s
finitude. About human knowledge of infinity she
earlier writes: “By conceiving of reality logically as a quantitative progression, the ego
‘manifestly knows’ that there is ‘more reality in
an infinite substance than in a finite substance.’
Manifeste intelligo: the positivity of the infinite
signified by the name of God is evident to the
ego because the ego has framed for itself an
infinite structure in which one and the same
abstract quantity progresses from zero, through
an open-ended series of finite degrees, to infinity” (pp. 161–162). This suggests that humans
do have content for their concept of infinity and
that said content is set theoretic in character. At
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one point she even cites Paul Halmos’s classic
text on naive set theory (p. 160). This is anachronistically strange. Yet then she goes on to
explain how there really is no content to human
knowledge of infinity: “Finite perseity, starting
with the ego’s own self subsistence, now appears to be limited, relative, imperfect—analogous to God’s perseity, but in such an infinitely
lower order as to lose its essential meaning.” Or
again: “The ego knows now that the idea of
infinite substance is valid and knows that its
content is incomprehensible” (p. 162). Yet, she
concludes, “since the paradigmatic case of perseity . . . is, as such, incomprehensible to the
finite ego, only the logical (or mathematical)
term at infinity remains clear and distinct” (p.
163). So set theoretic intuitions and logical necessity are part of Descartes’s philosophy? I
must admit to finding this an odd way to get
some content for infinity. But then the topic of
God’s infinity and its role in finite human understanding is not, in general, one that lends
itself to pellucid prose.
Despite these reservations, I strongly recommend this book to anyone who wishes to delve
into the depths of Descartes’s religious thoughts
and read about some of its contextualization.
Davenport makes a convincing case that you
cannot understand the Meditations unless you
take that leap.
PETER MACHAMER
Larrie D. Ferreiro. Ships and Science: The
Birth of Naval Architecture in the Scientific Revolution, 1600 –1800. 441 pp., illus. Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 2007. $45 (cloth).
The Oxford English Dictionary now defines
“naval architecture” as the planning or design of
ships and the superintendence of their construction. Historically, the term emerged in the late
1500s to describe a new approach to the design
and construction of warships, organized around
the use of three-view, architectural-style plans.
Ships and Science gets off to a shaky start
with a strange definition of “naval architecture”
as the application of scientific theory to ship
design, the theory in question being that developed by various European savants in the eighteenth century and generally referred to as “naval science” in England, after the title of a book
by Leonhard Euler.
In light of the dictionary and historical definitions of “naval architecture,” readers may note
a certain confusion as to the subject matter here.
It can’t be the “birth” of a naval architecture that
already existed. It might be naval science, but
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this is confused with naval architecture as a
whole. It might be naval architecture, but theory
is only a small part of that subject. Muddying
the waters still further, the prologue gives a
detailed account of the doings of the French
scientist Pierre Bouguer up to 1744, when he is
described as “ready to bring the laws of naval
architecture down from the mountain” (p. 22).
This makes it seem that Bouguer is the subject
of the book, and he is certainly its theory-hero,
but this is not his biography.
Bouguer? Naval science? Naval architecture?
Larrie Ferreiro seems to have been unable to
choose one or the other of these subjects and
arrange his material accordingly. The result is a
disorganized book that contains an excessive
amount of extraneous material.
The nature of the problem is apparent in the
preface. If this were a biography of Bouguer,
then biographical details would definitely belong. If the subject is naval science, then we
don’t really care what Bouguer and his colleagues and their mistresses were doing in the
mountains of Peru on a geological expedition
for several years. Similarly with the first chapter: if the subject is naval science, then this
chapter should have described the problems in
shipbuilding that naval science was supposed to
solve. Instead, it’s filled with a hodge-podge of
often mischaracterized, seemingly irrelevant information about the number of ships in various
European navies, the use of cannon, the line of
battle, and ship models, along with mention of
the use of plans, a few words about early treatises on naval architecture, and so on.
Naval science is indeed the focus of the
book’s three main chapters. The first deals with
mathematical theories relating to the maneuver
and masting of ships. The second deals with
theories of ship resistance. The third deals with
theories of ship stability (that is, the ability of
ships, when inclined, to return to the upright
position). Mathematical theories of maneuver
are not usually considered part of naval science,
and theories of masting are not traditionally
thought to be part of naval architecture. So the
author may have done good service here by
drawing attention to conceptual relations between these topics, just as he has done good
service in bringing together a large number of
French citations for the English-speaking
reader.
Regrettably, each of the three main chapters
suffers from the same combination of odd organization and extraneous material. One might
think, for example, that a chapter on maneuver
should start with a discussion of maneuver. It
starts instead with a history of the Jesuits. The

chapter on resistance contains a completely unnecessary discussion of Cartesian vortices, as
well as several other apparently irrelevant aspects of the Scientific Revolution. Two-thirds of
the way through the chapter on stability there is
suddenly a discussion of Robert Merton’s theory
of simultaneous invention. And so on.
The structural oddity of the book is rounded
out by a very peculiar fifth chapter that, after
repeating biographical details given earlier, literally lists the tables of contents of the “great
books” of naval architecture already discussed
in the text (more than once). The last chapter
purports to describe the professionalization of
various European navies in the nineteenth century as if maybe this was the subject. The epilogue completes the biography of Bouguer
abandoned after the prologue.
The main problem caused by the inclusion of
all this material is that not enough time, space,
or effort has been devoted to an explanation of
the actual science. Too-ready recourse is had to
the calculus, as if writing out equations is the
main work of the historian. Too little attention is
paid to conceptual underpinnings. The diagrams
are particularly unhelpful. They are generally
not accompanied by any explanation.
In the end, it’s clear that Ferreiro has done an
enormous amount of reading and made a great
many notes. Alas, it seems he could not bring
himself to leave any of them out.
DAVID MCGEE
Erica Fudge. Brutal Reasoning: Animals, Rationality, and Humanity in Early Modern England. x ⫹ 224 pp., figs., index. Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 2006. $45 (cloth).
Brutal Reasoning explores the role of nonhuman
animals— both real and symbolic—in the evolution of early modern ideas about what it was to
be human. According to Erica Fudge, animals
provided the essential foil against which preCartesian philosophers, theologians, and literati
defined and delineated the boundaries of humanity. So much so, she claims, that “without animals, humans would not only lose companions,
workers, sources of food, clothing, and so on;
they would lose themselves” (p. 36). Secondarily, Brutal Reasoning also attempts to redress
what the author rightly sees as a sort of historical cover-up: a marked tendency within the
humanities to ignore or make figurative the animals that were widely referred to in early modern texts. By bringing these animals back into
focus, Fudge seeks not only to enrich historical
analysis of the period but also to introduce new
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ways of conceptualizing humans and their place
in the world.
The book comprises seven chapters, each of
which covers a different aspect of the debate.
Chapter 1 focuses on the so-called discourse of
reason—that is, the relatively single-minded efforts of early modern thinkers to establish the
distinctiveness and superiority of humans over
other animals on the basis of the latters’ supposed lack of rationality. Initial attempts to uphold this orthodoxy, however, soon ran into a
range of conceptual problems (addressed in Chs.
2–5). For instance, if “human” is defined by the
possession of a rational soul, what is the status
of a young child who is clearly lacking in reason? In short, when does a human become human? Upon conception? At birth? Or at some
other point in biological development? In which
case, does humanity emerge naturally as a person matures, or does it require cultivation via
education? Conversely, if children are like animals, then it follows logically that animals are
like children; and if so, should they not therefore
be entitled to a comparable level of ethical treatment? Such paradoxes were further accentuated
by occasional examples of unusually sagacious
animals. Fudge dedicates an entire chapter to the
case of “Morocco the Intelligent Horse,” an
early version of Clever Hans, who baffled and
intrigued sixteenth- and seventeenth-century audiences with his apparent reasoning abilities and
whose cognitive capacities were still the subject
of philosophical discussion more than a century
after his death (reputedly at the hands of the
pope in Rome, where the horse and his master
may have been burned as witches). Chapter 6 is
dedicated to the writings of René Descartes and
their influence (or lack thereof ) on contemporary English thought. This, and the concluding
chapter that follows, provides one of the best
summaries of Cartesian ideology and its historical impact that I have ever read. The gist of
Fudge’s argument is that, by clearly separating
the animal automaton from the rational, human
“self,” Cartesian dualism not only gave moral
legitimacy to human “dominion” over nature
and other animals; it also effectively eliminated
animals from future philosophical discussions
concerning the nature of humanity. In the traditional discourse of reason, being human was a
relative concept that depended on the extent to
which one was able or willing to transcend animality through the exercise of reason. To Descartes, being human was an absolute distinction,
and any reference to, or comparison with, other
animals was simply misguided anthropomorphism.
Brutal Reasoning is not without flaws. The
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historical confines of the book are narrow, and it
might have been enhanced by more discussion
of medieval precursors to the early modern debate. However, the author provides a compendious and helpful bibliography of both primary
and secondary sources that offers the reader
ample guidance on where to look for supplementary information. Although thoroughly articulate, the text may be too dry for some tastes,
and the subtitle of the book is a trifle misleading
given that Fudge devotes nearly as much space
to the seminal influence of leading French thinkers—Montaigne, Charron, and Descartes—as
she does to the English ones. Despite these minor criticisms, Brutal Reasoning is a valuable
reappraisal of the early modern period and an
important contribution to the growing field of
human-animal studies. More to the point, perhaps, it also speaks directly to current debates in
cognitive ethology, evolutionary psychology,
and moral philosophy, where the animal/human
boundary has once again become a hotly contested territory.
JAMES A. SERPELL
Stéphane Garcia. Élie Diodati et Galilée: Naissance d’un réseau scientifique dans l’Europe du
XVIIe siècle. Preface by Isabelle Pantin. (Bibliothèque d’Histoire des Sciences, 6.) xix ⫹ 448
pp., figs., apps., bibl., index. Florence: Leo S.
Olschki, 2004. €46.
Élie Diodati et Galilée is a three-part work detailing some of the intellectual activities of Élie
Diodati, one of the two personages named in the
title of Stéphane Garcia’s book. The significance of Galileo does not have to be defended
for readers interested in the history of science,
but that of Diodati, an “obscure satellite” orbiting Galileo’s “exploding star,” does. Garcia provides a detailed intellectual biography of Diodati, concentrating on him as friend and
correspondent of Galileo, and giving also a thorough account of the activities and reactions of
Europe’s scholars, mathematicians, and natural
philosophers after Galileo’s trial; as its subtitle
announces, the book is concerned with the beginning of a scientific network in early
seventeenth-century Europe (a few decades before the birth of scientific societies, such as the
Royal Society and the Académie des Sciences,
and journals, such as the Journal des Savants
and Acta Eruditorum).
Using archival materials, the first part of the
book discusses Diodati’s atypical life story. His
powerful and wealthy family came from Lucca,
an independent city in northern Italy, but immi-
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grated to Geneva because of its conversion to
Calvinism. Élie Diodati, the eldest son, who was
expected to stay in Geneva and to take a religious course in life, as defender of the faith,
went instead to Paris to study law. He established himself there as a lawyer and court diplomat. Garcia relates tantalizing bits that demonstrate Élie’s independent streak, defying his
father’s wishes, including possibly a deathbed
request. He also finds a formal reprimand of
Élie’s behavior by collegiate (ecclesiastic) authorities—specifically, he conversed too frequently and in too familiar a manner with a
married woman during evening hours and continued this behavior after friends and relatives
had warned him against it. Thus Diodati became
the odd combination of an Italian-Swiss Calvinist who served as a diplomat for the (Catholic)
government of France (and who even immigrated permanently to France before the Edict of
Nantes).
The second part of the book discusses Diodati’s participation in the “republic of letters.”
Diodati maintained relations with a large number of geographically scattered scholars, meeting personally with many of them, traveling in
the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, England, and
France. His large circle of friends and acquaintances was perhaps not quite as large as that of
Marin Mersenne and N.-C. Fabri de Peiresc, but
it included the latter two and such quality correspondents as Hugo Grotius and the Huygens
family (the statesmen Christiaan and Constantin
and the physicist-mathematician Christiaan) in
the Netherlands; Cesare Cremonini and Galileo
in Italy; Matthias Bernegger and Wilhelm
Schickard (a correspondent of Kepler’s) in Germany; Herbert of Cherbury and Thomas Hobbes
in England; and Pierre Gassendi in France. Diodati was a member of the Tétrade, a group of
four close friends, also referred to as libertin
érudits: Diodati, Gabriel Naudé, Gassendi, and
François de La Mothe le Vayer.
The third part of Garcia’s work is a reconstruction of Diodati’s correspondence with Galileo, most of which was lost, as were many such
epistolary exchanges from the period. Diodati
oversaw the Latin translation and 1635 publication of the Dialogue on the Two Chief World
Systems as Systema cosmicum by the Elseviers
in the Netherlands, as well as his own Latin
translation, with an introduction presented under
a pseudonym, of the Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina in 1636. The latter was intended to
be published in Systema cosmicum but did not
arrive in time. The Latin translation of the Dialogue was accomplished by Bernegger—Diodati’s frequent correspondent, professor of history

at Strasbourg, correspondent of Kepler—who
had previously translated into Latin Galileo’s
first published work (1606) on the geometric
and military compass (the Latin translation was
published in 1612). Diodati also acted as intermediary in the publication of the Discourse on
the Two New Sciences.
Élie Diodati et Galilée is an excellent piece of
work, a very welcome treatment of seventeenthcentury intellectual life. In the penultimate chapter
on Libertas philosophandi Garcia analyzes the tactics behind Diodati’s attempts to publish Galileo’s
works and examines the arguments in his introduction to the Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina. He describes Diodati’s recognition of the
importance of contact and correspondence, along
with his role as discreet intermediary, in deepening
the level of philosophical discussion on behalf of
the new philosophy.
ROGER ARIEW
Michael Hunter. The Boyle Papers: Understanding the Manuscripts of Robert Boyle. With
contributions by Edward B. Davis, Harriet
Knight, Charles Littleton, and Lawrence M.
Principe. xi ⫹ 674 pp., apps., index. Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2006. $99.95 (cloth).
The Boyle Papers is, in the first instance, a book
about an archive. Its subject is the enormous
deposit of papers deriving from the eminent
seventeenth-century natural philosopher Robert
Boyle (1627–1691) that has been at the Royal
Society of London since 1769. As such, it contains an extended treatment of the papers and
letters included in the archive, outlining their
history, their contents, and the various strata
within them. The volume also contains a revised
catalogue of the Boyle Papers, which completely supersedes the catalogue published in
1992 (Michael Hunter, ed., Letters and Papers
of Robert Boyle [Univ. Publications America]).
But the volume is much more than a descriptive account of and navigational tool for one of
the richest scientific troves to come down to us
from the early modern period. For The Boyle
Papers includes a set of studies of the contents
of the archive that together furnish us with an
exemplary model of how scholars can quarry a
mass of over twenty thousand leaves in order to
glean new and important insights into the intellectual development of a leading scientist and
his methods of work.
The volume opens with a short introduction
that summarizes the ensuing chapters and sets
the archive in its wider context, relating the
Boyle Papers to other substantial archives from
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the period of the Scientific Revolution, such as
those of Newton and Leibniz. This is followed
in Chapter 1 by a substantially revised version
of the account of Boyle and his archive that
introduced the 1992 catalogue. As Michael
Hunter notes, the original catalogue was, in a
sense, the victim of its own success, insofar as it
was a catalyst for new research on the archive
that had the effect of rendering the original catalogue obsolete. The same can be said for the
introductory essay to that catalogue, for since
1992 an enormous amount has been discovered
about the Boyle Papers that has given us a more
accurate understanding of its various strata and
diffuse contents. In the updated account we are
provided with a useful overview of recent developments in Boyle studies and the ways in
which the archive has been put to use. For instance, we learn of the identification of a
hitherto-unknown amanuensis of Boyle’s,
Thomas Emes, and about various other improvements to our understanding of the handwriting found in the archive. We also get a sense
of the collaborative nature of recent work on the
archive. This is well illustrated by the summary
account of the discovery by Lawrence Principe
of an inventory by the eighteenth-century nonconformist divine Henry Miles (BP 36, fol. 196)
of bound volumes within the archive. This inventory proved to be an important key for the
discovery and identification of additional, unknown Boyle manuscripts elsewhere in the
Royal Society’s general manuscript series.
Not surprisingly, some of these manuscripts,
as well as material within the archive itself, have
been lost, and Chapter 2 (by Hunter and Principe) documents the state of our knowledge of
materials that, frustratingly, have disappeared
from the archive. Chapters 3 and 4 are those that
will be of greatest interest to historians of science, for they provide introductions to and detailed analyses of two particularly rich sources
for Boyle’s method of work and his approach to
the organization of knowledge. In an importantly augmented reprint of Hunter and Charles
Littleton’s article on Robert Boyle’s Workdiaries, we learn of an extraordinary and yet underutilized set of experimental diaries that is
randomly distributed throughout the archive.
The following chapter is a hitherto-unpublished
study by Hunter, Harriet Knight, and Littleton of
another set of documents within the archive that
constitute the basis of an uncompleted work,
entitled Paralipomena, that Boyle was preparing in the 1680s.
The paralipomena were supplements or appendixes to natural philosophical works that
Boyle had published and that comprised repos-
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itories of newly accumulated data or data that
had not made it into the original publications.
Boyle’s chapter headings for this work and the
methodological rationale he gives for the arrangement of its various parts reveal both the
extent to which his natural philosophical methodology was an elaboration of Francis Bacon’s
method of natural history and the extent to
which Boyle viewed his own publications as
merely first installments in an ongoing, even
collaborative, enterprise. On the one hand, the
paralipomena serve as a kind of key to those
experimental and data-gathering projects that
had continued into the last decade of Boyle’s
life; and on the other hand, they reveal the difficulties Boyle had in ordering and arranging the
plethora of observations and experiments with
which he was dealing. But the importance of the
paralipomena transcends the archive itself,
shedding important light on some of Boyle’s
major publications from the last decade of his
life, such as Human Blood (1684) and the posthumous General History of the Air (1692).
The fifth and final chapter preceding the catalogue (which comprises over half of the volume: pp. 277– 651) is a study by Hunter and
E. B. Davis of the process of composition of
another of Boyle’s important publications from
his last decade, the Notion of Nature (1686). In
all, The Boyle Papers is an important and timely
publication. One hopes that other substantial
early modern archives will soon be subjected to
the same level of expert scholarly analysis.
PETER ANSTEY
Vincent Jullien. Philosophie naturelle et géométrie au XVIIe siècle. (Science, Techniques et
Civilisations du Moyen Âge à l’Aube des Lumières.) 477 pp., figs., table, index. Paris: Honoré
Champion, 2006. €83 (cloth).
“If this book were a novel, one would have to
acknowledge Descartes and Roberval as its
main heroes” (p. 439). However, it isn’t a novel
but a collection of essays, half of them dedicated
to “natural philosophy,” half to “mathematics
and philosophy,” and many of them previously
published elsewhere, albeit sometimes in fairly
different form. Still, Descartes and Roberval do
provide the thematic nucleus of Vincent Jullien’s collection. In the Adam-Tannery edition
of Descartes’s correspondence, Roberval is the
most frequently mentioned author, although it
appears from contemporary sources that on the
few occasions when the two men met they spent
their time loudly disagreeing with one another.
Professional rivalry and jealous competition for
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Marin Mersenne’s esteem may explain the emotional aspects of their uneasy relationship, but
Jullien prefers to stress their intellectual differences, and in particular these: First, for Descartes, all science sprouts from the roots of
metaphysics, whereas Roberval has little time
for first philosophy. Second, the two men differ
over the foundations of their respective geometries: whereas Descartes tries to derive his geometrical notions from a set of basic intuitions,
Roberval embarks on novel applications of
mathematical indivisibles. Third, Roberval subscribes to a radically different view of natural
philosophy than Descartes does and attacks the
latter’s belief in mechanical explanations, his
denial of the vacuum, his theory of light, and his
mental derivation of an ordered world from initial
chaos (Ch. 12). Incidentally, Jullien resents that
Roberval has not been treated fairly in the historiography, and some of his best pages are dedicated
to his vindication. For example, Jullien finds that
Roberval’s claim to have developed a geometrical
method based on infinitesimals at least as early as
Cavalieri is not implausible. In Chapter 11 he not
only provides a detailed chronology of Roberval’s
application of his method to geometrical figures,
beginning with the 1630s fragments on the trochoid, but also explains the fundamental difference from Cavalieri’s indivisibles. In Roberval’s
case, the indivisibles were homogenenous with
respect to the magnitude analyzed (surfaces being
the indivisibles of surfaces, etc.), but in Cavalieri’s
case they were heterogeneous (lines being the indivisibles of surfaces, etc.).
All the other chapters have in some way or
other to do with the above-mentioned issues
separating Roberval and Descartes. For example, the memorable title of Chapter 9 states that
“in Descartes, intuition stands to deduction as
geometry stands to algebra.” The thesis behind
this analogy constitutes one of the leitmotifs of
Jullien’s book. Descartes felt that geometrical
magnitudes were directly present to the mental
eye, whereas he thought of his geometrical algebra as a type of formalism that could be used,
notably, for treating polynomes but that by itself
was not directly accessible to intuition, in the
same way that he thought of a deduction as an
ordered chain of intuitions that, as a whole, went
beyond what was given directly in intuition.
Descartes’s view of algebraic formulas as artifacts implied that they had to be derived from
basic geometrical intuitions. But what to do
when one encountered an empirically valid formula that had not first been derived from such
intuitions? In what may be the most fascinating
theme in his book—and one that he addresses in
a number of chapters—Jullien investigates the

problem provoked by the law of refraction, on
whose mathematical formulation everyone
agreed and on whose presumed physical basis
everyone disagreed. In Chapter 2, for example,
he analyzes Newton’s and Leibniz’s respective
theories of light in great detail. His conclusion is
that whereas both men mathematized physics,
“Newton develops a mathematics to validate his
physics, while Leibniz turns to physics so as to
affirm and validate his mathematics” (p. 124).
The phenomenon of light is also, for Jullien, a
paradigmatic case where experimental evidence
propels natural philosophy in new directions, often
against the latter’s abstract tendencies (Ch. 3).
This book is full of interesting insights, notably where it speaks of the evolution of French
physico-mathematics. It is somewhat less convincing on the few occasions when it opens its
angle of vision to survey the wider European
scene. Jullien knows his French sources but is
less well acquainted with the scholarship available in other languages and treating of other
countries. In fact, his non-French quotations and
bibliography are sloppy. Furthermore, his first
chapter in particular, on the debate concerning
the vacuum, is too skewed toward the French
situation to be entirely reliable. The oddest thing
about it is without doubt the appended chronology (pp. 68 – 69), which suggests that the international debate concerning the void started with
that utterly inconsequential corollary found in
Isaac Beeckman’s medical thesis on tertian fever, defended at Caen in 1618, and passes over
in silence the Italian engineering context of
1630 in which the debate truly originated. This
distortion (which is only partly corrected in the
chapter itself ) is possibly due to the intellectual
position that Jullien feels he must embrace in the
introduction to his book. That introduction,
which is the only truly bad part of Philosophie
naturelle et géométrie au XVIIe siècle, is an orgy
of anachronistic and seemingly unmotivated anger. It whips Thomas Kuhn’s allegedly externalist
school of historiography and hails Jean Dhombres
(to whom the book is dedicated) as the redeeming
internalist alternative. Dhombres is quoted as insisting on the primary desire of figures such as
Galileo and Descartes “to do science while dissociating the problems of their lives from the intellectual problems at hand” (pp. 20 –21). The assertions of the introduction are too unsophisticated to
rebut—all the more because they are not at all
required by the content of the book. Readers are
strongly advised to start perusing this otherwise
fascinating book at Chapter 2.
CHRISTOPH LÜTHY
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Eve Keller. Generating Bodies and Gendered
Selves: The Rhetoric of Reproduction in Early
Modern England. xi ⫹ 248 pp., figs., bibl.,
index. Seattle: University of Washington Press,
2007. $30 (paper).
In Generating Bodies and Gendered Selves, Eve
Keller studies well-known anatomical, medical,
and obstetrical texts published in England between the early seventeenth and early eighteenth
centuries, noting how they construct gendered
identities. In focusing on reproduction in early
modern England, she joins an expanding group
of scholars who analyze the changing representations of gender and the body produced during
a period of religious and political upheaval (Lisa
Forman Cody, David Cressy, Mary Fissell, Elizabeth Harvey, and Adrian Wilson, to name only
a few). Keller’s overall argument is that although Galenic models of physiology were being challenged in the texts she investigates, concomitant gendered hierarchies were reinforced
and even intensified. Men were increasingly associated with a disembodied form of individuality, whereas women were identified with their
wombs and not awarded a similar degree of
personhood.
Keller claims that in his anatomical text Microcosmographia (London, 1615), Helkiah Crooke
strove to adhere to Galen’s theories but ultimately
diverged from them by implying that a disembodied self presided over the parts of the body. Crooke
explained that the stomach, for example, became
full so that “wee may have leisure for other businesse” (Microcosmographia, p. 118; cited in
Keller, p. 59). Keller argues that such references to
“we” and “us” posit an entity separate from the
body, presaging an autonomous sense of the person. She distinguishes her interpretation of Crooke
from that of David Hillman and Carla Mazzio,
editors of The Body in Parts: Fantasies of Corporeality in Early Modern Europe (Routledge,
1997), who assert that a new aesthetic of the part
was created during the early modern period. They
contend that when Crooke claimed that “a part is a
body cohearing or cleaving to the whole” he produced a contradictory image of attachment and
detachment in keeping with contemporary practices of anatomical dissection (Hillman and Mazzio, p. xv).
Keller goes on to address how the revision of
Galenic theories in early modern English publications could retain the one-sex model of the
body famously described by the historian
Thomas Laqueur in Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud (Harvard, 1990)
while nevertheless insisting on sexual difference. In her discussion of A Directory for Mid-
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wives (2nd ed.; London, 1656), she notes that
Nicholas Culpeper employed Galen’s concept of
the bodily homology between men and women
in order to stress difference. After describing the
male testes, he asserted that “the Stones of
Women (for they have such kinds of toys as wel
as Men) differ from the Stones of Men”
(Culpeper, p. 29; cited in Keller, p. 89). Keller
relates Culpeper’s subsequent characterization
of the female stones as “less” than those of men
to his rigid insistence on female inferiority, a
point also made by Mary Fissell in Vernacular
Bodies: The Politics of Reproduction in Early
Modern England ([Oxford, 2004], p. 143).
Keller’s book offers a compelling series of
close readings of selected texts, undertaking detailed analyses of their language to reveal implicit ways of thinking in early modern England.
Though Keller refers to the anxieties caused by
the religious and political turmoil of the time,
the historical context of the publications is studied in greater depth in Fissell’s book. Generating Bodies and Gendered Selves will thus be of
most interest to literary scholars concerned with
the emergence of the modern subject in written
texts, but it should also appeal to historians of
medicine as a companion to the historical accounts.
LIANNE MCTAVISH
Maria Teresa Monti. Spallanzani e le
rigenerazioni animali: L’inchiesta, la communicazione, la rete. ix ⫹ 424 pp., figs., bibl., index.
Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 2005. €47 (paper).
Maria Teresa Monti has investigated a central,
but rather unanalyzed, part of the scientific work
of Lazzaro Spallanzani (1729 –1799). Spallanzani’s few publications on animal regeneration
constituted a partial post festum presentation of
his experimental discoveries. Monti is the first
to have scrutinized the immense wealth of
manuscripts on the Italian scientist’s groundbreaking inquiries in that area, in particular the
notebooks of experiments, research agendas,
and plans for defining a “canon” of laws based
on the parameters of organic self-restoration.
Spallanzani’s interest in the regeneration of organs had been triggered by investigations such as
Réaumur’s on crayfish, lobsters, and crabs, Trembley’s on hydras, and Bonnet’s on freshwater
worms. In 1765–1768 Spallanzani would fill his
“Giornali” with extensive and detailed experiments on “riproduzioni animali”: he would experiment on worms (especially earthworms), frog and
toad tadpoles, salamanders and newts, slugs and
snails. In all cases he excised parts following
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graded series of mutilations and tried to account
for the multiple variables, representing environmental (habitat, temperature, nutriment) and organic (life cycles, anatomical and physiological
features, reproductive modes) conditions, that affected the experiments’ positive or negative outcomes.
In Chapter 2, “Le esperienze” (pp. 47–134),
Monti analyzes those three years of overwhelming experimental activity, when experiments
took place between spring and fall and the planning of “cose da farsi” and complementary reading occupied the cold months. Along the way,
Spallanzani reported to Bonnet on his work in a
rather partial fashion and exploited the Genevan
naturalist as a source of information and a
sounding-board on interpretive issues. But he
did not communicate his real progress to his
“mentor”—nor the uncertain results, frequent
morphogenetic disorders, and interpretive ambiguities he confronted. Bonnet was essentially
interested in collecting proofs for a theory positing the pre-existence of specialized local germs
responsible for the reconstitution of organic parts.
Needham, who would not meddle in “metaphysical issues,” was faced with experimental situations
that could be accounted for either by germ-derived
organic formation or by epigenetic tissue extension: a case in point was bone reproduction in
leg-amputated salamanders. In his investigation of
tadpole mutilations, however, Spallanzani—who
reasonably suspected that reproductive processes
followed lawlike determinations, akin to those of
generation—also undertook series of observations
on the fertilization of amphibian eggs. Assimilating these eggs with preformed organisms apparently found in an unstructured state, he sided with
the supporters of a “visibilità debole” requirement
(Bernardi) for preformation theories. Meanwhile,
Spallanzani accumulated convergent, but at times
ambiguous, observations, especially on the microstructural and physiological conditions of organic
restoration, on inordinate morphogenetic processes, on natural and artificial monstrosities, and
on the indefinite number of variables that might
intervene in vital phenomena set at the borderline
of inorganic processes.
Chapter 3, “La communicazione” (pp. 135–
260), examines the multiple publication plans
for a “grande opera” on regenerations. The most
significant projects pointed to the writing of
“mémoires” devoted to the animal species observed. Unlike Bonnet, Spallanzani was not interested in producing a manifesto supporting the
pre-existence of germs: “L’epigenese me deplait
autant, que je suis porté pour les germes. Je
n’aime pourtant pas que mon lecteur s’aperçoive
de l’affection pour ce dernier systeme. Je veux

qu’il me juge par les faits et par les consequences immediates que je tirerai de ces faits”
(p. 138). But Spallanzani never succeeded in
compiling his innumerable data in an appropriate scholarly form. Instead, he published a “program” for the future treatise, with summaries of
experimental inferences extracted from his
“Giornali”: among those itemized were the iterative reproduction of heads and tails and anastomosis of the natural and artificial parts in sufficiently large excised portions of earthworms; the
reproduction of excised tadpole tails, which depended on the relative immaturity of the mutilated
organism and resulted in surprising circulatory disorders; the restoration of the antennae, foot, collar,
and head of snails, with some disorderly variants
in the reproduced parts; and the neoformation of
bones in repeatedly excised tails and legs of
salamanders. All these would illustrate a “canon”
of strict equation between the artificial part and the
excised one, any aberration being presumed to
result from partial or imperfect mutilations. The
Prodromo di un’opera da imprimersi sopra le
riproduzioni animali (1768) was soon translated
into French (1768), English (1769), and German
(1769). The regeneration of snail heads instantly
became a subject of controversy across Europe.
Monti analyzes the various experimental contributions that emerged on both sides of the debate,
along with Spallanzani’s replies and the incentives
he offered supporters for further experimentation.
Among the principal scientists involved, mention
should be given of the opposition— or reservations
regarding various nuances— of Lavoisier, Adanson, Schröter, and Müller; support—though with
caveats— came from Bonnet, Girardi, Caldani,
and Senebier. Bonnet even resumed experimental
work and published a series of “mémoires” in the
period 1777–1781 on some of the themes developed in Spallanzani’s research program. While
still promising the publication of his “grande opera,” the now celebrated Italian naturalist issued
two memoirs on the regeneration of the snail’s
head in 1782 and 1784: one rehearsed the statements of the Prodromo in a more polemical mode,
so as to counter criticisms voiced by the scientific
community; the other was an artfully contrived
selection of texts from the polemics.
The failed publication of the magnum opus is
skillfully analyzed in Chapter 5, “Dell’Opera
mai scritta” (pp. 337–377). But Monti is especially to be lauded for Chapter 4, “I Lombrici”
(pp. 261–335), in which she focuses on Spallanzani’s experimental investigations on earthworms.
Her close survey of the “Giornali” establishes the
outstanding anatomical and physiological features
of Spallanzani’s analytic work. But, because of the
partial or even failed diffusion of his work, we
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must wait for later researchers to produce equivalent experimental results. Monti concludes her erudite, well-argued, and enlightening study with
what are probably some of the best pages available
anywhere on Spallanzani’s views about the decentralized organic conditions of biological individuality and on his constant quest for a “canone generale” (p. 386) that would account for the general
elementary features of physiological processes.
Spallanzani deployed strategies of using interpersonal relations to achieve academic recognition,
but his entire effort was grounded in “a slow and
tortuous crystallization of partial results that
emerged from his re-elaborating observations previously made, rectifying his methodology and
working matters through” (p. 390). This monograph will probably remain a landmark for historians of eighteenth-century natural science.
FRANÇOIS DUCHESNEAU
Richard B. Sher. The Enlightenment and the
Book: Scottish Authors and Their Publishers in
Eighteenth-Century Britain, Ireland, and America. xxvi ⫹ 815 pp., illus., figs., tables, apps.,
bibl., index. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2006. $40 (cloth).
Richard Sher’s The Enlightenment and the Book
offers a clever interpretation of the Scottish Enlightenment. Instead of spending reams of paper
dutifully recounting all of the debates and existential angst that the term “Enlightenment” engendered for the Frankfurt School or for francophone literary critics, Sher’s introduction
explains that his approach draws from a long
line of well-established scholars who specialize
in the history of the book, a subfield of history
and literature that has strong connections with
what is sometimes called bibliographic history,
the history of reading, and the sociology of
texts. More specifically, he sees his work as part
of a larger tradition that includes authors like
Robert Darnton, Elizabeth Eisenstein, and
David McKitterick. On a more Scottish level,
his research falls solidly within the current
school of Scottish book history that has sought
to shift the limelight from a canon fashioned in
the Victorian era to one that focuses more on the
periodicals, books, and other sources of print
that were considered to be authoritative by those
who lived during the eighteenth century. His
research therefore complements the work of
Paul B. Wood, David Allan, Stephen Brown,
and Warren McDougall. Since the notion of the
“Scottish Enlightenment” means many things to
many people, Sher uses the term to represent a
common core of interests in mid to late
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eighteenth-century Scotland that revolved
around notions of improvement, sociability, humanity, toleration, and intellectual cultivation.
In this sense, his use of the term encapsulates a
movement that was “not in a fixed body of
doctrines or a universal reform program or an
institutional structure or a particular field or
school of thought but rather in a set of general
values to which proponents of the Enlightenment adhered” (p. 16).
The book is based on an impressive array of
primary sources, and it is unequivocally a major
achievement that represents the fruition of three
decades of research. In particular, Sher scoured
archives spread across the world to create a list
of 115 authors whose books went on to have a
significant impact on Scotland’s Enlightenment
ideals or became part of the medical, law, arts,
or divinity curricula taught in Scottish, Irish, and
American universities well into the nineteenth
century. His overriding goal is to show how
these books, and hence the ideals and values
contained in their pages, spread out from the
presses of Edinburgh into Scotland, London,
Ireland, and then Philadelphia and the American
market. Although the book is over 800 pages
long, it is neatly divided into four sections. The
most important of these is the appendix, the first
table of which lists the biographical details of
the authors under consideration. A second table
lists the format, number of volumes, price, topic,
Sher’s unique “popularity rating,” and publication details for the 360 Scottish, Irish, and
American first editions published by the said
authors. This is followed by a third table that
lists the publishers who brought these books to
print. Although Sher’s own previous work on
the subject has led him to include or omit names
of authors and publishers from his impressive
lists, his introduction clearly indicates that his
research represents the tip of a bibliographic
iceberg: “Yet the book history of the Enlightenment, especially the English-language Enlightenment, remains a story waiting to be told” (p.
5). Even so, Sher has sunk a deep shaft down
into an extremely dense pile of sources, and his
work will no doubt serve as a reference point for
historians of print culture and reading practices
for years to come.
Drawing from the information contained in
the tables, the first section of the book concentrates on Scottish publishers, particularly their
partnerships with the London book market but
also their innovative commissioning practices
(paying authors directly and handsomely, for
example), copyright exploitation, and the intellectual predispositions that led them to appreciate both the content and the economic value of
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different types of book. In addition to being
London’s competitor, Edinburgh was notable
because its publishers actively participated in
the academically charged conversations that
took place in the city’s coffeehouses, clubs, and
societies. This setting allowed publishers to
meet fellow Scots who were authors and to
receive valuable advice concerning which nonScottish works were worth translating and reprinting. The book’s next section focuses on
both Scottish and Irish publishers who operated
in Dublin, the self-styled second city of the
British Empire. Sher points out that Dublin had
a thriving community of publishers (several of
whom were women) that reprinted many of the
titles listed in his tables. The overarching theme,
therefore, is the complex story of the dissemination of Scottish books, especially the intellectual, social, legal, and financial factors that influenced what types of books publishers brought
to print. The third section’s treatment of Scottish
and American publishers addresses the same
issues. Although it mentions New York and
Boston, it gives the most space to Philadelphia
publishers like Robert Bell, William Young, and
Mathew Carey.
The real meat of the book, to my mind, lies in
the fact that Sher gives a detailed picture of what
people read, who was able to get their ideas into
multiple editions of print, and, to a certain extent, the ways in which the changes that occurred between different editions affected how
people read books. The underlying target of the
study is the very canon of texts associated with
the intellectual ferment that took place in mid to
late eighteenth-century Scotland. In this sense it
connects with a larger movement in recent decades that has sought to reevaluate the criteria
used to determine how a text becomes canonical. Inspired by Frank Kermode, Walter Ong,
and others, “canon busting” is now a standard
feature of studies written in just about every
branch of the humanities. This type of research
has produced a new sketch of what people were
reading in different times and places. Since texts
were read in many different ways, these studies
often focus necessarily on the notebooks of one
person, a defined set of letters, or sometimes one
commonplace book. To put the point more simply: they use intellectual microcosms to snipe at
the traditional canon of their discipline. Yet,
ironically, it is still the canon against which they
rage, thereby reinforcing its presence.
As Sher has noted several times over his long
career as a historian, the list of authors associated with eighteenth-century Scottish intellectual history has remained relatively impervious
to opposition. One need only witness the influx

of recent academic and popular books that take
David Hume, Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson,
James Watt, Thomas Reid, and James Hutton as
the starting point for serious discussion of modern Scottish thought. The reason the canon of
the Scottish Enlightenment has remained relatively unchanged stems from the fact that it is
one thing to poke holes in it and another to
modify or replace it. The former action usually
occurs on the individual (scholarly) level, while
the latter necessitates a larger shift in both popular and academic opinion. More important, before any shift occurs or an intransient interpretation is offered, we need more detailed studies
on the larger context of Scottish readership, curriculum design, and book circulation. Without
this type of information, it will be very hard to
offer a convincing argument that will allow
scholars to agree on how to dismantle, modify,
or replace the canon. This is precisely what
Sher’s work is attempting to achieve— especially in terms of the material circulation of
ideas within a defined geographical setting. For
natural history, for example, his approach allows him to sidestep the typical historiographic
gaze that seeks to divide the views of Edinburgh’s 1780s and 1790s naturalists into those
of “Huttonian vulcanists” or “Wernerian neptunists.” A cursory look at his publication tables
quickly shows that there was a whole lot more
on offer, most notably in terms of the specialized articles published in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, the Essays and Observations of the
Edinburgh Philosophical Society, the Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, and the
Transactions of the Society of the Antiquaries of
Scotland. Furthermore, from the natural history
lectures of John Walker at the University of
Edinburgh and James Anderson at the University of Glasgow, to the works of Lord Kames,
Lord Monboddo, William Smellie, Charles Alston, John Hunter, Elizabeth Hamilton, Mungo
Park, and more, Scots had much to say on topics
that, though relevant at the time, have been
overlooked by modern historians because they
do not easily fit into the “common sense” or
“pre-evolutionary” historiographies so often
used to evaluate eighteenth-century Scottish authors. Sher’s detailed study exposes the weak
points not only in the traditional canon used to
represent the history of natural history, but also
in the canon frequently employed by historians
of natural philosophy, medicine (including
chemistry), philosophy, rhetoric, and belletristic
literature.
This book represents a powerful tool that will
no doubt be used to reinterpret and, I hope, to
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recast the intellectual framework so often used
to understand the books being read in Britain,
America, and the British Empire during the second half of the eighteenth century. It makes a
plethora of insightful points regarding the factors that motivated writers to write, readers to
read, and publishers to publish. The research is
solidly based on printed and manuscript primary
sources, thereby allowing it to be responsibly
innovative. In short, it raises the bar to a new
level for scholars of eighteenth-century Scottish
thought who are serious about the cultural history of ideas and who prefer specific examples
over brushstroke theorizing.
M. D. EDDY

Richard Sugg. Murder after Death: Literature
and Anatomy in Early Modern England. 259
pp., illus., apps., index. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 2007. $45 (cloth).
The plethora of recent books on medicine, anatomy, and English literature by authors such as
Jonathan Sawday, Margaret Healy, Hillary
Nunn, and Gail Kern Paster made me skeptical
that Richard Sugg could find anything new to
say in Murder after Death. I’m happy to say I
was wrong. Sugg’s book is quite original; and
although it swings between brilliant and opaque,
there are enough brilliant moments to make it
well worth reading.
Unlike other authors who have used literature, at least in part, to talk about actual practices and public opinion, Sugg seeks something
more elusive that he refers to as “the rhetoric of
anatomy,” defined mainly as the infiltration of
anatomy into English literature and culture between about 1550 and 1630. He considers not
only the activity but also the idea of anatomy,
which includes metaphors and imagery of cutting, tearing, splitting, eating, and flaying the
body. Sugg argues that the work of Vesalius led
to a new culture of anatomy that “invad[ed]
older traditions of spectacular corporeality” (p.
30). In other words, the act of anatomy and the
new, grisly imagery in literature combined to
remake the relationship between body and self.
He further substantiates this thesis by a survey of works that employ the word “anatomy”
in their titles—a total of 120 titles—as well as a
list of allusions to anatomy in sermons. This
survey is an excellent example of the impact of
electronic books, in this case EEBO (Early English Books Online), which have revolutionized
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the way early modernists in particular do research. Murder after Death well illustrates the
merits of this kind of research, as well as, perhaps, some drawbacks.
Sugg makes his case about the pervasiveness
of the new anatomical culture by looking less at
canonical works (although he includes an interesting analysis of cannibalistic language in As
You Like It and Twelfth Night) than at more
obscure works. Of course, there is a reason some
of these works are obscure, and Sugg admits that
Henry Chettle’s The Tragedy of Hoffman, which
occupies much of his first chapter, is a pretty
awful play (a judgment substantiated by the
quotations he provides). Sugg uses the play as a
way to talk not only about anatomical imagery
but about what audiences would have seen in the
staging of this play; he argues that public awareness of dissection meant that the public responded to Chettle’s play. Indeed, he goes further, arguing that Chettle might indeed have
used anatomical imagery to enliven an otherwise poor play because he knew the public
would respond to it. Sugg cannot prove this to
be the case, but his proposing it is typical of the
plethora of ideas that emerge from this book.
In other chapters, Murder after Death explores
cannibalism, the idea of the body as proof, the
search for a corporeal site for the soul, and vivisection. Sugg looks at a number of authors, from
Donne, Jonson, and Shakespeare to the more obscure Jacobeans Tourneur, Shirley, and Drayton
and the Restoration dramatist Thomas Killigrew,
as well as Harvey, Helkiah Crooke, and Henry
More. The wide net EEBO casts helps support
Sugg’s contention of the ubiquity of anatomical
imagery, but it raises questions (which Sugg does
not address) about how representative these particular authors are of any general Zeitgeist.
The last chapter looks at vivisection—not at
actual animal vivisection, but at imagined human
vivisection, focusing particularly on Thomas
Nashe’s “protonovel” The Unfortunate Traveller
(1594). Sugg ends this chapter with a look at the
Marquis de Sade. Although James Steintrager’s
Cruel Delight (Indiana, 2004) offers a more thorough analysis of Sade’s uses of anatomy, Sugg
contrasts Sade with writers of the early seventeenth century to suggest that by the 1780s the soul
was no longer an issue. If his conclusion that
“ultimately, the body becomes the new soul, just
as science becomes the new religion” (p. 205), is a
little too pat, the journey to get there gave me some
new perspectives on the role of anatomy in early
seventeenth-century English society.
ANITA GUERRINI
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Keith Thomson. Before Darwin: Reconciling
God and Nature. xiv ⫹ 314 pp., illus., bibl.,
app. New Haven, Conn./London: Yale University Press, 2005. $27 (cloth); $18 (paper).
Keith Thomson charts the long intellectual odyssey of English natural theology from Francis
Bacon to Charles Darwin in order to illuminate
how the scientific revolution and the Enlightenment transformed science from a handmaiden of
Christian religious certainty to its dangerous
challenger.
The story in broad outline is straightforward.
Contradictions to the biblical account of creation accumulated during the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries thanks to the increasingly
accurate and sophisticated observation of nature,
forcing scholars to devise novel ways to reconcile
science and religion. This was not “a cynical exercise in damage control but a manifestation of the
belief that rational enquiry ought to lead to new
revelations of the power and mysterious ways of
God” (p. 141). Natural theology emerged both to
embrace and to domesticate science. Ultimately,
however, the scientific commitment to explanation
via secondary causes posed the most basic threat to
the symbiosis between faith and rationality. Understanding nature exclusively through secondary
causes demotes God from an all-powerful active
presence in the universe to a distant first cause—at
best. At worst, God simply fades away. William
Paley attempted to neutralize this threat in Natural
Theology (1802): if the ordered complexity of living organisms could never be reduced to the blind
operation of secondary causes, God’s continuous
and active role in nature was impregnably preserved. This defensive strategy was rather threadbare by the start of the nineteenth century, and
Charles Darwin ripped it apart when he provided a
workable evolutionary mechanism. Natural theology proved to be “the last great attempt to find a
comprehensive answer to the question ‘Does God
exist and what is his nature?’ through the objective, empirical methods of science rather than
through revelation, biblical exegesis or the inspiration of God’s vicars on earth” (p. 279).
Thomson writes gracefully, with a keen eye
for the revealing anecdote and the telling quotation. He does not lament the scientific passing
of natural theology but nonetheless treats its
advocates with warmth, sympathy, and admiration. His large cast of characters (which includes
Paley, John Ray, Robert Boyle, John Toland,
Gilbert White, Thomas Burnet, William Whiston, William Buckland, and Philip Henry Gosse)
emerge as honest men who wrestled commendably with difficult problems “at the forefront of
an epic enquiry” (p. xiii).

Thomson admits that he is telling “a particular
version of the battle between science and religion,”
one that is “set squarely within a long English
tradition.” Nonetheless, he clearly wants the reader
to attach broader significance to this “peculiarly
English part of the phenomenon” (p. 7). Unfortunately, the history of English natural theology contains too many local peculiarities to serve as a fully
adequate exemplar of broad historical trends. The
practical, philosophical, and religious implications
of approaching life as the product of chance and
blind necessity look much different when one
pulls the focus back from the concerns of English
naturalists and parsons in the Age of Reason and
the Enlightenment.
Before Darwin obscures rather than illuminates the full significance of teleology in the
history of biology. Thomson implies on several
occasions that naturalists who invoked enddirected processes in nature were keeping faith
with Christianity and classical philosophy rather
than with the scientific quest for physical properties and natural laws. But the belief that biological systems possess an end-directedness fundamentally different from anything found in the
inorganic world cannot be historically understood exclusively in terms of natural theology.
Thomson obliquely acknowledges this fact by
choosing as a chapter epigraph a question about
the relationship between physics, chemistry, and
life posed by Erwin Schrödinger in What Is
Life? (1944). Introduce towering figures like
Immanuel Kant and Georges Cuvier into the
story—which Thomson never does—and the
rise of evolutionary thinking and the attempted
reconciliations of God and nature before Darwin
acquire a different cast.
Thomson also overestimates the decisiveness
of Darwin’s influence on the popular and scientific meaning of Victorian natural theology. The
fact that teleological, and often explicitly theistic, evolutionary theories flourished long after
the Origin is acknowledged only in the passing
comment that “it took a while for Darwinism to
be fully accepted” (p. 267). And it is flatly false
to claim that “once On the Origin of Species had
been published, the arguments of Buffon, Erasmus Darwin, Hutton, Paley, Priestley, and all
the others were pushed to the sidelines” (p. 217).
Evolutionists who wished to understand life teleologically, including Darwin’s close ally Asa
Gray, continued to do so for decades, even if the
respectability of invoking divine will explicitly
as an explanatory principle had declined precipitously by the dawn of the twentieth century.
Examining the reaction to the Origin by theistic evolutionists like Gray would have allowed
Before Darwin better to fulfill its explicit goal of
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judging whether natural theology possesses
“any long-standing merit” (p. 58)—and to do so
more presciently. Thomson briefly criticizes Michael Behe for his Paleyesque reliance on “irreducible complexity” (pp. 61, 263). In The Edge
of Evolution (Free Press, 2007), Behe graduates
to an unambiguous acceptance of “common descent,” but with the significant proviso that evolutionary patterns can be explained fully only if
we posit “nonrandom mutations” shuffled into
the process by an intelligent designer; this simply updates (obliviously, it seems) Gray’s postOrigin belief in preordained variation with the
language of modern biochemistry and molecular
genetics. In The Language of God: A Scientist
Presents Evidence for Belief (Free Press, 2006)
Francis Collins labels himself a theistic evolutionist and identifies Gray as a predecessor (apparently unaware of his eagerness to invoke
God’s superintending power in scientific argument). A fuller examination of how teleology
and natural theology mixed with evolutionary
theory in Darwin’s wake could have allowed
Thomson to have forward-looking responses to
both Behe and Collins waiting.
Before Darwin succeeds as a series of vivid
and appealing portraits of men grappling with
issues of faith and rationality amidst maelstroms
of intellectual, political, and religious change.
But it does not work nearly as well as a coherent
account of either the broad historical relationship between science and religion or the intellectual origins of modern evolutionary thought.
To put it another way: I marked numerous individual sections of the book as possible undergraduate reading assignments, but I would be
loath to assign the book in its entirety.
RICHARD BELLON
Jenny Uglow. Nature’s Engraver: A Life of
Thomas Bewick. xix ⫹ 458 pp., figs., illus.,
index. London: Faber & Faber, 2006. £20
(cloth).
Thomas Bewick, eighteenth-century wood engraver and fervent naturalist, shot like a “firework” into national fame with the publication of
the General History of Quadrupeds (1790). This
plain-speaking son of a Northumberland tenant
farmer and collier sealed his reputation as England’s most masterly engraver with the twovolume History of British Birds (1797, 1804).
The huge success of these works (Quadrupeds
sold around fourteen thousand copies) was attributable to Bewick’s exquisitely fine wood engravings. Long after the descriptive text had
become outdated, the images continued to en-
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trance viewers. Jenny Uglow, in a beautifully
written book intended for a general readership,
makes use of these images both to tell Bewick’s
life and to captivate her own audience. In so
doing, she allows historians of science already
familiar with Bewick from his now-classic autobiography to see him anew. Although Uglow
relies heavily on the autobiography (as any biographer must do), she never loses sight of its
primary value as Bewick’s confirmation of his
own sense of self at the end of his life— or of the
slippages and gaps in such memories. The
strength of Nature’s Engraver is the way in
which the wood engravings themselves are used
to illuminate not only Bewick’s views on society and nature but also his world of work.
Throughout, the practical issues involved in
the production of Bewick’s images are emphasized, from the manual skills involved in the
engraving of hard boxwood to the trials, tribulations, and triumphs of his business and the
daily management of apprentices in his workshop. Moreover, when he began illustrating
quadrupeds, Bewick took pains to seek out living examples of the more exotic animals he
wished to portray but had never seen. Uglow
provides a fascinating glimpse into a world
where popular touring menageries offered the
only means of direct observation of such creatures, which many readers then saw for the first
time in Bewick’s engravings. Although sometimes forced to copy illustrations from other
natural history books or work from stuffed specimens, Bewick insisted on drawing only from
living models whenever possible because he
was less interested in classifying animals than in
portraying their character and habits. It is this
quality in his work that allies his close observation of the natural world to that of his contemporary, Gilbert White of Selborne. Both were to
remain popular throughout the nineteenth century, but while White’s characteristic observation of nature as detached from human society
became a model for field studies, Bewick’s pictures shaped a sensibility to the natural world
that explicitly encompassed both the social and
the political.
This is immediately apparent in Bewick’s natural history works, whose appeal lay not only in
the fine depictions of animals but also in the
minutely engraved tailpiece vignettes that fill
any blank spaces. Bewick believed that serious
learning was best imparted if combined with
amusement, but the often humorous and whimsical “tale-pieces” (as he punned) also aimed to
illustrate some truth or point to a moral. Uglow
uncovers and recovers many of these meanings
in her reading of these images, which depict
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Bewick’s own life and that of his community in
rural Northumberland as well as his radical conservative politics, including his criticism of actions that curtailed the freedom of the poor, his
hatred of war, his Deism, and his radical belief
that a knowledge of nature underlay all knowledge. Uglow thus makes great use of these vignettes to elucidate Bewick’s values, but she
does not tie them in as effectively as she might
to the plan and purpose of his natural history
works. While the excellent, true-to-size reproduction of many of the vignettes in Nature’s
Engraver allows us to appreciate the sheer visual pleasure these images have imparted to
readers ever since they were first published, Uglow’s claim that by “floating without captions in
the text” the tailpieces “appear as their first
readers saw them” is misleading (p. xvi). Although she notes that the positioning of the
tailpieces in Bewick’s natural history works “often made an oblique comment on the ways of
men and animals” (p. 185), in freeing them so
completely from this context some of the force
of Bewick’s moral vision of nature is lost. For
example, no reader of Bewick could have come
across the image of a poor man huddled under a
tree in driving rain tending several fishing lines
(reproduced by Uglow on p. 317) without noticing that this appears at the end of the entry on
the heron, in which Bewick challenges Buffon’s
description of this bird as “exhibiting the picture
of wretchedness, anxiety, and indigence, condemned to struggle perpetually with misery and
want, and sickened by the restless cravings of a
famished appetite.” Alert to the dangers of judging
by appearances, Bewick instead suggests that the
heron could be seen as “of a melancholy deportment, a silent and patient creature,” whose habit of
standing “in the most severe weather . . . motionless . . . fixed to a spot . . . waiting for its prey”
more likely indicated pleasure than pain, just as the
ability of the poor to partake of nature’s bounty
was a cherished freedom. Bewick brings his political point home by stating that in England herons
“were formerly ranked among the royal game, and
protected as such by the laws” (History of British
Birds, Vol. 2 [1804], pp. 40 – 41).
There is much material in Nature’s Engraver
for assessing Bewick’s importance in the development and use of scientific illustration. Bewick’s skill led to his being sought out by the
botanist Robert Thornton, who commissioned
over a hundred engravings of plants for his
Herbal (1810). Although only briefly mentioned
by Uglow, Thornton’s emphasis on Bewick’s
accurate observation and depiction of living natural objects—in contrast to the dangerous inaccuracy of most illustrations in medical botany

texts— clearly indicates one obvious need for
reasonably priced and reliable images.
These, however, are small complaints. In its
rich detail and narrative structure—as pleasurable as one of Bewick’s vignettes—this is popular biography at its best.
ANNE SECORD
f

Modern (Nineteenth Century to 1950)

Philip Cash. Dr. Benjamin Waterhouse: A Life
in Medicine and Public Service (1754 –1846).
516 pp., apps., index. Sagamore Beach, Mass.:
Boston Medical Library and Science History
Publications, 2006. $56 (cloth).
This book chronicles the life of Benjamin Waterhouse, the Harvard professor of medicine
known for introducing and popularizing smallpox vaccination in the United States. Philip
Cash examines Waterhouse’s medical activities,
and the conflict-ridden political and social environment in which he operated, to good effect.
As a moderate Federalist with Jeffersonian leanings and a fractious personality, Waterhouse
clashed with the High Federalists who dominated the medical community. This estrangement cost him his teaching position in 1812,
when, according to Cash, longtime enemies who
had made Waterhouse’s life at Harvard increasingly miserable ultimately conspired to force
him out.
Cash’s book is organized chronologically,
covering Waterhouse’s family background and
upbringing in Quaker Newport; his medical education in London, Edinburgh, and Leyden under the patronage of the prominent John
Fothergill; his strategies for convincing the public of the virtues of vaccination with cowpox;
his trials and tribulations at Harvard; and his
work for the army, first as Physician in Charge
of the Charlestown Marine Hospital and then as
Hospital Surgeon in the First Military District,
consisting of Massachusetts and New Hampshire.
Although Cash demonstrates the profound influence that personality and politics had upon
medicine, his book tends to be more narrative
than analytical. Waterhouse, we learn, wrote and
commented on a diverse array of topics in medicine, history, and politics—whooping cough,
dysentery, the treatment of American prisoners
during the War of 1812, and the career of William Pitt, to name a few— but Cash does not
explain how, or if, this mélange of opinions on
subjects both medical and political coalesced
into a distinctive vision of the role of science
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and medicine in the early republic or whether
Waterhouse was using his publications to fashion a public identity that he thought would further his greater goals. At times, it would seem
that Waterhouse was unconcerned about his image, as when he humiliated two of his most
powerful enemies by publishing a newspaper
satire about them, oblivious to how his rashness
might undermine his credibility. In other circumstances, however, Waterhouse could be interpreted as shrewd, calculating, and more in
tune with the ethos of a competitive, entrepreneurial, individualistic, and democratizing republic than his elitist enemies. He was savvy
enough, after all, to enter the Jeffersonian patronage network by leveraging the relationship
he had forged with the president during early
efforts to spread vaccination into the South and
West. At the same time, he maintained a cordial
relationship with John and Abigail Adams.
Many of the incidents Cash enumerates in the
book point toward the conclusion that Waterhouse was forward looking in comparison with
his elitist enemies. Waterhouse used the newspapers to spread knowledge of Edward Jenner’s
insights on the relationship between cowpox and
smallpox at a time when his colleagues regarded
direct attempts to sway the public as “vulgar” (p.
181). In 1804 he wrote a tract on clean living
that would seem to foreshadow the reform
movements of the antebellum period, as typified
by figures such as Sylvester Graham. Later in
his career he supported an unsuccessful plan to
create a new medical society, the College of
Physicians, to offset the power of the Massachusetts Medical Society. And in his old age he was
willing to entertain medical ideas that were
frowned upon by the orthodox establishment, as
evidenced by his friendship with the botanical
healer Samuel Thomsen.
Tantalizing as these leads may be, however,
Cash does not venture an argument as to Waterhouse’s motives or suggest how we might
resolve the disparate faces of Waterhouse. He
also neglects to pursue Waterhouse’s ideas on
race, a particularly volatile issue in this period.
While Cash mentions at the start of the book that
Waterhouse harbored a “lifelong contempt” for
blacks “based on a conviction of their innate
inferiority” (p. 3), he never explains whether,
and in what ways, this attitude influenced
Cash’s medical or political thought. This would
be a potentially fruitful line of investigation,
given Waterhouse’s attraction to Jeffersonianism, an ideology whose thrust was to expand
equality among white men while at the same
time tightening the bonds of race-based slavery.
Despite these omissions, Dr. Benjamin Water-
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house is an impeccably researched book that helps
us to understand the factionalization within the
medical community in early nineteenth-century
Boston and the monumental difficulties—not to
mention drama—that attended the introduction of
vaccination. The numerous instances in which attempted vaccinations did not “take” because doctors did not yet know the best time and method for
collecting vaccine matter led to public skepticism,
as did an epidemic in Marblehead, Massachusetts,
that, according to Cash, broke out because smallpox matter was mistaken for cowpox, exacerbating popular fears that cowpox was dangerous.
Meanwhile, the public was aware that doctors who
advocated vaccination often stood to gain financially from the procedure. Waterhouse himself—
who tried, briefly and unsuccessfully, to set up a
regional vaccine “trust,” or monopoly—was no
exception.
Although the book would have been of
greater benefit had Cash voiced a stronger thesis, there is much here to be praised. Cash reproduces extensive passages of Waterhouse’s
writings, so that readers can gain a sense of his
flamboyant personal style as well as his thoughts
on medical topics. Waterhouse’s frustrations
with the local hierarchy in Boston are most
palpable in passages that Cash quotes from the
Patriot, a Jeffersonian newspaper in which the
doctor poured out his rancor, once going so far
as to rail against Boston as the “Head Quarters
of Tory Principles” (p. 358). The drama of Waterhouse’s life and the struggle to spread knowledge of vaccination will make the book attractive to a wide range of readers, while scholars
will appreciate that it generates questions about
important issues such as the operation of patronage networks, the relationship between popular
and elite medical ideas, the cultivation of public
opinion, and the interplay between medicine and
politics in the early national period.
LOUISE A. BREEN
Daniel J. Cohen. Equations from God: Pure
Mathematics and Victorian Faith. x ⫹ 242 pp.,
bibl., index. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007. $50 (cloth).
In this book, based on his 1999 Yale doctoral
dissertation, Daniel J. Cohen explores the interconnections between mathematics— or, more
properly, the philosophy of mathematics—and
religious faith in the thought primarily of three
nineteenth-century English-speaking mathematicians, the American Benjamin Peirce and the
Englishmen George Boole and Augustus De
Morgan. Cohen sets his historical stage against
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the backdrop of the stunning purely mathematical discovery—and subsequent observation—in
1846 of the planet Neptune. What were the implications of this? For some, it provided dramatic evidence that mathematics was, in fact,
the language of God. To understand mathematics was to understand not only God’s plan in
nature but also divine truth.
Ideas like this were certainly not new, and
Cohen opens his analysis with a chapter-length
overview of the evolution and implementation
of an idealist philosophy of mathematics from
Plato to Proclus in antiquity, from John Dee to
John Norris and John Wallis in the early modern
period, and from Immanuel Kant, Samuel
Coleridge, and William Wordsworth into the
nineteenth century. For the Victorian mathematicians on whom Cohen focuses, however, “the
idea of communing with a unified divine Mind
naturally pushed them toward a denial of the
Trinity and a skepticism about the importance of
the Church and clergy” (p. 40). While Peirce, De
Morgan, and, to a more ambiguous extent,
Boole entertained Unitarianism, Cohen makes
the more all-encompassing claim that “the mixture of Unitarianism and mathematical idealism
was a powerful undercurrent to research in pure
mathematics and mathematical logic in the Victorian age” (p. 41).
The next three chapters— on Peirce, Boole,
and De Morgan, respectively—present three
case studies focused on the philosophical and
religious ideas (the two are often blurred in
Cohen’s analysis) as well as, to a lesser extent,
the actual mathematical ideas of their respective
protagonists. Each chapter also lays out evidence for the “affinity between pure mathematics and idealist Unitarianism in the nineteenth
century” (p. 57), with those on Boole and De
Morgan especially analyzing their respective developments of mathematical logic as part of
their efforts to produce a science of thought. As
case studies, these chapters present glimpses
from at least one angle into the minds and milieus of their subjects, even if an argument connecting Boole and De Morgan emerges from
them much more clearly than does one linking
these two British protagonists and the American
Peirce.
The issue of argument becomes more acute in
the final chapter of the book, where Cohen
draws broad conclusions about the professionalization of mathematics in Great Britain and in
the United States in the last three decades of the
nineteenth century largely on the basis of his
three case studies. He contends that in Great
Britain, as in the United States, “the correlation
between ideological change”—namely, the

abandonment by mathematicians of their “traditional, religiously tinged philosophy of mathematics”—“and mathematical professionalization is conspicuous” (p. 138). This argument—
too frequently based on hasty generalization—
proves problematic on too many levels to
elaborate in the limited space of this review. To
give just two examples, it assumes that there
was one, monolithic “philosophy of mathematics,” somehow shared by nineteenth-century
mathematicians in the United States and Great
Britain, to be abandoned. Had different case
studies been taken, however—say, those of
James Joseph Sylvester and Arthur Cayley instead of Boole and De Morgan—a very different
picture would have emerged. Cohen’s argument
also fails to take into account critical cultural
and social differences that make the stories of
the development of scientific professions and
institutions in Great Britain and in the United
States so different in the many details. In the
United States, the Civil War and the following
Gilded Age witnessed the private endowment of
new, Prussian-inspired institutions of higher education focused from the beginning on research
and the training of future researchers. In England, the slow but ongoing effects both of the
so-called Age of Reform and of the development of the new social category of the “professional man” in Oxbridge and elsewhere were
key components of change. Cohen has offered
food for thought for historians of Victorian science in general and of mathematics in particular.
Unfortunately, some of it should be consumed
with caution.
KAREN HUNGER PARSHALL
Erik M. Conway. Blind Landings: LowVisibility Operations in American Aviation,
1918 –1958. xiv ⫹ 218 pp., illus., notes, index.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
2006. $45 (cloth).
Erik Conway’s Blind Landings: Low-Visibility
Operations in American Aviation, 1918 –1958,
is an important contribution to the history of the
technology of flight. Conway’s intelligent analysis differentiates this volume from many books
on the history of aviation, which are often technologically deterministic and methodologically
progressive. In contrast, Blind Landings sheds
badly needed light on the erratic evolution of an
important element of aviation’s infrastructure
during the formative period of its growth. The
book makes it evident that the pursuit of “lowvisibility operations,” far from being a seamless
succession of triumphant events, was an en-
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Ed Link posing with his “blue box,” an early blind fighter trainer. National Air and Space Museum,
Smithsonian Institution, SI 99-4151 (taken from Conway, Blind Landings).

deavor filled with pitfalls, institutional rivalries,
petty bickering, and bitter politics.
Conway examines the development of what
in the interwar years was called “blind flying”;
this later evolved into technologies that enabled
aircraft to fly in all weather conditions. Ultimately, he concludes that the pursuit of “blind
flying” was abandoned not because the problem
was impossible to solve but because the competing demands of technology, politics, and culture that shaped the solutions were impossible to
resolve. Conway claims that a huge consideration was the reluctance of pilots to trust that an
aircraft, fitted with the appropriate technology
and tracked and guided by someone on the
ground, would be able to find its way in difficult
weather. A penchant for self-preservation made
pilots believe that only they should be in control
of their aircraft.
The book tells the complicated story of
forty years of efforts to perfect aircraft landing systems. Nevertheless, Conway manages
to deal with the issues clearly and to provide
sufficient context to explain that while the
technology was a difficult enough nut to
crack, the human element was perhaps the
most imposing consideration. World War II

had the effect of speeding up the development
of blind landing system technology, producing, for example, the MIT Radiation Laboratory’s radar-based Ground Controlled Approach System (GCA). Nevertheless, the
conflict between pilot-controlled and groundcontrolled systems remained.
After World War II, the competition between
GCA and the Instrument Landing System (ILS),
which had been tested in 1929 and installed at
six locations in 1941, came to a head, with the
Army Air Forces (AAF), the Air Transport Association (the representative of the commercial
airlines), and the Civil Aeronautics Administration promoting ILS and the Navy and the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association advocating
GCA. Technologically, politically, and culturally, ILS was preferred by the AAF and the
commercial pilot community because it was perceived to give pilots more control of the aircraft
than GCA. GCA, a radar-based system controlled primarily on the ground, was seen as
making flying easier for the private aircraft community.
When the U.S. Congress got into the battle
sparks flew, and Conway makes a point of
revealing the misleading rhetoric on both
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sides of the question, promulgated by the special interests as well as by the aviation press.
In discussing the safety issues surrounding
each system, Conway says that despite the
perception that aviation was unsafe in the
early post–World War II era, the reality was
that the airways were much safer than they
seemed to be. “It simply did not appear that
way to a public misled by a number of sensational crash stories and equally ostentatious
tales of radar’s [i.e., GCA’s] ‘all-seeing eye.’
Congress chose to act on the appearance
rather than the reality” (p. 152).
Eventually, both sides realized that ILS and
GCA were complementary systems, and the task
of finding a way to integrate them fell to the
revived Radio Technical Commission on Aeronautics (RTCA). The RTCA had been formed in
1936 by the Bureau of Air Commerce to deal
with problems in aviation associated with radio
technologies, but it had no legal authority. The
new RTCA, Conway says, “produced a template
for not only a landing aids solution but for a
comprehensive nationwide system of air traffic
control” (p. 164).
Conway concludes that although the concept
of “blind landing” was never realized, “the
dream of blind landing was . . . important to
aviation because it stimulated development of
an array of technologies that proved important
to related needs” (p. 186). These technologies,
Conway contends, made it possible for commercial aviation to achieve better safety and regularity in operations than other systems of transportation.
DOMINICK A. PISANO
Charles Darwin. The Correspondence of
Charles Darwin. Volume 15: 1867. Edited by
Frederick Burkhardt et alia. xlii ⫹ 705 pp.,
illus., figs., tables, apps., bibl., index. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press,
2005. $130 (cloth).
The Correspondence of Charles Darwin is the
definitive edition of all known letters to and
from Charles Darwin. The volume under review
is the fifteenth and most recent, covering the
year 1867. Like its predecessors, it demonstrates
that the Correspondence is a model of academic
research and publishing. The letters are meticulously edited and expertly annotated to throw
light on the relevant scientific and historical
contexts.
In 1867 Darwin, turning fifty-eight, completed the manuscript of his longest work: The
Variation of Animals and Plants under Domes-

tication (Murray, 1868), begun in 1860. The
book covered what had been intended to be the
topic of the first two chapters of his larger unpublished work on evolution: natural selection.
Much of Variation discusses artificial selection;
it also presents the first discussion of the provisional hypothesis to explain inheritance: pangenesis. In typical fashion, Darwin had been
mulling it over for more than twenty-five years.
The book was published on 30 January 1868,
just beyond the time frame of this volume of
correspondence. Because his health had improved, Darwin was able to pursue several
projects simultaneously. In addition to the
lengthy task of correcting the proofs of Variation, he began an essay on man that would
become The Descent of Man (Murray, 1871) and
Expression of the Emotions (Murray, 1872).
Much of the correspondence in this volume concerns Darwin’s interest in these topics.
Perhaps most powerfully of all, this volume
of the Correspondence demonstrates Darwin’s
astonishing international network of correspondents on research questions such as human expressions across cultures and races. One of his
correspondents, the Russian embryologist Alexander Kovalevsky, sent “a very fine big black
Russian bear” skin made into a carpet, complete
with head and paws. A footnote (p. 307) reveals
that the bear was dutifully brought out and displayed in the drawing room when Kovalevsky
came for a visit.
Two important critiques of Darwin’s theory
of evolution also appeared in 1867. The Reign of
Law (Strahan, 1867), by the duke of Argyll,
George Douglas Campbell, particularly criticized Darwin’s argument that beauty in nature
has an adaptive function. Argyll insisted that
beauty was designed by the Creator for the benefit of man. The other important critique was an
anonymous review in the North British Review
by the engineer Fleeming Jenkin. The review
claimed that an advantageous variation would
not be promoted by natural selection because it
would be diluted and lost owing to blending
inheritance. In response, Darwin altered the
wording in Origin (5th ed.; Murray, 1869) to
stress the omnipresence of variations in many
individuals and the likelihood of multiple variations in a population being selected.
Some of the footnotes may strike some readers as less helpful than others, especially those
referring to the contents of the present volume.
If the same subject (such as a sick child) is
referred to in subsequent letters, it will produce
a cascade of footnotes referring readers back to
earlier letters in the volume. Yet an interesting
external point—for example, the fact that the
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first letter in the volume, which was originally
published in the Athenæum, was republished
two days later in the Times (7 Jan. 1867; p.
8)—might not be mentioned.
The Correspondence is not only the premier
Darwin reference work but also the greatest biography of Darwin ever written— or that could
be written. It leads us in a detailed, often dayby-day, close-up journey though his life and
thought—and it offers windows into the life and
thought of those who communicated with him as
well. It is impossible to know or understand
Charles Darwin without reading and rereading
the Correspondence volumes.
The funding bodies that have had the foresight and courage to support the long-term research to produce these outstanding volumes
should be very pleased. The assembled research
experience and expertise concentrated in the
project, in addition to the invaluable volumes
themselves, is surely worth the price. The only
downside that I can see to the Correspondence
project is that at the current rate of production—
slow but magnificent—we must wait another
twenty years before we can enjoy all of it.
JOHN VAN WYHE
Judith R. Goodstein. The Volterra Chronicles:
The Life and Times of an Extraordinary Mathematician, 1860 –1940. (History of Mathematics, 31.) x ⫹ 310 pp., illus., apps., bibl., index.
Providence, R.I.: American Mathematical Society, 2007. $59 (cloth).
Judith R. Goodstein presents a biography of the
Italian mathematician Vito Volterra. She has
based her work solidly on archival sources,
which include Volterra’s personal and professional correspondence with family members
(mainly his mother, uncle, cousin, and wife) and
with influential mentors and colleagues (among
them Antonio Ròiti, Enrico Betti, Tullio LeviCivita, and Guido Castelnuovo), as well as on
interviews with Volterra’s descendants and acquaintances.
Born in an Italian Jewish family in the year of
the unification of Italy and of the liberation of
Italy’s Jewish ghettos, Volterra attended the university and the Scuola Normale Superiore in
Pisa, where he worked under both Ulisse Dini
and Betti. Immediately after graduating in physics in 1882 Volterra became Betti’s assistant,
and in the following year he joined the faculty.
Volterra’s academic career, which started when
he was only twenty-three, is discussed in the central part of this biography. Goodstein carefully
describes the negotiations that led to Volterra’s
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appointments, underscoring the mathematician’s
political and professional struggle to obtain his
subsequent professorships in Turin in 1893 and in
Rome in 1900. In these years Volterra began to
build his reputation as one of the finest Italian
mathematicians both in Italy and abroad and established extensive scientific contacts with the rest
of the Italian mathematical community and with
his European colleagues.
At the turn of the twentieth century, Volterra’s career experienced an incredibly rapid rise.
The biography’s closing chapters describe the
ascent that occurred over the course of the first
three decades of the new century, when Volterra
became the leading mathematician of the Italian
school of mathematics and “Mr. Italian Science”
to the rest of the world. In this period he delivered invited lectures at international congresses
of mathematicians and spoke at universities and
institutes in several countries. In particular, he
traveled to the United States three times. Goodstein devotes a beautiful and captivating part of
the book to Volterra’s American experience and
to his influence on the American mathematical
community.
The rise of fascism in Italy marked the decline of Volterra’s career both as a politician and
as a scientist. The author provides a detailed and
interesting account of those years and shows
evidence of Volterra’s opposition to Mussolini’s
regime. His refusal to sign a loyalty oath to the
fascist government in 1931 led to his dismissal
from the University of Rome. Out of Italy’s
1,250 university professors, only twelve refused
to sign the oath and lost their jobs; Volterra was
the only mathematician. Volterra’s health began
to decline in the wake of these events and with
the enforcement of the infamous racial laws of
1938. He died in his bed in 1940.
This well-written volume is intended for a
broad, nontechnical audience; indeed, mathematics and its applications are barely present in
The Volterra Chronicles. The author succeeds,
nevertheless, in conveying the significance of
Volterra’s work by outlining his mathematical
achievements in the context of three appendixes.
An analysis of Volterra’s mathematical works
and a list of his 236 publications are included in
Appendix A, which consists of a reprint of the
obituary Sir Edmund Whittaker published with
the Royal Society of London in 1941. Appendix
B consists of a reprint of the inaugural address
delivered by Volterra at the opening of the 1901/
1902 academic year at the University of Rome;
while Appendix C contains his inaugural talk at
the first congress of the Italian Society for the
Progress of the Sciences, given in 1907. These
last two appendixes highlight Volterra’s interest
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and involvement in the development of science
in Italy and in the application of mathematics to
the biological and social sciences. All of this
more technical material nicely complements the
vivid portrait of Volterra’s life presented in the
main part of the text. The total conveys what
made Vito Volterra an extraordinary mathematician, a fine man of science, and a remarkable
individual.
I have only one regret: the original Italian of
the many interesting quotations is not given.
This inclusion would have been useful from a
scholarly point of view; at the same time, it
would have allowed readers to enjoy the flavor
of Volterra’s nineteenth-century Italian style.
Notable studies on Volterra and his times
have been published recently in Italy, as Goodstein acknowledges in her selected biography.
However, the present volume is one of the few
sources in English. It is also one of the (too) few
biographies of remarkable Italian mathematicians of post-unification Italy (although see Hubert C. Kennedy’s Peano [Dordrecht, 1980]). It
is to be hoped that Goodstein’s book will inspire
more work in this direction by historians of
science in general and of mathematics in particular.
LAURA MARTINI
Ulf Hashagen. Walther von Dyck (1856 –1934):
Mathematik, Technik und Wissenschaftsorganisation an der TH München. (Boethius: Texte
und Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Mathematik und der Naturwissenschaften, 47.) vi ⫹
802 pp., bibl., index. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner
Verlag, 2003. €108.
With this book Ulf Hashagen presents one of the
most extensive biographies of a mathematician
ever written. Walther von Dyck was one of the
few university professors of mathematics in
Germany at the turn of the twentieth century
who had an enduring influence on his country’s
scientific and cultural development. Dyck contributed greatly to the outstanding reputation the
Technische Hochschule of Munich now enjoys.
This book traces his life in an unusually detailed
and careful way.
Dyck studied at the Technische Hochschule
and the University of Munich and took his Ph.D.
at the university in 1879 with a dissertation on a
topic suggested by Felix Klein (1849 –1925). In
1880 he followed Klein to the University of
Leipzig, where he completed his Habilitationsschrift in 1882. In 1884 he was appointed a full
professor at the Technische Hochschule of Munich. From 1900 to 1906 and from 1919 to 1926

he was its rector, and he took an increasingly
prominent role in German mathematics. Together with his school friend Oskar von Miller
he founded the Deutsches Museum in Munich;
the founding of the commission at the Bavarian
Academy of Science for editing the works of
Johannes Kepler can also be credited to Dyck.
Walther von Dyck (1856 –1934): Mathematik,
Technik und Wissenschaftsorganisation an der
TH München is divided in seven parts, with
twenty-nine chapters. Parts 1, 2, and 6 are
largely chronological in order, while Parts 3, 4,
5, and 7 follow a systematical order. The structure of the book thus reflects Dyck’s way of life,
for he often pursued several parallel trajectories
at the same time. Thus some repetitions and
jumps cannot be avoided.
Part 1 treats Dyck’s “Youth in Munich”
(school and university study), Part 2 “A New
World and a Strange Native Country.” After his
time as an assistant at the University of Leipzig
Dyck made trips to Berlin (visiting Kronecker,
Kummer, and Weierstrass), Paris (Poincaré),
and North America. He became acquainted with
mathematicians in Montreal, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Cincinnati, Kansas, New Mexico, San
Francisco, Berkeley, and Chicago. Part 3 describes his situation as “Professor of Mathematics at the TH Munich” (here the topics include
educating engineers, the rivalry between the
Technische Hochschule and the university, and
Dyck’s own career), and Part 4 is entitled “Politics Concerning Universities and Education in
Bavaria in the Time of the Prince Regent Luitpold.” Part 5 is concerned with the editing of the
Mathematische Annalen and the Encyclopedia,
the founding of the Deutsches Museum, and
politics at the Bavarian Academy of Science.
Part 6, “A Professor in the War,” primarily investigates Dyck’s relation to the University of
Ghent; and Part 7, “The Unremitting Scientific
Politician in the Weimar Republic,” turns to his
activities as rector, editor, scientific historian,
and politician.
Dyck’s impact can be ascribed to his personality and to his views about the close relationship between mathematics and the arts. As measured by the number and the extent of his
mathematical works, he was not an unusually
productive mathematician. His main topics lie in
the field of Riemann surfaces, group theory, and
topology. He left most of his working fields after
some years of research. As Hashagen shows,
Dyck—in a manner similar to his mentor
Klein— devoted himself to the exciting work of
building bridges between his scientific research
and public engagement with science. Like
Klein, Dyck was cut out to be a teacher, and he
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was a far better advocate for the public impact
and appreciation of mathematics than some of
the more famous and productive mathematical
researchers of the twentieth century.
This biography is based largely on unpublished archival papers. Unfortunately, the papers
of Dyck himself are presented only in part. A
great deal of material—for example, manuscripts of his own lectures and his letters—is
missing. Despite this difficult situation concerning the sources, the author uses a well-reasoned
methodical conception of his subject to paint a
successful portrait of the versatile Walther von
Dyck and his impact.
The supplementary materials include a survey
of the rectors, teachers, and dissertations at the
TH Munich and indexes of abbreviations, the
sources used, the literature, and names (there is
no subject index). Small misprints are negligible
in the face of the book’s appealing layout.
This volume is addressed to readers who are
interested in the connection of the history of
mathematics with the history of culture and institutions; these issues are explored through the
treatment of an authoritative figure at an important German university. In deference to this focus, the history of technical and social questions
takes second place. This versatile and impressive biography documents an eventful chapter in
the history of science as it played out in and
around the universities in Munich and Leipzig in
the years between 1880 and 1940. It sets a new
standard for ambitious scientific biographies.
MICHAEL TOEPELL
Michael Hau. The Cult of Health and Beauty in
Germany: A Social History, 1890 –1930. x ⫹
286 pp., illus., bibl., index. Chicago/London:
University of Chicago Press, 2003. $22 (paper).
Michael Hau investigates the social and cultural
basis of ideas of health and beauty before 1930.
His endeavor is geared to explaining why the
Nazis demonized such groups as Jews and gypsies as pathological, ugly, and sinister figures.
Hau analyzes the discourses around nature therapy and eugenics and works mainly through
description, narrative, and occasional biographical sketches. Neither epistemological issues
concerning the demarcation and validity of alternative medicine nor the more mundane issues
of organizations, collective biographies, professional and national politics, and the economics
of medical practice and the publishing market
figure in his account to any great extent. The
analysis of key issues of health, hygiene, and
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fitness consequently has a somewhat impressionistic quality.
Hau attempts to reconfigure the historiography of eugenics by drawing close links with
nature therapy. The ideological spectrum of eugenicists involving Lamarckian environmentalism, the eugenic interest in abstinence from alcohol, and links between eugenics and such
movements as monism are hardly new topics.
That there was Roman Catholic and socialist
support for eugenics (pp. 136 –151) has long
been recognized; more interesting is Hau’s evidence as to the prevalence of support for euthanasia among nature therapists. His text revolves
around a series of putative, ethereal discourses.
Points of ideological tension—as between “constitutional theory” and nature therapy—are not
exploited.
There are some errors, indicating a lack of
sureness with the material—for example, reference to Adolf rather than Alfred Ploetz (p.
117)—and nowhere is it made clear that Hugo
Iltis was Czech. But more significant is the failure to identify key ideological polarities. Hau
discusses German racial hygiene in terms of
holism, citing the case of Fritz Lenz: this is
puzzling, as Lenz—whose work was grounded
in genetics—joined the attack on holistic hygiene in Nazi Germany as dangerously theistic.
Race hygienists abhorred notions of environmental hygiene or “geo-medicine” drawing on
Gestalt theory. Hau expands his categories of
interpretation to the point that they become
opaque and intangible—and somewhat ephemeral. Although interesting, and with some suggestive illustrations, overall The Cult of Health
and Beauty in Germany is weakened by its impressionistic approach and a somewhat arbitrary
cutoff point in 1930.
PAUL WEINDLING
Daniel Kennefick. Traveling at the Speed of
Thought: Einstein and the Quest for Gravitational Waves. xii ⫹ 319 pp., illus., figs., bibl.,
index. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 2007. $35 (cloth).
This is a book about how physicists decide when
their ideas are right. Much has been written
about how physicists conclude that their experiments are correct, but less attention has been
paid to how they declare their theories to be
finished. Daniel Kennefick’s book tackles this
question through the history of gravitational
waves (ripples in space-time predicted by Einstein’s theory of general relativity), a subfield of
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physics that has already proven to be a rich topic
for science studies.
Part of the appeal of gravitational wave physics for science studies is the peculiar detail that
the discipline operated with very little experimental constraint from World War I to the
1970s. The theorists were on their own. How did
they function without the experimental anchors
that were traditionally supposed to restrain wild
speculation and keep physics from becoming
lost in deep waters? Kennefick shows that the
most valuable tool for theorists navigating in
such unknown realms was the analogy. That is,
physicists calibrated their sense of how a poorly
understood theory (general relativity) was supposed to work by finding fruitful physical, mathematical, or conceptual analogies to a wellunderstood theory (here, electromagnetism).
Specifically, the analogy of electromagnetic radiation functioned as the pole star for physicists
investigating gravitational waves, helping them
figure out where to look and what to look for.
But the “correct” use of an analogy is far from
obvious, and this book shows that many of the
disagreements over the existence, meaning, or
detection of gravitational waves can be traced to
how the scientists involved thought about the
analogy between electromagnetic and gravitational radiation. Some took the analogy quite
seriously and strongly, while some resisted investing it with too much authority. Kennefick
tells the story of gravitational waves as a struggle between skeptics and believers battling over
the correct use of the electromagnetic analogy,
and he does an excellent job with the tricky task
of presenting both parties in a respectful and
rational light.
The book focuses largely on the development
of gravitational wave theory after Einstein presented his general relativity theory in 1915, with
some occasional chronological jumps and one
chapter on the prehistory of concepts and techniques germane to the discussion. The majority
of the narrative traces gravitational waves from
their initial prediction through the various controversies when physicists grappled with the
question of exactly what (if anything) these
waves were and precisely how they should deal
with them. Along the way we get a minihistory
of general relativity’s birth, nadir, and renaissance. Kennefick illustrates a number of detailed
technical controversies and provides vivid portraits of the individuals and conferences involved, often using impressive archival detective work and original oral histories. One
missing element that readers might expect is a
detailed discussion of gravitational wave detectors such as LIGO. The final chapters of the

book contain very interesting and thoughtful
discussions of important issues such as different
styles of scientific reasoning and the way physicists use their field’s history as a tool in contemporary controversies.
One of Kennefick’s major explanatory categories is the “theoretician’s regress”: the
puzzle of how a theorist decides when a calculation is correct. Everyone in this story
wants a crucial experiment to test the theory,
but they first need to agree on precisely what
the theory predicts, which turns out to be
extremely nonobvious. This is an important
contribution to the way we think about the
relationship between theory and observation,
showing that the establishment of a theoretical
prediction is no more straightforward than the
experimental tests of that prediction. Kennefick also uses this category to discuss the
role of intuition in science (it can help break
the regress) and how different styles of scientific reasoning shape the debates around uncertain theoretical results.
Kennefick makes heroic efforts to explain the
properties of tensors and difficult concepts such
as choice of coordinate systems, but sections of
Traveling at the Speed of Thought will be difficult for someone without a decent physics background (or a fair deal of patience). Other parts
are much more accessible, but the book does
assume that the reader already knows the basics
of gravitational waves.
Gravitational wave studies have been important and controversial in science studies,
and Kennefick wades confidently onto that
battlefield. He takes a moderate position between Harry Collins and Allan Franklin, asserting that both sides on the Weber controversy can be thought of as rational. This book
overlaps very little with other books on gravitational waves, such as Collins’s Gravity’s
Shadow (Chicago, 2004) or Marcia Bartusiak’s Einstein’s Unfinished Symphony (Joseph Henry Press, 2000), and in fact complements both of those books nicely. Traveling at
the Speed of Thought will be valuable for
historians, sociologists, and philosophers of
modern physics and others interested in the
development and use of scientific theories,
and it will also be of significant interest to
practicing physicists and physics students.
MATTHEW STANLEY
Leoncio López-Ocón; Jean-Pierre Chaumeil;
Ana Verde Casanova (Editors). Los americanistas del siglo XIX: La construcción de
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una comunidad cientı́fica internacional. 355
pp., illus., figs. Frankfurt: Vervuert Verlagsgesellschaft, 2006.
During the second half of the nineteenth century, the term “Americanism” was used in several European countries (“américanisme” in
France, “americanismo” in Spain, “Amerikanistik” in Germany) to define a new field of studies
primarily concerned with the analysis of primitive American cultures. This discipline emerged
with the convergence of two developments. The
first was a renewed interest in the study of material culture stemming from Native American
communities. The development of ethnographically based museums during the nineteenth century provoked an unprecedented interest in a
wide range of items (e.g., tissues/fabrics, weapons, tools) from small-scale American societies.
Second, the development of scientific disciplines such as history, anthropology, and archaeology encouraged the study of so-called
primitive cultures, then considered representative of a more primitive humankind. In this
context, “Americanism” emerged during the
nineteenth century as an interdisciplinary field
defined by the creation of new scientific societies (such as the French Société des Américanistes), the convening of international congresses
(held, for instance, in Brussels in 1879 and in
Paris in 1895), and the establishment of international scientific networks.
Los americanistas del siglo XIX analyzes the
constitution of this interdisciplinary field in
France, Spain, and Germany. The book compiles
the proceedings of an international congress held
in Madrid in October 2003. The editors have divided the twelve contributions into two parts. The
first analyzes the work of several distinguished
“americanistas” of the nineteenth century (Désiré
Charnay, Florencio Janer, Jiménez de la Espada,
Sir Clements Markham) and how traditional
American objects were exhibited in France and
Spain. The second part focuses on the relationships between “Americanism” and other academic
disciplines like history and, in particular, anthropology. As these authors point out, the origins of
“Americanism” were multiple and diverse, stemming from a fusion of distinct fields and diverse
academic traditions. This interdisciplinarity allows
these historians to examine various scientific disciplines treating this new discourse about America.
This examination is, in my view, the book’s
main strength. The volume successfully reconstructs and contextualizes ways in which “Americanism” emerged during the second half of the
nineteenth century as a new discourse treating Na-
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tive American societies. As most of these essays
demonstrate, scientists dealt with data and objects,
but also with colleagues, journals, international
networks, and public and private institutions. In
this sense, the establishment of this new field is a
process that involved both the definition of a new
object of study and the institutionalization of certain structures (e.g., museums, congresses, publications) that supported the emergence of the new
discipline. “Americanism” is here rightly defined
as a global project that included the constitution of
an international community (best exemplified in
chapters treating the relationship between the
French and Spanish scientific communities), the
appropriation of Americans’ primitive material
culture (see Pascal Riviale’s and Leticia Ariadna
Martı́nez and Ana Verde Casanova’s essays), and
the establishment of personal and professional networks (see, e.g., Leoncio López-Ocón’s piece on
Jiménez de la Espada). Most important, “Americanism” established a number of heterogeneous
relationships with other disciplines (see the chapters concerning the relationship between “Americanism” and anthropology, for instance). All these
processes are appropriately examined here. Therefore, the collection’s chief merit is its reconstruction of the constitution of this scientific field.
The volume pays little attention, however, to
how “Americanism” served to support colonialist economic, political, and cultural systems. After the recent boom of work on postcolonialism,
it has become evident that Western knowledge
examining non-Western cultures has also served
to justify imperial practices of domination.
“Americanism” is no exception. Unfortunately,
linkages between power and knowledge in the
constitution of the field are only vaguely explored in this book.
In short, although greater attention might have
been given to the political implications of “Americanism,” the academic strength of the volume
leaves nothing to be desired, and the claims entertained are significant within the history of science.
OSCAR MORO-ABADı́A
Donna C. Mehos. Science and Culture for
Members Only: The Amsterdam Zoo Artis in the
Nineteenth Century. 212 pp., illus., plates, bibl.,
index. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University
Press, 2006. $49.95 (paper).
For many a Western capital or large city in the
nineteenth century, establishing a zoological
garden was a symbol of civic and national
pride. To maintain and display a collection of
live, exotic animals was to demonstrate a
city’s or nation’s wealth, culture, commitment
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to science, and ability to command faraway
resources. After the first new zoos were
founded in Paris (1794) and London (1828),
the creation of other zoos proceeded apace.
Prominent among them was the zoological
garden of Amsterdam. Founded in 1838 with
the name “Natura Artis Magistra” (“Nature is
the Teacher of Art”), the Amsterdam zoo
functioned simultaneously as a site for zoological research and a center of bourgeois
culture. Donna C. Mehos’s Science and Culture for Members Only illuminates the scientific and social roles that “Artis” played.
Artis was established by three Amsterdam
burghers who wanted, as their prospectus said,
“to advance natural historical knowledge in a
pleasant and illustrative manner” (p. 60).
More specifically, they sought to establish a
zoological garden and a natural history museum that would be the focus of a new, private
social club. The institution indeed proved very
attractive to bourgeois Amsterdammers, and
by the middle of the century it claimed
twenty-five hundred members. Not until the
twentieth century were the gates opened to the
general public.
A key theme of Mehos’s book is the way
that Artis functioned for several decades as
the leading cultural center of Amsterdam. At a
time when art museums such as the later-tobe-magnificent Rijksmuseum were unable to
attract financial support, Artis thrived. Significantly, it was more than just a place to view
live and stuffed animals. Members of the club
could hear the city’s leading orchestras play
highbrow music there or dine in a handsome
restaurant. Artis was a site for cultural elevation and social interaction, where, as Mehos
suggests, the burghers who met each other
“were perhaps as likely to discuss the latest
trends on the stock exchange as natural history” (p. 23).
Several Artis members aimed to make the institution a place for serious zoological research. They
included the zoo’s principal founder, Gerardus F.
Westerman, a book publisher whose private collection of live birds became the first animals of the
new zoo; Hermann Schlegel, a taxonomist and
illustrator; and Willem Vrolik, an expert on pathological and comparative anatomy. When the zoo
board initially refused to provide funds in support
of scientific research, the scientists formed an independent “Scientific Association for the Advancement of Natural Historical Knowledge” (p.
64). In 1847 this association finally became connected to Artis. The following year, under Artis
auspices, the journal Bijdragen tot de Dierkunde
(Contributions to Zoology) began publication, sig-

naling Artis’s commitment to science and Dutch
interests in taking a place on the international scientific stage.
As was true for most other nineteenth-century
zoos, the scientific research conducted at Artis was
not especially innovative. Though Artis naturalists
recited the advantages of being able to study live
creatures, they rarely profited from the opportunity. Neither the behavior nor the physiology of
living animals became the focus of their attentions.
They were interested primarily in anatomical and
taxonomic problems that were best studied after an
animal died. Where the naturalists were most
likely to make a mark, one guesses, was by describing exotic specimens that came to the zoo
thanks to Dutch colonial connections. Vrolik developed an international reputation for his anatomical and taxonomic studies of monkeys.
Did Vrolik and his colleagues actively urge
colonial officials, sea captains, and the like to
collect specific animals for Artis? The book
does not tell us. It says much about the scientific and cultural intentions of the zoo’s
founders but little about the growth of the
collection. One reads that the zoo’s specimens
reflected Holland’s colonial reach, but not
which species were collected or where they
came from. Nor does the author describe how
the animals were displayed (though some of
the book’s illustrations help in this regard) or
the various sights, sounds, and smells that zoo
visitors encountered. We hear briefly of two
hippopotami that arrived at the zoo in 1860,
but nothing else about individual animals that
may have sparked the interest of Amsterdammers. The book is primarily about Artis’s cultural place in nineteenth-century Amsterdam,
not about life at the zoo or Dutch attitudes
toward animals. One might wish for more on
these last-mentioned topics, but Mehos nonetheless provides a very welcome contribution
to the growing literature on zoos and what
they meant in their particular historical contexts.
RICHARD W. BURKHARDT, JR.
Linda Nash. Inescapable Ecologies: A History
of Environment, Disease, and Knowledge. xii ⫹
332 pp., figs., notes, bibl., index. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006. $60 (cloth);
$24.95 (paper).
In her impressive new book Inescapable Ecologies, Linda Nash traces the interconnected histories of health and the environment in California’s Central Valley. Her starting point is a
nineteenth-century worldview that connected
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bodies and places. Nineteenth-century American settlers often mixed their judgments of a
landscape’s fertility or resource richness with
close attention to their sense of its health. To
them, health was a quality of the environment,
and they judged lands sickly or salubrious on the
basis of the perceived qualities of soils, airs,
waters, plants, and climates. But the health of
the land was not a quality that inhered in the
land alone; it also connected body and environment across a porous boundary. This particular
worldview had not received much scholarly attention until recently, in part because it was
often based on wrongheaded miasmatic theories
and thus was easy to dismiss. But Nash suggests
that there is much for both environmental and
medical historians to learn from these premodern ecologies of health: they provided a sense of
connection to which we need to return.
Nash begins her analysis in Gold Rush California, as fortune seekers poured through the
Central Valley to access the Sierra gold fields.
The Central Valley, then a vast plain of deltaic
and seasonal wetlands, produced in many of
these migrants both ill health (usually malaria)
and constitutional anxieties that together shaped
their sense of the landscape. Nash is particularly
successful in communicating how foreign, even
tropical, the climate and environment seemed to
outsiders and how much energy they devoted to
assessing whether their bodies fit the place. Today most see California’s climate and environment as anodyne, but well into the twentieth
century the Central Valley was one of the most
malarious spots in North America. For many
early California transplants—and the metaphor
is an apt one—transforming the environment
was not an act of conscious conquest but a more
anxious attempt to create conditions under
which they might flourish in new soil and a
strange climate.
Nash’s interest in nineteenth-century ecologies of health is not only about explicating a
worldview lost to modernity. What intrigues
her, and what defines the second part of the
book, is how that nineteenth-century worldview
prefigured the Central Valley’s postwar ecologies of health. With the germ theory in hand,
scientific medicine taught that disease was the
result of discrete agents working within bodies.
The conceit of modern medical practice as it
developed in the early twentieth century, Nash
insists, was that environment did not really matter much to health or, to the extent that it did,
that it could be mastered through modern methods of sanitary engineering. But as the Central
Valley became the global epicenter of agricultural industrialization, a new set of concerns
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about toxic pesticides revived nineteenthcentury ecologies of health in select ways. Nash
does a particularly strong job in showing how
bodily response to chemical exposure was
rooted not just in a reductive body– chemical
relationship, but in the particularities of place
and space—in how chemicals interacted with
soils, waters, crops, and climates as well as
particular bodies. In short, the environment mattered again, and a new ecology of health grew
up with these postwar toxic threats. Nash ends
her book with a look at a series of cancer clusters in Central Valley communities, examining
how modern medical and public health experts
flailed in their efforts to connect bodily illness to
environmental contamination while those most affected— often poor or working-class MexicanAmerican farmworkers—fought to have their experiences of illness taken seriously.
Inescapable Ecologies is a sweeping history
that isolates in one place a crucial set of transitions in medical and environmental thought and
practice. It is mostly successful in doing so, and
it should soon become required reading for students of western, medical, and environmental
history as well as historians of science. It is, in
short, a very good book. But there are also
aspects of Nash’s analysis that I found unsatisfying. While her theorizing about bodies, space,
and modernity usually advances her argument,
there are moments when it seems to get in the
way. Moreover, however similar the miasmatic
and toxic worldviews were in linking bodily and
environmental health, and however each bucked
modernist medical efforts to confine disease within
the body, these two worldviews had profoundly
different implications for how people thought
about nature. Ultimately, and despite certain important exceptions, nineteenth-century Californians saw unimproved nature in the Central Valley
as unhealthy, while postwar Americans saw a
landscape polluted by humans as the problem.
Nash does not ignore this facet of the story—she
notes, for instance, that the “environmentalist demand for absolute purity was itself an outgrowth
of sanitary modernity” (p. 214)— but I was surprised by how little developed it was. Finally, in
her idealization of the body– environment connection, Nash elides the imprecision of nineteenthcentury thinking and, more important, so thoroughly blurs the line between disease experience
and causation as to leave the reader wondering
how seeing a fundamental porosity between body
and environment might help to underwrite clearer,
more effective, and more just public health interventions. By her final paragraph, she seems to be
wondering the same thing herself.
PAUL S. SUTTER
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Eizabeth R. Neswald. Thermodynamik als
kultureller Kampfplatz: Zur Faszinationsgeschichte der Entropie, 1850 –1915. 475 pp.,
figs., bibl. Freiburg: Rombach Verlag, 2006.
€48 (cloth).
This broadly researched study examines the cultural meanings of entropy in Britain, France, and
the German lands from 1850 to 1915. Having
published in 1850 the first expression of what
became known as the second law of thermodynamics, Rudolf Clausius introduced the term
“entropy” in 1865 to capture the fact that many
natural processes—most notably the flow of
heat from a hotter to a colder body— exhibit
inexorable directionality. The cognate notion of
the “dissipation” of mechanical energy had been
introduced by William Thomson in 1852, employing a word rich with connotations. Implicit
in all this is the point that frames Elizabeth
Neswald’s study: the principle of entropy was
ostensibly a universally applicable law of nature, even as the concept of entropy was given a
diversity of interpretations embodying a variety
of examples and analogies. Hence its appeal to a
variety of people who exploited its protean
meanings for diverse ends.
The author echoes the view that ostensibly
objective scientific knowledge cannot be separated from its cultural context, “that both producers and receivers of scientific knowledge act
within a common and heterogeneous cultural
space” (p. 21). In the event, she has little to say
about the generation of scientific knowledge
within the context of technical problems and
solutions and nothing about any cultural influences back onto the technical sphere. The language of “producers” and “receivers” correctly
suggests that Thermodynamik als kultureller
Kampfplatz will not achieve the much-sought
transcendence of the internal/external distinction.
Neswald analyzes the cosmologies of Buffon,
Kant, Laplace, and William Herschel, all of
which posited some kind of progressive development, typically involving passage from a hotter to a colder state. Progression is thus a law of
the universe, in accord with a theology of historical progression and of creation out of chaos.
Drawing on a rich secondary literature, Neswald
notes the connection in mid-nineteenth-century
Britain between notions of energy conservation
and natural theology: energy conservation was
compatible with the long-term stability of a divinely governed cosmos. The world might well
have evolved from nebular beginnings, but it
had to all appearances reached a stable state.

Heat took on enhanced significance with the
advance of steam technologies in the nineteenth
century. The steam engine became a symbol of
progress and of control over the powers of nature; a metaphor for the energetic functions of
the animal organism; and a stimulus to preoccupation with the efficient performance of work,
one of whose fruits was the elaboration of what
became the second law. What gave that law its
broad cultural significance was its connection
with questions of mechanical and economic efficiency and of the thermodynamic fate of the
world. Especially with the popularization of notions of the dissipation of energy and the heat
death of the universe, the second law validated a
conception of the world as requiring a source of
original order and exhibiting a unique sequence
of events.
In one of the more original sections of the
work, Neswald discusses many lesser-known
advocates of a temporally unbounded cyclical
universe, an alternative cosmology with radically different theological implications. In her
estimation, that cyclical cosmologies found favor principally in German lands reflects the relative respectability of materialism there. The
heat-death hypothesis thus constituted an alternative to Ernest Haeckel’s materialistic cosmology of unlimited cyclical time. Employing the
entropy law against scientific materialism allowed religion to invoke science on its behalf.
Arguing that the heat-death hypothesis had initially been given a theological gloss consonant
with biblical notions of creation and the end of
time, Neswald maintains that its pessimistic interpretation only arose in connection with late
nineteenth-century concerns over the projected exhaustion of coal reserves, whereby
the acceleration of economic progress— entailing the increased consumption of energy
resources—simply brought closer the inevitable end state of dissipated energy unavailable
for work.
Developments in physiology paralleled those
in cosmology. Although physiologists were
guided by the assumption of energy conservation, they were minimally successful in reducing
vital phenomena to physicochemical laws and
failed entirely with respect to embryological development, consciousness and thought, and the
organism’s complexity, purposefulness, and
self-maintenance against forces of decay. Nor
did the second law afford them any explanatory
purchase. In this context vitalists argued that
life, precisely by seeming to run against entropy’s tendency always to increase, required a
principle (like Henri Bergson’s élan vital) beyond the laws of physics and chemistry. Thus
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were the implications of the second law again
found agreeable to opponents of mainstream science.
It is impossible here to convey a sense of this
book’s richness of detail or to display the many
nuances that qualify the connections discussed.
As befits the book’s theme, scholars with different agendas will mine it with profit for their own
ends. One problem with Neswald’s account,
however, is that in shifting back and forth between English, French, and German sources she
often fails to tell a coherent story in terms of a
specific cultural context. In looking at the acceptance of the first law during this time period,
I have been struck by the extent to which one
cannot assume the free movement of ideas
among these linguistically defined communities.
KENNETH CANEVA

Laura Otis. Müller’s Lab: The Story of Jakob
Henle, Theodor Schwann, Emil du BoisReymond, Hermann von Helmholtz, Rudolf Virchow, Robert Remak, Ernst Haeckel, and Their
Brilliant, Tormented Advisor. xix ⫹ 316 pp.,
figs., bibl., index. New York: Oxford University
Press, 2007. $55 (cloth).
“Johannes Müller never had a lab” (p. xi). Thus
begins the story of Müller’s Lab. The book’s
title nicely captures its main message: the stories
of the famous anatomist and physiologist as they
were told by his students are fictionalized reports, colored by the students’ situation, goals,
ambitions, and agendas and, last but not least, by
their personal relation with their teacher. Laura
Otis compares seven accounts of Müller’s life
and work to examine how scientists’ narratives
can shape the history of science. Each student’s
account reflects his personal and professional
interests, political position, and institutional
context, just as Otis’s book reflects current concerns with communicating science, the functions and uses of (re)constructions of past science, audiences, and “scientific personae.”
The first chapter presents Otis’s own story of
Müller’s life and career. She stresses that this is
not meant as a master narrative or authoritative
“true” account of Müller’s life but, rather, as a
“template” (p. xix) through which the seven
students’ tales may be read. The subsequent
chapters are for the most part biographies of
these renowned students; most of them also include a section on Müller’s persona as it
emerges from the writings—letters, public lectures, obituaries— of the chapter’s protagonist
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(“Schwann’s and Henle’s Müller”; “Virchow’s
Müller”).
Chapters 2–7 contain vivid depictions of the
often grim realities of medical education and
research practice in the nineteenth century. They
provide a wealth of information about the daily
life of a medical student and researcher and are
bristling with quirky details, such as Jakob Henle’s report that he had just dissected “a baby he
had ‘cured to death,’ then bought from the
mother for a taler” (p. 47). The reader can almost smell the stench of the rotting body parts in
the dissection room, feel the exhaustion and
fatigue after a long day packed with demanding
lecture courses, and see the frogs hopping about
in the students’ cramped and poorly heated living quarters. The reader also learns a lot about
the social and professional relations among the
members of this diverse group of medical men.
Moreover, through the biographical accounts,
Otis provides information about the development of main research topics, such as cell theory
and histology (Ch. 2, on Henle and Schwann),
electrophysiology (Chs. 3 and 4, on Helmholtz
and du Bois-Reymond), pathology and public
health (Ch. 5, on Virchow), and evolutionary
theory (Ch. 7, on Haeckel). Otis does not aim to
provide entirely new insights into these individuals’ lives and achievements beyond what we
know from earlier, in-depth studies by C. Goschler, L. Nyhart, H.-P. Schmiedebach, A. Tuchman, and others. Yet by drawing these accounts
together she presents an accessible overview of
nineteenth-century German anatomy and physiology and gives the reader a good sense of the
richness of this field.
But the book aims to do much more. Otis calls
her approach a “literary-historical case study,” a
study of how history is written. She takes seriously the fact that scientists’ accounts of other
scientists’ lives and works are not transparent
windows to the past but self-serving stories,
shaped by the narrator’s personal, institutional,
social, and political situation. Broadening earlier
analyses by N. Jardine and others, Otis seeks to
draw out the students’ motives for writing and
their consciousness of their audiences, their
choices of words and their favorite words, as
well as their narrative tactics.
Otis does not suggest that science is just texts
and nothing but texts. Science is done by people
who really lived and worked. Exploring multiple perspectives on Müller, she maintains, is the
most secure approach to the truth about his life
and science. Yet she consciously abstains from
offering detailed analyses of the differences between the various accounts of Müller’s life and
work. She lets her case studies speak for them-
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selves and ultimately leaves it to the reader to
decide what to make of them. Only in the afterword does she highlight significant differences
between the portrayals of Müller as a researcher
as they emerge from the seven students’ accounts. She links them to social forces like income and class and, most important, to differences in the individuals’ personalities.
Her study of scientists’ personal styles of
writing complements previous works on communicating science (by C. Bazerman, A. Gross,
S. Shapin, T. Shinn, and R. Whitley, among
others), which examine the significance for
knowledge production of textual genres such as
the scientific article and popular accounts of
science. Otis’s principal concern is the emergence of images of Müller, although she does
invite the reader to consider how literary studies
of scientists’ personal styles of writing “can help
us to understand their experiments” (p. xix). Her
main conclusion is that personal interactions and
the interactions of personalities are the key to
explaining scientists’ motivations and ideas and
that scientific work as a whole is, in fact,
“driven” by such personal interactions (pp. xvii,
233).
While I agree that studies of scientists’ constructions of the past are most valuable, I do not
always find Otis’s analyses of these scientists’
literary techniques enlightening. For example,
she compares du Bois-Reymond’s description of
his encounter with Müller with the tales of seduction in Choderlos de Laclos’s Les liaisons
dangereuses (p. 96)— but what exactly do we
learn from the perceived parallels in these narrative styles? Gripes aside, the book does raise
many fascinating issues pertaining to the reconstruction of science past. After reading it, I
found myself reflecting on many absorbing
questions: How did the different accounts of
Müller’s life and work shape the later history of
science and medicine? How, for instance, did du
Bois-Reymond’s narrative become the master
narrative of Müller’s life? How should we deal
with the multiple perspectives that the book offers? How should we weigh the different tales,
and how can we approach the truth about Müller? What exactly is the status of Otis’s own
account of Müller’s life? What are the wider
implications of Otis’s study for the writing of
the history of lesser-known figures and episodes, where we are not so fortunate as to have
many accounts to draw on and the multiperspectival approach she advocates is not an option? I
would have loved to read more about how Otis
grappled with the problem of constructing accounts of her protagonists while writing her
book.

Müller’s Lab will be of interest to historians
of science and working scientists, and the stories
of life in and around “Müller’s Lab” are gripping enough to hold the attention of the general
reader. While an engagement with Otis’s historiographical points of course requires consideration of the book as a whole, parts of it could be
profitably used in introductory courses in history
of science and medicine.
JUTTA SCHICKORE
Dirk Preuß; Uwe Hoßfeld; Olaf Breidbach
(Editors). Anthropologie nach Haeckel. 256
pp., figs., illus., index. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner
Verlag, 2006. €46 (paper).
This volume resulted from a symposium on the
history of anthropology held at the FriedrichSchiller-University in Jena, Germany, in January 2004; it appears in the series “Wissenschaftskultur um 1900” [“Scientific Culture
around 1900”], edited by Olaf Breidbach. Breidbach is director of the Institute for the History of
Medicine, Science, and Technology and its ErnstHaeckel-Haus, to which the coeditors of this volume, Dirk Preuß and Uwe Hoßfeld, are also attached. The museum exhibits and archives the
manuscripts, letters, and drawings of the German
biologist Ernst Haeckel (1834 –1919).
Several contributions deal with biological anthropology and medicine at the University of
Jena, engaging with the image of the university
as a former “fortress of National Socialist race
idiocy”: Katja Regenspurger (Ernst-HaeckelHaus) analyzes the Jena University clinics’ enforcement of sterilization in the context of the
race hygiene laws of the 1930s (“Ein Opfer im
Dienst der Volksgesundheit”; on race hygiene at
the University of Jena see also Susanne Zimmermann’s “Rassenhygiene in Forschung und
Lehre an der Medizinischen Fakultät Jena vor
1933”). In “Phyletische Anthropologie” [“Phyletic Anthropology”], Hoßfeld speaks of the appropriation of Haeckel’s work by social Darwinists, race hygienists, and National Socialists and
conveys the impression that Haeckel’s early biological anthropology was politically neutral but
that his work degenerated into a racist and spiritualist monistic anthropology toward the end
of the nineteenth century. This representation
seems questionable, given Haeckel’s early racial
theory. In fact, in another article in this volume,
coauthored with Stefan Wogawa and Breidbach
(“‘Sie ist eine Rassenfrage’: Ernst Haeckel und der
Antisemitismus”), Hoßfeld himself points to Haeckel’s racial hierarchy, which placed Homo caucasicus at the top of ten human species (Natürliche
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Schöpfungsgeschichte, 1868). Again, the authors
argue against reading Haeckel as an anti-Semitic
prophet of National Socialism.
Hans-Konrad Schmutz provides a case in
point for the interconnectedness of scientific discourses on race and sociopolitical settings in
“Vermessene Nation” [“Measured/Surveyed/
Presumptuous Nation”]. In the construction of
the notions of a Homo alpinus and of a Prussian
race in the late decades of the nineteenth century, craniometric studies that were intended to
reveal the racial makeup of populations fed into
identity-endowing national histories that served to
provide biological roots for one’s own nation or to
deconstruct the “myths” of others. Schmutz’s essay, like those of the anthropologists Winfried
Henke and Hartmut Rothe on the history of paleoanthropology (“Zur Entwicklung der Paläoanthropologie im 20. Jahrhundert,” “Stammbäume sind
wie Blumensträße”; see also Natalie Chaoui’s
“Adolph Hans Schmutz (1891–1976) im Spannungsfeld zwischen Anthropologie und Primatologie”) and Breidbach’s piece on neuroanthropology
(“Neuro-Anthropologie?”), illustrates the fact that
the volume aims to exemplify the genesis of a
biological anthropology and its differentiation into
such areas as race hygiene, paleoanthropology,
constitutional biology (Konstitutionsbiologie), and
human genetics more generally. This is further
reflected in the contributions of Preuß and Michal
Šimùnek.
Preuß’s “Zeitenwende ist Wissenschaftswende?” substantiates the editors’ claim in the
introduction that the role of professional anthropologists in National Socialism, rather than having been critically examined, became a taboo
topic after World War II. Preuß demonstrates
the continuities (but also the discontinuities) in
the personae as well as the content of German
anthropology and ethnology pre- and post-1945
in the case of the anthropological group under
Egon Freiherr von Eickstedt, originally at
Breslau University. Although von Eickstedt had
applied to the NSDAP for membership (in vain),
supported the law against hereditarily tainted
progeny, issued expert reports on individuals’
racial and familial backgrounds, and wrote antiSemitic tracts on racial anthropology, he eventually managed to reestablish the Breslauer anthropological tradition at the University of
Mainz in the French zone of occupation.
Šimùnek (“Biotypologie”) discusses the rise
of Czech biotypology as a science applied to the
rationalization of large-scale industrial production at the shoe factory of Tomáš Bat’a sen. The
goal was to have each employee occupy the job
he or she was best suited for, and a central health
register was established in the 1930s that con-
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tained information on each person’s physical
and mental state and family background. On the
basis of this information the employees were
divided into five groups that also corresponded
to the different levels of efficiency required for
tasks at the factory. The Czech biotypological
society, founded in 1937, emphasized the practical uses of the pronouncedly interdisciplinary,
international, and holistic field; it established
connections to state institutions such as the ministries for education and health, but also to the
military and the eugenics society. The enthusiasm for biotypology was cut somewhat short,
however, with the German occupation in 1939,
when race hygiene and race biology became the
preferred fields in the protectorate.
In view of the broad spectrum in terms of
time, place, and kind of anthropological science
(in the widest sense) considered here, the volume’s title seems misleading. A common focus
of the essays is arguably the politics of bioanthropological theory, practice, and application
and their historical and local contexts. This focus is complemented by probings into presentday scientifically informed Menschenbilder
(Breidbach) and by explorations of future possibilities for the anthropological sciences
(Henke and Rothe). Anthropologie nach Haeckel contains original contributions to littleknown subjects and will be of interest well
beyond the small circle of historians of anthropology.
MARIANNE SOMMER
Richard Rapport. Nerve Endings: The Discovery of the Synapse. 240 pp., bibl., index. New
York: W. W. Norton, 2005. $23.95 (cloth).
Guests at the 1906 Nobel ceremonies must have
wondered at the spectacle of archrivals Camillo
Golgi (1843–1926) and Santiago Ramón y Cajal
(1852–1934) sharing the award in Physiology
and Medicine for “work on the structure of the
nervous system.” In 1872–1873 Golgi’s innovative use of silver nitrate (the “black reaction”) to
stain nerve and cell structures had revolutionized neuroanatomy. His results supported the
“reticular theory” of the interconnection of nervous tissue. But Ramón y Cajal, using Golgi’s
methods and his own refinements of them, had
since 1887 provided even more beautiful evidence for the competing “neuron theory,” canonically articulated by Heinrich Wilhelm Gottfried Waldeyer in 1891. Cajal integrated
theoretical contributions—notably “dynamic
polarization”—with laboratory observations in
his monumental Textura del sistema nervioso
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del hombre y de los vertebrados (Moya, 1900 –
1904). While Golgi’s Nobel acceptance speech
was a last-ditch, unconvincing defense of reticulation, Cajal graciously acknowledged that his
neuron theory would underpin twentieth-century
neuroscience.
The title of Nerve Endings flaunts Cajal’s
victory, which identified the “gap” between neurons—Charles Sherrington dubbed it the “synapse”—as a definite entity and the key to nerve
function. However, Richard Rapport’s very
readable book is not a scholarly history of neuroanatomy but a compact retelling of Ramón y
Cajal’s elegant and voluminous autobiography,
bracketed by the neurosurgeon author’s reflections on how Cajal’s life and work have framed
his own.
Both Golgi and Cajal saw brain and nerve
tissue as (literally) the core of what makes us
human. The actual means of visualizing it—the
technology, technique, and artistry—were central to their work. While Rapport does not attempt a detailed reconstruction of their laboratory (sometimes, kitchen) lives, he “stains” this
specimen of medical history so that we see both
technique and technology in vivid detail. The
achromatic light microscope enabled Cajal’s
work, and he pushed it to the limit: further
anatomical detail would emerge only with electron microscopy, shortly after his death. Particularly interesting is Rapport’s discussion of Cajal’s science in relation to his artistic passions,
including photography.
Imagine Cajal’s career as a neuron: Rapport
dissects nicely the dendritic input and the chemical neurotransmitters stored at the presynaptic
membrane. He describes the impulse moving
current treatment of illnesses such as Parkinson’s disease. Yet Rapport is less satisfactory on
what happens at this particular nerve ending. He
seems implicitly to attribute “the discovery of
the synapse” to Cajal rather than to Sherrington,
who appears mainly as Cajal’s gracious and
admiring host on the occasion of his Croonian
Lecture. Yet Sherrington worked in the English
physiological tradition rather than the (mainly
German) anatomical tradition that culminated
with Cajal. While Cajal theorized about function
on the basis of observed structures, Golgi had
sought structures capable of explaining complex
neurological function—a project in some respects more akin to that of Sherrington, who
found his answer in Cajal’s “gap.”
Rapport describes elements found with electron microscopy that might partially vindicate
Golgi’s reticular theory. He notes, too, that Cajal
found it necessary until his death to defend neuron theory. But it is perhaps not helpful to con-

tinue their debate on the other side of the synapse, as Rapport does when describing results as
“concessions” to Golgi while implying that Cajal, nearly single-handedly, made all of modern
neuroscience possible.
Historians will regret Rapport’s unselfconscious use of metaphors, his invocations of “national character,” his amateur psychobiography,
and his uneven attempts to contextualize the
scientists’ stories. However, his lively storytelling and lucid explanations of scientific concepts
will engage and inform—and likely inspire—
many grateful readers. The book’s melding of
the personal, technical, and social aspects of a
fascinating story enhances our appreciation of
neuroscience as a humanistic endeavor.
BONNIE ELLEN BLUSTEIN
Arnold Reisman. Turkey’s Modernization: Refugees from Nazism and Atatürk’s Vision.
xxvii ⫹ 571 pp., illus., figs., bibl., index. Washington, D.C.: New Academia Publishing, 2006.
$28 (paper).
The Turkish Republic was founded under the
leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1923
on the hot ashes of the Ottoman Empire. The
majority of the land contemporary Turkey
now occupies was neither very rich nor strategically important to the Ottoman Empire.
Although the elite and bureaucratic groups
were by and large products of the Young Turk
regime that immediately preceded the republic, most other resources had to be created
from scratch or reluctantly appropriated from
the empire. Darülfünun, the premier institution of higher education of the twentiethcentury Ottoman Empire, was practically the
only university after 1924, when the Islamic
colleges (madrasas) were shut down by
Atatürk and his cabinet. The prospects of creating a national science and culture were quite
slim. And most contemporary observers of
science in Turkey agreed that it still retained
its scholastic tint. İsmayıl Hakkı Baltacıoğlu,
the former rector of Darülfünun and arguably
the most talented pedagogue at the disposal of
the new regime, had suggested that it would
take decades before the Ottoman intellectual
heritage could be ousted in favor of a modern
and national replacement from the galleries,
institutes, concert halls, laboratories, and
schools. It was shortly after this comment, on
31 July 1933, that Darülfünun was shut down.
On 1 August the new Istanbul University
(which claims to have been founded in 1453)
was opened on the very same site. Most Turk-
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ish faculty members, including several very
prominent intellectuals of the era, were fired
without advance notice and replaced by German counterparts who, having lost their jobs
after the Nazi party passed the Reconstitution
of Civil Service law early in 1933, were invited by the Turkish government to teach at
the new university. The vast majority of the
émigrés who came to Turkey, many of whom
were already prominent in their respective
fields, were assigned to the faculties of medicine and natural sciences. Accompanying
these new appointments was the setting up of
new research labs.
Hence, it was a contingent conjunction of
events that set in motion the institutionalization
of modern science in Turkey. Arnold Reisman’s
book is a satisfying prosopography of the German émigrés who made this process possible.
The book also serves as a compendium of primary sources relevant to the subject matter.
Reisman’s account captures the complexity of
the relationship between forced migration and
scientific change from predominantly German
and American testimonials. Reisman’s habit of
quoting at length makes quite interesting firsthand accounts and memoirs accessible to the
interested scholar who would otherwise have a
difficult time gathering these dispersed documents, not to mention the fact that he has also
carried out extensive correspondence with the
families of and survivors among the Germanspeaking émigrés who spent time in Turkey.
Given that Turkey’s Modernization is the only
work of such breadth in the English language,
the book is a must-read for all those who intend
to work on science in the twentieth-century Ottoman Empire and Turkey. Those who already
have some knowledge about science in the early
Turkish Republic might be pleased to know that
Reisman’s book successfully replaces Horst
Widmann’s study from 1973, Exil und Bildungshilfe. Those who work on German émigrés in the
United States will find that the Turkish experience,
as portrayed by Reisman, is vastly different from
the American one. Reisman’s interests also encompass comparative technology transfer and its
political and economic effects, as is clear from his
final chapter. The book will also be of interest to
those who study the relationship between science
and collective memory.
Reisman’s work marks a beginning rather
than an end. There still are many gaps in the
historical context that need to be filled before we
can understand the scientific culture of Turkey.
Reisman’s account does not highlight the complex and dramatic nature of Atatürk’s university
reform, which was an ideologically charged mo-
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ment and, as such, has recently drawn the attention of scholars such as Mete Tunçay, Ali Arslan, Rifat Bali, and the late Stanford Shaw.
However, several well-known histories of modern Turkey, such as those of Niyazi Berkes,
Bernard Lewis, Feroz Ahmad, and Erik Jan
Zürcher, have little to say on the role of science,
and of the university reform of 1933, in the early
career of the Turkish Republic. The influence of
the German émigrés on the subsequent generations educated in Turkey and on the institutional
composition of Turkish university science (not
too different from the German “mandarin” system) is undeniable and merits further research.
B. HARUN KÜÇÜK
Julia Rodriguez. Civilizing Argentina: Science,
Medicine, and the Modern State. xii ⫹ 306 pp.,
illus., figs., apps., bibl., index. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006. $24.95
(paper).
The dawn of the twentieth century appeared to
be Argentina’s golden age. At the time, it was
one of the richest countries in the world. Signs
of modernity could be found in the country’s
railroads, factories, and streetcars and in its urban cityscapes, rivaling those of Paris. In a few
decades, several million immigrants flooded to
Argentina, hoping to share in this prosperity.
This was also—seemingly—a golden age for
Argentine science. Scientists there enjoyed institutional and political power that would have
been the envy of their colleagues in Europe and
North America. Julia Rodriguez’s work focuses
on the prolific “generation of 1880,” a loose
group of liberal intellectuals that included
some of the country’s most eminent scientists
and physicians, among them José Ingenieros,
Emilio Coni, and Juan Vucetich. They were
concerned with the social disorders that accompanied Argentina’s rapid modernization.
These “social pathologists” included specialists in—for example— hygiene, public health,
psychiatry, criminology, eugenics, and puericulture. They were strikingly successful in
achieving their goals, building an unprecedented alliance with the Argentine state. Collectively, their mission was to modernize Argentina and to build a national science to meet
national aims.
Rodriguez offers a deeply critical and original
reinterpretation of this supposed golden age. Beneath this superficial liberal modernization, she
argues, the work of Argentina’s liberal scientists
served reactionary ends. The country’s ruling
elites used science as a tool for maintaining the
existing social hierarchy in the face of massive
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immigration and the social and economic transformations that accompanied it. Rodriguez argues that Argentine scientists began to “medicalize” criminality, delinquency, and any sort of
deviance that ruling elites found threatening.
This medicalization of deviance in turn helped
rationalize and legitimize state intervention. For
example, Argentina’s social pathologists interpreted prostitution, malingering, and anarchism
as caused by “degeneration” in the immigrant
communities. Rodriguez builds her narrative on
the basis of impressive research into police and
penitentiary records, as well as a wide array of
medical, criminological, and psychiatric journals published in Argentina during this period.
The book is organized into four thematic sections: symptoms, diagnosis, prescriptions, and
hygiene. Throughout these sections, Rodriguez
shows how Argentine scientists constructed deviant behaviors as medical and social problems
and then developed institutions and technologies
to address them. Women, working-class people,
and foreigners bore the brunt of these scientific
measures of social control. Hygienists carefully
monitored and regulated prostitution—not for
the protection of the prostitutes but, rather, for
that of their clients. Even where secular and
scientific institutions supplanted those run by
the Catholic Church, they continued to enforce
traditional social values. Social pathologists, for
example, prescribed domesticity as a cure for
problems faced by “deviant” women—frequently prostitutes or working-class women
who worked outside the home. Likewise, the
new generation of scientists continued to believe
in the civilizing influence of motherhood. They
promoted puericulture—the rational science of
child rearing—as a way of ensuring the future of
the Argentine nation.
State repression also became more scientific
and rationalized in this period— especially in
the face of growing social unrest from those
immigrants who were excluded from Argentina’s political systems. Ironically, one of the
most important innovations in scientific policing
in this period came from someone who was
himself an immigrant. The Yugoslavian immigrant Juan Vucetich developed an efficient system of fingerprinting criminals, which eventually was taken up not only in Argentina but in
parts of North America and Europe as well. The
Argentine state also built a new national penitentiary along the lines of the most progressive
prisons in the United States and Great Britain.
Argentine criminologists sought to change the
goal of incarceration from punishment to rational rehabilitation. In public spaces, hygienists
also helped significantly diminish the rates of

infectious disease in Argentina. Here, as elsewhere, sanitation was a “civilizing and modernizing force.” Hygiene and sanitation were also
used, however, as a means of excluding people
deemed to be sick or weak from full citizenship.
Here, Argentina’s elites drew a strict analogy
between medical health and social and political
health.
This is a pathbreaking and ultimately convincing reinterpretation of Argentina’s golden
age, of interest not only to historians of science
in Argentina but also to economic and social
historians. While the text frequently alludes to
the broader context of the Atlantic world, Rodriguez does not develop this broader geographical and comparative context as fully as she
might. Nonetheless, Civilizing Argentina remains an important work that places the history
of science fully at the center of Argentina’s
social, political, and economic history. As the
book concludes, the scientific model of civilization developed in this period ultimately contributed to the growing bureaucratic authoritarianism that was to plague Argentina for much of
the twentieth century.
STUART MCCOOK
David N. Stamos. Darwin and the Nature of
Species. xix ⫹ 273 pp., bibl., index. Albany:
State University of New York Press, 2007.
$28.95 (paper).
Whenever I teach a course on or with Darwin, I
ask my students, even before they ask me: “Do
you think species exist for Darwin?” Answers
vary; but the best I ever got was from Jessica at
UCLA: “Yes, but . . .”—as usual, students are
the most useful source of reflection on academic
matters. Arguably, the existence of species is the
most thought-provoking and obscure aspect of
Darwin’s theories. Scholars of the level of Ernst
Mayr, Michael Ghiselin, and John Beatty, to
mention just three, have given challenging and
often at least partially conflicting explanations
of that point. Now David Stamos, after other
preliminary publications on that matter, has produced a whole book on the issue.
Stamos seems to belong to that rather restricted but extremely active and productive
group of historians who still believe that to find
out what their author really thought is as important as to unveil the political and sexual inclinations of his or her maid or valet. In other
words, Stamos studies the internal history of
science (at least mainly, if not entirely), and his
book is a fine example of intellectual history of
the sort produced by the likes of Bob Richards,
Jon Hodge, Michael Ghiselin, John Beatty, Pe-
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ter Bowler, Polly Winsor, Antonello La Vergata, and Eve-Marie Engels, to mention just a
few of that ilk—few but good, one would be
tempted to say.
Stamos expresses his view in a bold and direct way from the very beginning: Darwin is a
realist; species do exist for him. To support this
view, our author analyzes every single aspect of
the problem, from Locke’s famous nominalist
concept of species to the well-known interpretations of species offered by Mayr, Ghiselin, and
Beatty. The question— even after the thorough
investigations of those scholars—is complex
and not much helped by Darwin himself, who
seemed to use different concepts of species,
whether morphological, biological (often called
“physiological” in the nineteenth century), or
genealogical. He shifted from one concept to
another in his publications and in his private
papers— his unpublished notes are vital to understanding his thought, as the Darwin Industry
has shown and as Stamos knows perfectly well.
Ghiselin is a main character in Stamos’s book—
almost the main reference—and this is not surprising, given that Darwin’s thought is incomprehensible without reference to Ghiselin’s
seminal publications. Ghiselin is a convinced
believer in the individuality of species, and this
theme is profusely discussed by Stamos. Also,
Beatty’s writings on species are discussed by
Stamos as perhaps the main critical reference of
his book. Another author often quoted and criticized is Gordon McOuat.
Stamos is very strong on the philosophical
side of things. He knows how to argue in a
precise and clear manner and quotes practically
everything that has to be quoted on the matter,
with the exception of Jon Hodge’s Origins and
Species (Garland, 1991), a book of great importance that is almost entirely neglected by scholars—including its very author, who proposed
the best-founded hypothesis on Darwin’s philosophical roots in the thought of David Hume.
Stamos gives us a thorough and competent discussion of species and individuality, the reality
of species and the nonreality of higher taxa, and
the concepts of “laws of nature” and vera causa,
on horizontal/vertical distinctions. There is a
further point that makes Stamos’s book particularly interesting: he uses his case—Darwin on
species—as an example for elaborating questions in the philosophy of science. Thus the
philosophy of science is based not on abstract
models but on concrete historical problems: this
use of history to elucidate problems of the philosophy of science is extremely fruitful, and
Stamos uses it to reconsider Thomas Kuhn’s
famous view of scientific revolutions.
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Perhaps the major fault of Darwin and the
Nature of Species can be found in the excessively bold and assertive—almost to the point of
arrogance—tone of Stamos’s arguments, so
very different from that used by Darwin himself.
We are told repeatedly that Darwin is a species
realist. But this is not a fact; it is Stamos’s
well-argued view. Perhaps a less aggressive
style would have better suited the gentler style
of Darwin himself.
Are we convinced by Stamos’s forceful arguments? Are we totally persuaded that Darwin
was a convinced species realist? Up to a point
Stamos is convincing: he knows the subjects,
has read everything relevant, and controls his
material admirably. Personally, I see Darwin as
a “metaphysical minimalist,” as someone who
did not try to replace other people’s metaphysical “isms” with his own—whether “nominalism,” “realism,” “populationism,” or whatever.
Perhaps his philosophical position, which owed
a lot to Hume, as Hodge has shown, is mirrored
by W. V. Quine’s “ontological relativity”—relativity, not relativism: species are real when it is
useful to consider them real—for example, in
their genealogical meaning, as the result of natural selection and descent; species are not real
when we see them from a morphological point
of view (as often in the Origin of Species) or are
semi-real as in the biological sense, leading to
Mayr’s populationism. Quine is the most Darwinian of all philosophers and is mentioned by
Stamos only briefly.
This said, there is no way we can ignore the
realist stance presented by Stamos when we talk
about species, whether we are in discussion with
our colleagues or teaching students. Stamos’s
view will have to be presented as a plausible,
well-argued, and empirically sustained interpretation of Darwin’s concept of species. It will
have to be compared with the views of Mayr,
Ghiselin, and Beatty and taught alongside them
in classrooms. After all, Jessica’s answer to the
question “Do species exist for Darwin?” remains
the best point made on the subject: “Yes, but
. . . .”
MARIO A. DI GREGORIO
f

Recent (1950 –)

Loren R. Graham. Moscow Stories. xi ⫹ 305
pp., bibl., index. Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006. $29.95 (cloth).
Loren Graham is a capable raconteur who can
deliver teasing comments with a twinkle in the
eye and a wink to the onlooker. His wit and
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extensive experience as a writer and historian
also flow forth in this excellent memoir: an
erudite, beautifully written autobiography and
meditation on the meaning and role of the historian
in modern society with an edge that made me
laugh and pause for reflection throughout.
Graham provides an autobiographical account of his interests and motivations in the
history of science and Russian science in particular. In doing so, he discusses his many
trips and experiences in Russia, mostly in
Moscow, during and after the Cold War, always returning to the humanity and the social
environment of those he met and interviewed.
The description of his meeting with Bukharin’s widow, Anna Mikhailovna Larina, forms
one of many memorable testimonies. The roster of characters that appear is quite startling:
Graham knew Wendell Furry from their
hometown of Farmersburg, Indiana; he went
to college with Neil Armstrong; he met Yuri
Gagarin; and he had a loose knowledge of the
whereabouts of Lee Harvey Oswald in 1961.
Graham himself can be succinctly described as
the major figure in the history of Russian science
in the last fifty years. From the immense brilliance
of Science and Philosophy in the Soviet Union
(Knopf, 1972) to the poignant morality of The
Ghost of the Executed Engineer (Harvard, 1996),
he has set a high standard. His books offer case
studies for the student and many nuances and insights for the researcher. Moscow Stories is a wellwritten reflective work that presents some important background material in addition.
A fascinating feature of this volume is Graham’s candor in describing and questioning
the political context and character of attempts
to develop a critical history of Russian science
in this period. As one might expect, there are
some very amusing and frightening episodes
involving KGB interest in a United States
citizen, especially one conducting research
into Soviet science in Moscow during the
Cold War. Graham also relates his experience
of attempts by U.S. agencies to elicit his help
in espionage. The complexity of friendships
under the Russian dictatorship is well documented, but Graham also alludes to complexity in some of his friendships and professional
relationships in the United States. His concern
about the political undertones of the history of
science and its obvious instrumental value to
agencies beyond the scholarly arena is
brought home in a section on the vetting of
research applicants and its relationship to the
U.S. government. At the same time, he outlines his own reasons for engaging in the
anti–Vietnam War movement.

Throughout, Graham ponders and agonizes
about his political role— or, as was most often
the case, his deliberate disassociation from
such a role. This provides a very interesting
and provocative subtext, as Graham considers
whether he should have been a spy and reflects on his beliefs about the social responsibility of a historian of science in the modern
world. When doing research on left-wing scientists during the Cold War and earlier, one
finds that they constantly encountered questions and possibilities of espionage; the aim of
such endeavors would always be to support
the progressive “socialist state” against capitalism. Here, Graham, with no illusions about
such a progressive state, experiences the diametrically opposed problem: whether he
should have helped destroy “socialism” by
working for U.S. intelligence, even while accepting the limitations and shortcomings of
“Western” society.
Thus, an enormous question that stalks history of science internationally is articulated. Is it
correct to feign or even to believe in the dispassionate voice of the historian of science, when
science is such a politically explosive discourse
that conveys a distinct social power? Many historians choose to ignore the potential use of their
work in the social or political arena. Graham has
impressively refused to ignore it and considers
his actual and potential social action.
Consequently, this book is valuable at a number of levels. As the memoir of a celebrated
historian, as a series of amusing and poignant
anecdotes, and as commentary on the history of
Russian science, it is a marvelous read. As a
more philosophical and political essay on the
social responsibility of a historian and the political dimensions of modern history of science, it
is outstandingly provocative.
C. A. J. CHILVERS
Benjamin P. Greene. Eisenhower, Science Advice, and the Nuclear Test-Ban Debate, 1945–
1963. xiii ⫹ 358 pp., bibl., index. Stanford,
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006. $65
(cloth).
In September 1963 the United States Senate
ratified a treaty, signed in July 1963 by representatives of the United States, the Soviet
Union, and Great Britain, banning the testing of
nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in outer
space, and under water. As a result of a moratorium issued by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in response to a Soviet initiative, the
United States had conducted no nuclear tests
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since late 1958. Underground and then atmospheric tests had resumed in September 1961
under the orders of President John F. Kennedy,
following a Soviet test. In Eisenhower, Science
Advice, and the Nuclear Test-Ban Debate,
1945–1963, Benjamin P. Greene reexamines the
views and actions of Eisenhower on the matter
of nuclear testing during his two administrations, as well as his attitude toward the 1963
treaty. Greene brings to this analysis a detailed
study of archival documents and personal papers
that were unavailable to some earlier historians
who wrote on this issue, as well as a critique of
historians who question Eisenhower’s genuine
commitment to a test ban. In contrast, Greene
supports the view that the test ban was one of
Eisenhower’s major goals during his presidency, that it was an early goal of his presidency, and that technical issues such as international inspections and thresholds for seismic
detection were among the factors that undermined Eisenhower’s efforts toward a test-ban
treaty.
Greene focuses on three main themes in his
study: the relationship between Eisenhower and
Lewis Strauss, who chaired the Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC) from 1953 to 1958; Eisenhower’s leadership style of taking recommendations from advisors rather than simply following
his own instincts; and Eisenhower’s evolving
attitude toward scientific advisors and his
changing relationships with particular scientists
during his presidency. In Greene’s view, Eisenhower already favored a nuclear test ban in
1954, when he appointed Harold E. Stassen his
disarmament advisor. However, Eisenhower’s
skepticism about the reliability of scientists’ advice on national security matters and his trust in
the deceitful and forceful Strauss led him to
accept the arguments of Strauss—a nonscientist
who shared the views of AEC scientists such as
Edward Teller and Willard Libby—that the testing of nuclear weapons was essential to American weapons superiority, that international
agreements relying on monitoring were impossible, and that atmospheric tests posed no public
health hazards (a position on which Libby
changed his mind in 1959 following the detection of dangerous levels of strontium-90 in Minnesota wheat).
After the launch of Sputnik in 1957, Eisenhower set up an eighteen-member Presidential
Scientific Advisory Committee, which included
the physicists I. I. Rabi and Hans Bethe, and
appointed a personal advisor for science and
technology, with the result that he was no longer
so strongly dependent on the counsel of Strauss
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and his successor at the AEC, John McCone.
Former MIT President James Killian, Jr., was
Eisenhower’s first personal scientific advisor,
and the Harvard University chemist George B.
Kistiakowsky succeeded Killian. Adlai Stevenson had made a testing ban a theme in the 1956
presidential campaign, and Rabi used his acquaintance with Eisenhower to offer personal
advice to halt testing. After Eisenhower declared
the voluntary moratorium in 1958 and opened
discussions in Geneva with the Soviet Union
and the United Kingdom for banning all testing,
he continued throughout his presidency to resist
arguments from test-ban opponents at the AEC,
the Department of Defense, and the national
laboratories at Los Alamos and Livermore that
he should withdraw delegates from the Geneva
talks and resume testing. Although Eisenhower
was told that the moratorium was undermining
morale and expertise at Los Alamos and Livermore, Greene notes that the number of staff
members in fact increased during the period it
was in effect.
Greene makes it clear that Eisenhower
viewed a test ban in the 1950s as highly desirable in order to maintain the superiority of the
American nuclear arsenal and prevent proliferation to China and other countries. Greene also
stresses Eisenhower’s determination to press for
a general testing ban that would require international monitoring stations and periodic inspections within nuclear countries, rather than dependence on remote detection systems, because
of his continued suspicions of the Soviet Union.
Eisenhower’s farewell speech of January 1961,
one of the most famous documents from his
presidency, cautioned the American public
about the rising influence of the “militaryindustrial complex” in national affairs. Greene
highlights Eisenhower’s second warning in
the speech, this one against large-scale,
government-funded scientific research that
makes public policy a captive of a scientifictechnological elite. Greene notes that the draft
of an eloquent section in the speech expressing disappointment over the lack of progress
on disarmament is in Eisenhower’s own hand.
Greene’s book is a valuable addition to the
historical literature on U.S. policy on nuclear
weapons and on the role of presidential science
advising in the early Cold War period. He succeeds in making a strong case that Eisenhower
was disappointed that he did not achieve a nuclear test-ban treaty during his presidency.
MARY JO NYE
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Zonggang Hu. Jingsheng sheng wu diao cha
suo shi gao [Historical manuscript of Fan Memorial Institute of Biology]. (Zhongguo jin xian
dai ke xue ji shu shi yan jiu cong shu.) 250 pp.,
illus., figs., tables, bibl., index. Jinan: Shangdong jiao yu chu ban she [Shandong Education
Press], 2005. 29 yuan (paper).
The history of biology in twentieth-century
China is attracting increasing interest from
scholars. This is a welcome development, because biology was a crucial part of the history of
science in twentieth-century China. Together
with a few other sciences, such as geology and
archaeology, biology— especially field biology—ranked as one of China’s most successful
scientific enterprises in the first half of the twentieth century. Field biology was also important
because of its role in nation building and national imagining. For Chinese biologists at the
time, biological surveys contributed to the mapping and cataloguing of the nation’s natural
riches.
The Fan Memorial Institute of Biology was
one of the first and most active biological research institutes in Republican China (1912–
1949). Established in 1928, the institute was a
private organization directed and staffed by Chinese scientists. But it also had strong American
connections. Most of its funding came from a
joint Sino-American foundation. The idea for
the institute owed much to the examples of the
Wistar Institute and the U.S. Biological Survey,
and many of its scientists had received their
degrees in the United States. The zoologist Bing
Zhi, who served as the first director of the institute, had studied under the entomologist James
Needham at Cornell University in the 1910s.
Bing’s successor Hu Xiansu was a Harvardtrained botanist. However, there were also
European-trained staff members, such as the
fern expert Qin Renchang. The primary projects
of the institute were collecting, field biology,
and taxonomy. They covered botany, mycology,
ornithology, and ichthyology, among other topics. Later, the institute helped establish the Lushan Arboretum and Botanical Garden, which
pursued research on forestry, wood, and horticulture. The Sino-Japanese War broke out in
1937. Officially, the Fan Memorial Institute remained in Beijing, but many of its staff members moved to the Chinese-controlled provinces,
where they joined or set up research stations.
Since this part of China abounded in botanical
riches, these scientists actually had a lot of material to work on. But they were hampered by
lack of funds. The Sino-Japanese War was followed by the Civil War. After the Communist

regime took power in 1949, all scientific institutes were nationalized and put under the direct
control of the government. Consequently, the
Fan Memorial Institute was abolished and absorbed into the national scientific organizations.
This book is a straightforward, chronological
account of the Fan Memorial Institute of Biology, from its founding in 1928 to its abolition in
1950. The main focus is on the major scientists
and supporters of the institute, the principal
achievements of its scientific work, the financial
and other difficulties it encountered in its short
but eventful history, and the impact of major
political events, such as wars, on the fate of the
institute. The book is narrowly focused, and its
goal is modest. (A better rendition of its Chinese
title would be “A draft history of the Fan Memorial Institute of Biology,” rather than the official English title given above.) It does not try
to situate its subject in the overall context of
science in twentieth-century China, nor does it
try to engage in academic scholarship in the
history of science. Nevertheless, the book adds a
key piece to the picture of science in Republican
China. Field biology constituted a vital part of
that science, and the Fan Memorial Institute was
a leader in that area of research in China at the
time. In this regard, the book complements well
Laurence Schneider’s fine study of genetics in
China, Biology and Revolution in TwentiethCentury China (Rowman & Littlefield, 2003),
which concentrates on the Communist era and
neglects field biology. In charting the history of
the Fan Memorial Institute, moreover, Zonggang Hu’s book touches on many significant
historical issues and questions that merit further
investigation. For example, I find very interesting the brief account of the pioneering science
illustrator Feng Chengru and the development of
modern science illustration in China. There is a
great dissertation topic here!
Overall, the author has done a solid job of
piecing together the history of one of the most
important scientific institutes in twentiethcentury China.
FA-TI FAN
Sarah E. Igo. The Averaged American: Surveys, Citizens, and the Making of a Mass Public.
398 pp., illus., index. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007. $35 (cloth).
The triumph of the aggregate is a theme so
central to twentieth-century U.S. history that
mass institutions, majority opinions, and largescale communities can sometimes seem like the
inevitable by-products of modernizing processes
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that historians chant like mantras: industrialization, urbanization, immigration. Sarah Igo’s fascinating and important book explores the place
of social facts and numbers in this story. In
survey research and polling—subjects usually
consigned to the dusty margins of both history
of science and social history—she sees the origin of trends in personal and national consciousness that transformed how people understood
themselves and how citizens understood their
nation during the middle decades of the twentieth century. “The averaged American” of Igo’s
title was not axiomatic; it emerged gradually
from historically specific knowledge technologies. Community studies, opinion polls, and sex
research measured social truths objectively, according to social scientists, as if they did nothing
but hold a mirror up to a changing society. Their
efforts to make the mass public visible to itself,
according to Igo, solidified the culture of consensus evident by midcentury. The history of
social science is therefore nothing less than “an
index to political and epistemological power”
(p. 22).
Igo tackles three substantive cases to support
this argument: Middletown, by Robert and
Helen Lynd; the polling enterprises of George
Gallup and Elmo Roper; and Alfred Kinsey’s
reports on sexual behavior. All three were famous, widely discussed, and controversial for
their methods as well as their findings. While
Igo details the influence of social science on
individuals and communities, she also aims to
show us how those individuals and communities
“talked back” to the social scientists who
claimed to represent them. In Muncie, Indiana,
where the Lynds popularized the ethnographic
sensibility previously associated with anthropological studies of primitives, residents responded with a mixture of distrust and resignation. They articulated the tension between local,
experiential forms of knowledge and the impersonal, quantitative “data” gathered by outside
experts.
Igo documents this tension repeatedly. Angry letters written to Gallup, Roper, and Kinsey illustrate that Americans were skeptical
about the scientific authority validating neat
summaries of their aggregated opinions and
behaviors. Sampling methods were objectionable to many people who simply did not believe that pollsters could be correct without
consulting them personally. Surveyors’ most
shocking assertions were aggressively contested as well. The war over Kinsey’s findings
exposed the slippage between statistical and
ethical conceptions of average, typical, and
normal sexual behavior. Notwithstanding her
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sensitivity to popular reactions, Igo admits
that surveys and polls were like “a genie out
of the bottle” (p. 189). Whatever their doubts,
many Americans were curious, even enthusiastic, consumers of information about themselves.
Of particular interest is the book’s illuminating consideration of majorities and minorities. Igo shows how scientific strategies for
achieving typicality promoted more homogeneous pictures of American life. The quest to
turn Middletown into Everytown, for instance,
not only distanced the Lynds from Progressives’ explicit concerns about immigrants, juvenile offenders, and other marginalized
groups but required them to exclude “foreign
elements” and “Negroes.” The drive to enhance the empirical credentials of surveys and
polls, in other words, promoted narrower,
more ideological understandings of which individuals and groups exemplified “America”
accurately. Native-born whites, paradoxically,
came to represent everyone in the country.
Minorities, when they were considered at all,
were consigned to the sidelines. They represented only themselves.
That social scientists quantified Americans so
exclusively between the 1920s and the 1950s
contributed to the powerful vision of a consensus society and, not coincidentally, frequently
united them with marketers bent on fueling mass
consumption. The civil rights revolution and
waves of immigration associated with the era
that followed turned “Who counts?” into the
most urgent question facing American democracy. Since the 1960s, majoritarian answers to
that question have been discredited, and it is no
longer possible to report national polls, as Roper
and Gallup did, as if “America Speaks!” in a
single voice. In our new age of pluralism, survey
researchers and pollsters emphasize multiple
publics and diverse views.
This shift has hardly diminished the significance
of popular social science. As Igo notes in her
conclusion, today’s debates over social facts and
numbers (from census categories and estimates of
the prevalence of homosexuality to vote counting)
remain symbols of conflict about what democracy
will mean politically, socially, and culturally.
Modes of scientific inquiry that contributed to aggregate ways of knowing decades ago have emphatically disaggregated our social world. Niche
marketing, a crowded blogosphere, cable narrowcasting, and other practices promising the tightest
possible fit between knowledge and democracy
simply confirm the stamina of statistical citizenship, now almost a century old. At once intensely
anonymous and voyeuristic, detached and reflex-
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ive, the legacy of American popular social science
remains powerful because we still want to know:
Who am I? Who are they? How do commonalities
and differences add, subtract, multiply, and divide
to define the “we” that is a country?
ELLEN HERMAN
Sean F. Johnston. Holographic Visions: A History of New Science. xxi ⫹ 518 pp., illus., figs.,
tables, bibl., index. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. $134.50 (cloth).
Sean Johnston has written a timely and much
needed book about the history of holography—a
“high-tech” science that emerged in the mid1960s out of the shadows of Cold War secrecy
to fascinate the wider scientific community and
the general public. Using tiny glass plates and
the beams of just-discovered lasers, holography
provided realistic three-dimensional images almost “out of nowhere,” thus realizing the ancient human dream of “magic.” The unique
properties of this new method of optical reconstruction— high sensitivity to microscopic
movements, information richness (each dot of a
hologram stores information about the entire
object), robustness, inherently parallel data processing, and more— opened incredible possibilities in information technology, nondestructive
testing, coding and security, and many other
areas. The aesthetic properties of holograms
soon attracted artists and artisans, and they
seemed to be a promising medium for advertising and the popularization of cultural objects.
“Holography hit the world with a bang in 1964,”
the author states in the beginning of his book (p.
vii), only to show in the chapters that follow that
the hopes it generated have not been realized:
the protagonists did not succeed in establishing
holography as a separate discipline, and its
glamour has slowly faded since the late 1980s,
with new developments in science and technology (the ICT revolution, work in the life sciences, nanotechnologies, etc.).
Yet holography did establish itself as a recognized research field, as a distinct method for
approaching a number of problems in science
and engineering, as an endless source of entrepreneurial inspiration, and as an original (if tiny)
domain of creative art. The spirit of the first
holographers is still alive. So this is a good time
to write a history, to go beyond “the hundreds—
perhaps thousands—[of] capsule histories” (p.
2), to bring together and analyze numerous partial accounts, personal memories, and oral histories (some of which are on the way to becoming myths). Johnston has chosen the right

moment, carrying out his study in a period of
relative calm, before some new discovery comes
to dominate the field—as has happened a number of time during the past sixty years.
In writing his history of holography, Johnston
has successfully avoided a number of pitfalls
described in the first “methodological” chapter.
While taking a critical stance toward other popular approaches, he opts for an approach closer
to that of authors like Peter Galison, in his study
of material culture in microphysics, and especially Terry Shinn, with his notion of research
technologies (p. 441). The first three chapters
analyze consecutively the contexts of research
out of which the three distinct constituents of
holography have emerged: the pioneering study
of Denis Gabor on optical wavefront reconstruction in electron microscopy, initiated at British
Thomson-Houston in the summer of 1947, and
his early followers’ research in the United States
and the United Kingdom; the Ph.D. thesis of
Yuri Denisyuk on wave photography, research
carried out at the State Optical Institute in Leningrad between 1958 and 1961; and, finally, the
Department of Defense–financed project of Emmett Leith and Juris Upatnieks on radar data
optical processing, developed since 1954 at the
Willow Run Laboratory of the University of
Michigan, which eventually led to the major
breakthrough in December 1963. Initially
named “lensless photography,” holography was
soon the subject of a blaze of publicity, and the
two young researchers gained wide recognition.
The book describes these events in detail, tracing the emergence and stabilization of new vocabulary, the revival of interest in the work of
Gabor and Denisyuk, and interrelations among
the three approaches, as well as the intrigues and
power games that soon began. It follows the
efforts of the main characters and a growing
number of disciples, colleagues, and other enthusiasts to develop the new field—the search
for applications, experimentation with new
schemes, the mobilization of efforts to solve
identified reverse salients (laser beam coherence, improving the recording media, white
light reconstruction, etc.), related inventions,
and so forth. This will make the volume very
useful for holographers themselves (scientists,
engineers, artists, and artisans): younger workers are already having difficulty maintaining the
integrity of their field and tend to mythologize
some aspects of its emergence and development.
Johnston has made some real discoveries that
provide new evidence on long-discussed topics in
science and technology studies, and so Holographic Visions will be valuable for STS scholars
as well. One such achievement comes from his
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analysis (in Pt. 3) of how holographic techniques
and artifacts laid the groundwork for the emergence and subsequent stabilization of (new) group
identities. Studying artisan holography, he also reveals how a different context of research, with its
own political, cultural, and emotional values, contributed to the invention of low-cost sandbox holography as a radically different technique. His
study of the decades-long efforts of holographic
entrepreneurs to identify and explore promising
areas of application reveals interesting patterns,
representative of the innovative activities in hightech fields whose markets are about to emerge or,
when established, are marked by sudden new entries, strong competition from both within and outside the field, high levels of technical variability,
and so forth. There are interesting reflections on
the differences between Western and former socialist countries, the lower scale of autonomous
entrepreneurial activity and the “statization” of holography’s applications in the latter being the most
important. The book treats decision makers in scientific and technological innovation, as well as the
analysts of entrepreneurship and business practices.
I will conclude with two critical remarks. Despite significant efforts to catch the development
of holography worldwide, the book mostly presents the history of holography in the United States
and the United Kingdom. The detailed analysis of
Denisyuk’s work and frequent references to other
Soviet holographers and centers of research cannot
compensate for the asymmetry in the scale and
scope of historical investigation and fieldwork in
the two contexts. Some important processes in
former socialist countries are mentioned barely or
not at all—for example, the role of the All-Soviet
School on Holography in building the identity of
the holographic community in these countries. Holographic research in Japan, China, Taiwan, and
other countries is merely sketched. Even holography in continental Europe, developed both in universities and in corporations such as Siemens,
Philips, and Thomson-CSF, is scarcely presented.
The book provides little evidence about the
intensive commercial and military-related research on holographic storage and processing of
information. I have claimed that—along with
embossed and security holograms, which Johnston describes—this has been the most intensive
area of research since the late 1960s (Ivan Tchalakov, “The History of Holographic Optical
Storage on Both Sides of the Iron Curtain,
1969 –1989,” ICON, 2005, 11:95–119). In the
Soviet Union (as well as in the United States),
these researches exceeded all other areas of holography in terms of the number of people involved and the scope of the investment made.
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The results remained classified for decades and
slowly began to emerge in the 1990s.
Hence further investigations are needed in order
to fill the gap. In this respect, Johnston’s analysis
of Project MICHIGAN— of the institutional and
cognitive context at Willow Run— could be an
important point of reference, especially if coupled
with a softening of the stance toward the “seamless
web” approach in sociohistorical studies.
IVAN TCHALAKOV
John Krige. American Hegemony and the Postwar Reconstruction of Science in Europe.
(Transformations: Studies in the History of Science and Technology.) viii ⫹ 376 pp., bibl.,
index. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006. $40
(cloth).
In this fine book, John Krige looks beyond the
more familiar role played by science and scientists in shaping the Cold War relations between
the United States and the Soviet Union to examine their role in defining postwar relations
between the United States and the countries of
war-ravaged Western Europe. In doing so, he
takes great care to treat those developments as
varied and conditioned by widely divergent contexts, specifically in France, Germany, and England. In contrast, Krige describes American
involvement in the reconstruction of science in
Europe as a coherent “hegemonic postwar
American project” (p. 2).
Key concepts, taken from diplomatic and political historians, are “hegemony” (dictionary
definition: control or dominating influence by
one person or group over others, especially by
one political group over society or one nation
over others) and “empire” (a group of nations,
territories, or peoples ruled by a single authority). Given the enormous disparity in resources
between the United States and European countries, Krige accepts as natural “the construction
of an ‘informal’ American empire in Western
Europe after the Second World War” (p. 4) and
looks to examine both the heretofore underappreciated role that science and scientific leaders
(both in the United States and in Europe) played
in the establishment and maintenance of this
“informal empire.” As important, he explores
the various ways and the extent to which that
hegemony became manifest not only in the relations between American and European science
but also in the very organization and practice of
science in both places.
Krige emphasizes, above almost all else, that
to establish its informal empire successfully the
United States required and found committed in-
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dividuals in Europe who were willing, even anxious, to collaborate in the reconstruction of European science in a manner consistent with
American interests and values. This is his concept of “coproduction.” Going beyond the diplomatic historian’s notion of “consensual hegemony” as a description of postwar American
influence in Europe, the use of the term “coproduction,” for Krige, is meant both to draw “attention to the creativity of both partners and to
the relative plasticity of U.S. policymakers” and
to signal “that the United States gave Europeans
room to leave their imprint on the hegemonic
regime and implies that empire building is a
fluid process” (p. 4).
The theoretical constructs are presented in
introductory and concluding chapters, sandwiched around case studies on science and the
Marshall Plan, the establishment of CERN (the
European high energy physics laboratory) and
its relationship to U.S. foreign policy, Rockefeller Foundation support of French science and
the CNRS (the French National Center for Scientific Research), Ford Foundation support of
European physics, the attempt by the Ford
Foundation and NATO to create a European
version of MIT, and Philip Morse’s attempt to
promote American-style operations research in
Europe. Without exception, these studies are
well documented and enlightening.
As mentioned, Krige never fails to emphasize
the multifaceted characteristics of science in Europe, noting differences not only between countries but internally—for example, within France.
It is noteworthy, in contrast, that the diversity
and contingency of American actors, actions,
and institutions are deemed less important.
Krige declares that the major American personalities in his case studies (Warren Weaver,
Shepard Stone, Isidore Rabi, and James Killian)
were all “liberal, internationalist, deeply concerned about Europe and respectful of its culture
and traditions.” And, going further, he characterizes the quartet as “quintessentially American: anti-Communist but not populist, nationalistic but not jingoist, firmly convinced that the
United States, whatever its flaws, had a key role
in defending the Free World and its values and
determined to use science to promote those values abroad” (pp. 257–258).
Although internal American conflicts are
barely discussed (the 1954 Oppenheimer fiasco is not mentioned), Krige certainly recognizes that there were powerful, contemporary
figures and forces in America who resisted
one or more of the views attributed to these
scientists. What remains extraordinary, in this
and so many other studies of the early postwar

period, is that for decades such divisions did
not seem to disrupt the “American project.”
Krige is almost certainly correct to highlight
that there was an overarching consensus on
American exceptionalism and anti-communism
and that this consensus was sufficient to swamp
deep divisions, at least in the sphere of American foreign policy.
The story by the late 1960s is of course much
more complex, in that these deep-seated stresses
began to manifest themselves in all aspects of
American society. Although the fine structure of
American science is not Krige’s focus, anyone
attempting to study and understand subsequent—far less coherent and effective—American attempts to dominate Western science and
technology will find Krige’s book an essential
starting point.
ALLAN A. NEEDELL
Andrew Lakoff. Pharmaceutical Reason:
Knowledge and Value in Global Psychiatry.
(Cambridge Studies in Society and the Life Sciences.) x ⫹ 206 pp., bibl., index. Cambridge/
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
$88.95 (cloth).
I came away from this book feeling the kind of
excitement prompted by the early work of the
sociologist Erving Goffman (Asylums: Essays
on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and
Other Inmates [Doubleday, 1961]). Andrew Lakoff’s book began life as a doctoral dissertation
in the Department of Anthropology at Berkeley.
Goffman isn’t even mentioned in the bibliography, but Lakoff too seeks to lay bare the social
relations and power relationships of a psychiatric institution. What gives Lakoff’s book its
charm, however, is that it’s not simply the sociology of a mental hospital— of which we have
many examples— but of an entire psychiatric
milieu: the “mundo psi” of Buenos Aires, a city
that has perhaps the highest concentration of
psychoanalysts in the world.
Lakoff is truly at home not in the uppermiddle-class suburbs, with their multitudes of
private-practice analysts, but in the psychiatric
institutions of the city, where social and community psychiatry is king, with Lacanian approaches coming a close second. The hook on
which Pharmaceutical Reason hangs is a French
neuroscience company’s efforts to gather DNA
samples from local patients with a putative diagnosis of “bipolar disorder”—a diagnosis the
analysts despise. So one is said to have bipolar
disorder, or not, depending on what ward one is
in. Yet the fascination of the study is in learning

This content downloaded from 132.177.229.130 on February 16, 2018 08:24:25 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

BOOK REVIEWS—ISIS, 99 : 1 (2008)

that various diagnoses, such as schizophrenia
and “bipolar,” have their own anthropology.
Many of these patients are quite ill: there is no
question of treating them with psychotherapy
alone; the dramatis personae agree that psychopharmacology is necessary.
But among the nonanalysts, the decision as to
whether a patient is bipolar or schizophrenic has
a political dimension. Here is Lakoff on “the
politics of classification”: “[Psychiatrist] Pablo’s attempt to expand the diagnosis of bipolar
disorder is part of a strategy to increase an
optimistic population: one whose treatment is
less debilitating, whose prognosis is better.”
Mood stabilizers for bipolar disorder are less
debilitating than the older antipsychotics such as
haloperidol. Lakoff: “The bipolar disorder classification is a tool for changing the structure of
authority between patients and doctors. Bipolar
patients can be more active in their own treatment, and in the evaluation of their care, than
schizophrenics, [Pablo] argues. The diagnosis
thus structures the doctor-patient relationship”
(p. 116).
A brief review cannot encompass the many
striking insights with which this highly original
work is filled. But historians of science and of
psychiatry may appreciate that it is the first
serious study in English of the psychiatric milieu in Latin America and that it offers a history
of Argentinean psychiatry from the 1960s to the
present. Biological psychiatry, to which most of
the players are hostile, is just beginning to take
off in Latin America. The Argentinean version
of social and community psychiatry, with its
rampant anticapitalism, is still dominant among
the nonanalysts, just as it once carried the day in
countries such as Italy. All the Argentines are
united in their rejection of the “DSM” style that
they believe represents U.S. psychiatry. All are
hostile to English-language psychiatric imperialism in the form of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Association and in the form of “neuroscience.” They
agree that considering patients’ distinctive personal histories and social circumstances is important; diagnosis is not just applying the checklist of “operational criteria” to which U.S.
psychiatry is increasingly being reduced. (There
is now a powerful backlash against this DSMchecklist approach in the United States as well.)
At a conceptual level, Lakoff introduces several ideas that deserve wide consideration. One
is the notion, raised in the book’s title, of “pharmaceutical reason,” which means defining illness entities on the basis of drug response: for
example, depression is the condition that responds to “antidepressants” (p. 7). The author’s
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own take is that “the effects that a given drug
produces depend, at least in part, upon the milieu of expertise into which it enters” (p. 10).
This is a concept long known in drug trials as
the effect of suggestion, or the placebo effect,
but I have never before seen it used as a means
of explaining differential efficacy among milieus. Lakoff says that pharmaceutical reason
reduces the social complexity of illnesses to
somatic diseases and makes the psychiatrist an
expert in managing “the neurochemical imbalance that disrupts normal behavior,” as he scornfully puts it (p. 176).
“Bipolar disorder” is taken as a kind of deus
ex machina that rides in and disrupts traditional
authority relationships in the mental hospital.
Yet it is not entirely clear that there is such a
thing as bipolar disorder, a diagnosis that implies that the depression of unipolar disorder is
very different from that of bipolar disorder (if
they are not so dissimilar, after all, you really
just have episodes of depression onto which
mania or hypomania may, or may not, be
tacked).
The only off-putting element I found in this
work, which otherwise positively jumps with
ideas, is the almost impenetrable jargon in
which some sections are written. The anthropological descriptions are crisp and clean. But
there are more than enough sentences of this
type: “What is most concretely at stake in recent
transformations of knowledge about abnormal
behavior, I argue, is the emergence and consolidation of a linked set of techniques and practices for reconfiguring the human and its ills” (p.
4). Nonetheless, dear reader, press on. Lakoff is
a rising star in the firmament.
EDWARD SHORTER
Jake Lamar (General Editor). Sixty Years of
Science at UNESCO, 1945–2005. 695 pp., illus., figs., tables, apps., bibl., index. Paris:
UNESCO Publishing, 2006. €30 (paper).
Many of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization’s selfpublished histories degenerate into chronologically ordered lists of acronyms or inspirational
sermons. Sixty Years of Science at UNESCO,
1945–2005, is much better, and the structure of
the book may reveal as much about this specialized U.N. agency as the contents. Annex 1 is the
key to the volume’s 212 acronyms. Annex 6 lists
the 63 contributors to the volume. The Table of
Contents records 75 headings dividing 638
pages of text, meaning that the average entry is
about 8.5 pages long. These short contributions
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are organized into six parts. Coordinating five
dozen authors and integrating so many entries
undoubtedly represents an organizational triumph; at the same time, the brevity of most
entries means that, despite the book’s length, it
is not a satisfying “analytic overview of the
history of the natural sciences programme at
UNESCO” (p. 22).
Noting this superficiality is not an indictment
of Sixty Years. It is an essential reference for
historians of postwar international science, a
book to be consulted rather than read. The brief
entries make it easy to locate particular projects
or themes. The reader will learn the key conferences, partner institutions, and dates necessary
for more in-depth research. Although one
wishes that the participant-authors had shared
more of their daily experience working in an
international bureaucracy, the lack of depth in
descriptions of work “in the field” may accurately reflect the organization’s programs that
attempted to “encourage” and “coordinate” action with limited resources.
Perhaps the most important point this volume
drives home is the inextricably intertwined histories of intergovernmental and international
nongovernmental organizations. The International Council of Scientific Unions, for example,
is an INGO that owes its postwar resurgence to
UNESCO, which not only provided office space
for ICSU but was its sole significant patron for
many years. At the same time, UNESCO relied
on ICSU as if it were an operational division.
Sixty Years shows that building INGO and state
competence in the sciences through networking,
partnership, and “clearing house” and “pump
priming” activities has been UNESCO’s principal strategy.
The collection begins with a review of the
organization’s first two decades. This section
is largely written by accomplished historians,
but the brevity of the chapters precludes nuanced analyses of the sometimes counterintuitive effects of the Cold War and decolonization. The middle sections focus on the work of
particular divisions of the Natural Sciences
Sector. Reflecting its importance in UNESCO,
“Environmental Sciences” is the longest and
most intriguing part of the book. Projects like
Man and the Biosphere and the International
Geological Correlation Program resonate with
themes in recent work at the intersection of
environmental history and history of science,
particularly in respect to the significance of
global infrastructures based on uniform standards. In the Basic and Engineering Sciences
Division, the late 1960s and 1970s (tumultuous years at UNESCO) are remembered as

“golden years” during which efforts to develop educational and institutional capacities
in developing countries were most generously
supported. Work under the rubric of Science
and Society included national science policy
planning, as well as an intriguing recent program on Local and Indigenous Knowledge
Systems. The longest essay in the book presents prosopographic data and a thoughtful
synthetic analysis.
Sixty Years ends with the plan of Walter Erdelen, the current Assistant Director-General for
Natural Sciences, for mobilizing science to
achieve “sustainable development.” On the one
hand, this seems a world away from the vision
of the department’s first director (Joseph Needham) of organizing a global network of scientific institutions. Then, science was justified according to its contribution to world peace. On
the other hand, the conviction that science and
technology are both a cause of and a potential
solution to present crises has proven remarkably
durable. Furthermore, the imperative of economic development in the context of diminishing natural resources has been a central theme
since the late 1940s.
More than the sheer number of authors and
entries—which makes one marvel at the production process, though it perhaps detracts
from the coherence of the final product—the
foreword to Sixty Years reflects the organization it describes. We learn from the current
director-general that this is “not an official
history” of UNESCO (p. 14). Commemorating its sixtieth anniversary, published by the
organization, and written and edited mainly
by staff members, this is certainly not an unofficial history. The “officially not official”
nature of the book mirrors the reality of the
intergovernmental sphere, where the semiofficial and the quasi-governmental are the rule.
Formal categories may reveal surprisingly little. As Vladimir Zharov, former director of
the Division of Basic Sciences, notes: “Over
time, there have been many modifications in
the logical breakdown of the [Basic Sciences]
programme. . . . But the programme per se has
remained steadfast in its goals, strategy, and
intrinsic structure” (p. 96). Taken as a whole,
this collection suggests the remarkable durability of bureaucratic structures, even as they
contributed to radical change in the political
world order.
PERRIN SELCER
Barron H. Lerner. When Illness Goes Public:
Celebrity Patients and How We Look at Medi-
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cine. xv ⫹ 334 pp., figs., index. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006. $25
(cloth).
Not long after reading Barron Lerner’s engaging
and intriguing book, I happened to learn (from
the news crawl on CNN) that the legendary
opera singer Luciano Pavarotti was, in the words
of his wife, “fighting like a lion” against his
pancreatic cancer. The lessons of Lerner’s analysis immediately caused me to zero in on everything I might otherwise have taken for granted: that the private health matters of a celebrity
should be deemed international news; that part
of what it means nowadays to be a celebrity is
that the details of one’s sicknesses and treatments should be shared, so that celebrities can
serve as the public faces of illness; that an unflagging optimism in the face of death is part of
the performance that celebrities are now obliged
to enact; and that, in part through the mythmaking that surrounds celebrity illness, “‘fighting’
one’s cancer has become the only appropriate
response to the disease in American society.
Indeed, the metaphor has become so ubiquitous
it is almost invisible” (p. 157).
When Illness Goes Public takes up the stories
of a set of well-known twentieth-century Americans who suffered diseases ranging from the
relatively unusual (amyotrophic lateral sclerosis) to the all-too-common (cancer and Alzheimer’s). Most of the cast of characters, like the
diplomat John Foster Dulles, the athlete Brian
Piccolo, and the actress Rita Hayworth, were
already famous before they became ill, but some
of them, like Augusto and Michaela Odone (the
parents of a sick child who were also portrayed
in the film Lorenzo’s Oil), became celebrities of
a sort by virtue of their close encounters with
disease. The slippage between these two different kinds of “celebrity patients” will be unsatisfying to purists. But the juxtaposition of cases
permits Lerner to periodize the history of the
twentieth century in a way that connects the
mushrooming of the cult of celebrity to simultaneous shifts in the “sick role,” the doctorpatient relationship, and the possibilities for patient activism. In the first era (roughly 1935–
1970), famous people who became ill and chose
to go public became inspirational figures but
rarely challenged conventional understandings
of the role of the patient. By the second era
(1970 –1980), the most notable celebrity patients were those who actively pushed the medical system to do better— both for themselves
and for others with the same condition. And by
the third era (1980 –1995), just about anyone
could get his or her Warholian “fifteen minutes”
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as a celebrity patient, but more and more of
them had come to act like wary consumers—
self-empowered patients who had taken responsibility for educating themselves about their
conditions and who were too savvy, or too cynical, to imagine that their own interests and
those of their doctors happily coincided. Over
the course of this sixty-year shift in attitudes, the
performance of the celebrity patient became increasingly scripted, with predictable narrative
arcs, confessional moments, and public exhortations. Like the actor Steve McQueen, who
“reacted to a hopeless prognosis by becoming,
in effect, one of his film characters, defiant and
confident” (p. 149), celebrity patients spun illness narratives that read like movie scripts—
small wonder that many of them inspired books
and Hollywood films that were “based on a true
story.” Meanwhile, over this same sixty years,
“by corollary, ‘ordinary’ patients were supposed
to act like ill celebrities” (p. 271)—increasingly
borrowing from them the scripts of how to confront disease with bravado and medical authorities with suspicion.
This is a book that can be appreciated on
many levels. Constructed as a dozen very readable chapter-length stories, When Illness Goes
Public can be enjoyed by a broad public interested in the modern intertwining of the concerns
of celebrity and health. At the same time, the
book self-consciously wrestles with historiography: it explores the tension between telling a
history of famous individuals and analyzing
broader social developments; and it seeks to
examine the mythic dimensions of cultural narratives of disease while attempting, simultaneously, to get at “what really happened” in the
course of these individuals’ illnesses and treatments. Together, these qualities also make the
book well suited for undergraduate teaching. I
can easily imagine pairing a screening of Lorenzo’s Oil with Lerner’s chapter about the Odones,
because Lerner not only describes the controversy over the film’s accuracy but also explores
what it means when a film becomes more “real”
than the story it depicts—for example, when the
actress Susan Sarandon, who played the role of
Michaela Odone, became a public authority on
the virtues of the experimental therapy that the
Odones had promoted.
Lerner speaks to still other audiences in this
volume. For the medical sociologist, his account
complements and complicates the story of the
twentieth-century emergence of patient activism
by emphasizing the complex interaction between well-placed individuals and large-scale
social movements. And Lerner raises important
questions of epistemology that will be of interest
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to scholars in science and technology studies:
What is the epistemic status of the anecdote—
what Lerner calls the “n of 1” data derived from
a single, well-publicized case? What does it
mean that the growing fascination with drawing
lessons from the one-off experiences of celebrities has paralleled a mirror-opposite tendency:
the rise of evidence-based medicine, whose promoters maintain that the hard data gleaned from
randomized trials and meta-analyses hold unsurpassed epistemic virtue? Rather than simply lament the tendency of many laypeople to treat the
celebrity as more credible than the statistician,
Lerner asks serious questions: Is there really a
clear hierarchy of medical evidence? How do
ordinary people embed statistical knowledge
within cultural narratives in order to make decisions in the face of illness? Lerner might have
gone further to try to answer such questions—
but that would have been a different book. This
one provides entry into a wide range of debates
without ever straying too far from its basic task
of telling some fascinating stories.
STEVEN EPSTEIN
Inken Rebentrost. Das Labor in der Box:
Technikentwicklung und Unternehmensgründung in der frühen deutschen Biotechnologie.
309 pp. Munich: C. H. Beck, 2006.
Eric J. Vettel. Biotech: The Countercultural
Origins of an Industry. 273 pp., notes, index.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
2006.
The history of molecular biology witnessed an
early wave of historical reflection and commemoration by the actors and shortly thereafter
spawned a growing scholarly industry led by
historians of the life sciences. Surprisingly, historical scholarship on the development of recent
biotechnology—including its core, genetic engineering—is not abundant. The two books under
review here are most welcome because they
help to fill a gap, each of them in its own
characteristic way. Eric Vettel traces the origins
of molecular biotechnology to California’s Bay
Area, in particular Berkeley, Stanford, and San
Francisco, with the eye of a general historian
interested in American politics and the culture
of science after World War II. Inken Rebentrost,
a bioscientist by training turned historian, presents us with a case study of the conditions
under which the first German biotechnology
start-up company arose out of an academic setting and made its way to the market. In particular, it reflects on the distinctive characteristics

of molecular biotechnologies. Taken together,
the two books also allow—within limits—for a
historical comparison between the United States
and Europe, in particular Germany.
Vettel’s book starts with an assessment of the
life sciences in the Bay Area just after World
War II. Whereas the physical sciences there had
played a major role since the 1930s and throughout the war, the Bay Area was, according to
Vettel, “a virtual backwater” in the biological
sciences. Though this statement should probably
be qualified (the work of George Beadle at Stanford, David Greenberg at Berkeley, and Henry
Borsook at Caltech comes to mind), such work
could well be perceived as small scale in light of
what was to come. Vettel’s primary example is
Wendell Stanley’s Biochemistry and Virus Laboratory, established in Berkeley in 1948. Stanley’s enterprise exhibits, in a paradigmatic fashion, two aspects of American bioscience policy
that Vettel considers characteristic for the first
two decades after World War II: first, the transition from selective philanthropic funding, such
as that practiced by the Rockefeller Foundation,
to massive federal funding, unprecedented in its
dimensions, in the immediate postwar period;
and second, an equally unprecedented emphasis
on basic research, with a concomitant explicit
effort to sever traditional links to medical and
agricultural departments and practices. Vettel is
ambivalent in assessing Stanley’s success. On
the one hand, Stanley put his bets on protein
research and thus missed the turn to DNA
around which the molecular biological revolution of the 1950s gained shape and lasting momentum. On the other hand, his “freestanding”
laboratory, with its emphasis on the physics and
chemistry of life, served as an incentive for
Stanford and the University of California at San
Francisco to reshape their life science research
programs accordingly.
Vettel then describes at length the rise, particularly around Berkeley, of an academic as
well as popular counterculture with an emphasis
on environment and health, issues that the basic
life sciences appeared not to address, and its
detachment from a generation that was perceived to have lost sight of the values of real life
and had led America into the war in Vietnam.
On the federal level, this movement coincided
with a policy shift initiated under Lyndon Johnson and continued under Richard Nixon. This
shift emphasized the need for practical returns
from the basic biosciences and also, in response
to the economic depression during the later
1960s, put an end to the miraculous increase in
federal research money that had characterized
the decade immediately after World War II and

This content downloaded from 132.177.229.130 on February 16, 2018 08:24:25 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

BOOK REVIEWS—ISIS, 99 : 1 (2008)

the decade following the Sputnik shock. This is
the climate in which Vettel places the origins of
a molecular biotechnology that, on the one hand,
resulted in a complete realignment of the relation between basic and applied research and,
with it, a complete shift in the academic selfperception of a new generation of bioscientists,
while, on the other hand, leading to an equally
complete realignment of the relationship between academia and industry. Accordingly, the
book ends with a brief history of the early years
of Cetus, history’s first biotechnology company,
founded in Berkeley in 1972.
Vettel’s book is a powerful and fascinating
argument for viewing scientific development,
including the perception of what it means to do
good and cutting-edge science at a particular
point in history, as culturally embedded. Concomitantly, however, he underestimates the
epistemic constellation underlying the advent of
genetic engineering: what a former generation
of scientists had to constitute as objects of research could be turned by a later generation into
molecular instruments and tools. This very turn
completely redefined what biotechnology was
all about. Unfortunately, whenever it comes to
the particulars and details of the research work
at issue, Vettel’s descriptions become somewhat
imprecise, at points even misleading.
Das Labor in der Box (the published version
of Rebentrost’s dissertation) starts with a description of Germany’s path into modern biotechnology. The comparison to the United
States is illuminating. On a broad scale, German
research in molecular biology began to be federally funded to an appreciable extent only
about a decade after World War II. The new
basic molecular biological research complex
only became effectively established another decade later, toward the end of the 1960s— by
which time the transition to gene technology in
the United States had already been fully set in
motion. Yet another decade later, around 1980,
it was the German government that tried to create conditions under which Germany’s bioscience would move into the gene technological
era. In America, by contrast, research universities and industry, particularly biotechnological
start-up companies funded by venture capital,
were the major players in this transition. In Germany, however, academia and also the big pharmaceutical industry remained reluctant. Where
the latter did become engaged, it was in the
United States rather than at home. And while the
cultural movement in America during the 1960s
was, as Vettel aptly describes it, a ferment for
the biotechnological revolution, the situation in
Germany a decade later was just the opposite.
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The growing ecological movement of the 1980s
perceived gene technology from the perspective
not of its potentials but of its dangers.
The first biotechnological start-up company
of the new type in Germany was founded in
Düsseldorf in 1984. Detlev Riesner, a young
professor of physical biology, together with a
group of students, took the initiative to found
DIAGEN, a company that was aimed at developing biotechnical products to be used in agriculture, diagnostic tests for virus diseases, and
molecular analytical separation techniques.
Tellingly, one of the very early venture capitalists who engaged in the formation of this business happened to be the founder of Cetus,
Moshe Alafi. Going into considerable detail and
using highly interesting archival sources—industrial sources are rare matters in history of
science—Rebentrost describes the early struggle
for survival of DIAGEN and how, working
through the vagaries of available market niches,
the company finally settled on the development
of a new molecular separation technology built
around the purification of nucleic acids, in particular recombinant DNA plasmids.
The “laboratory in the box” is a metaphor
for what helped to transform tedious molecular benchwork in the second half of the 1980s:
the separation and purification kits that became ubiquitously known under the label of
QIAGEN. The chromatographic procedure
underlying the technology not only had a deep
impact on the working culture of molecular
biological laboratories, both academic and industrial; it also formed a key component in the
transformation of nucleic acid technologies
into automated procedures, without which the
genomics of the 1990s would have been impossible.
The strength of Rebentrost’s book is that it
relates to both the laboratory in culture and
culture in the laboratory. It gives readers a sense
of the inner makeup of the sorts of technologies
that brought gene technology into the realm of
the feasible and that, from the late 1980s onward, started to permeate molecular laboratories
of the second generation in the form of readymade kits. Less strong is the form of this monograph: it bears all the traces that characterize
dissertations as a particular form of academic
writing.
HANS-JÖRG RHEINBERGER
Vaclav Smil. Transforming the Twentieth Century: Technical Innovations and Their Conse-
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Women working on transparent noses for A-20 attack bombers (taken from Smil, Transforming the
Twentieth Century).

quences. x ⫹ 358 pp., illus., figs., bibl., indexes.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. $45
(cloth).
It is difficult to determine the audience for
which Vaclav Smil’s wide-ranging Transforming the Twentieth Century is intended. As Smil
amply demonstrates, his knowledge of industrial
technologies is formidable, and most of the
work is devoted to detailed accounts of key
twentieth-century innovations that are written to
be accessible to informed readers. Ample photographs, well-conceived schematic illustrations, and highly informative graphs markedly
enhance Smil’s discussions of the genesis, everexpanding applications, and effects of vastly
improved, fundamentally reconfigured, and in a
few instances new technologies that he convincingly argues undergirded the fossil fuel– dependent, affluent societies and globalized international system that dominated life on most of the
planet during the last three or four decades of
the century. His vignettes detailing technological changes that in almost every case yielded
increased returns on existing technologies that
span several orders of magnitude are grouped in

four long chapters that cover, in succession,
modes of tapping ever-greater inanimate sources
of energy, innovative production techniques—
with a whole chapter devoted specifically to
automation and robotization—and vastly improved systems of communication and information gathering and dissemination.
The topically divided subsections of each of
the long chapters of Transforming the Twentieth
Century suggest the multivolume encyclopedias
that eighteenth-century French savants were so
fond of churning out. This impression is reinforced by Smil’s neglect of the broader historical contexts in which pivotal technological innovations occurred and copious references to his
companion volume, Creating the Twentieth
Century: Technical Innovations of 1867–1914
and Their Lasting Impact (Oxford, 2005). This,
then, is a book that few are likely to read straight
through. But it should serve as a concise, erudite, and accessible reference work for those
interested in interrelated scientific and technological transformations in the mature and late
industrial eras. And in contrast to Smil’s earlier
study, which is highly Western-centric, Trans-
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forming the Twentieth Century provides a somewhat more global perspective, with quite extensive and particularly revealing sections on Japan
and considerable attention to China, whose
post–World War II technological and environmental history Smil has analyzed in depth in two
books and numerous articles. Nonetheless, there
is surprisingly little on the other industrializing
societies of East and Southeast Asia, India, or
Latin America and negligible coverage of Africa
and the Middle East. This oversight is reflected
in his cursory treatment of watershed scientifictechnological breakthroughs that were centered
on the developing world, such as the Green
Revolution, which receives a brief paragraph
and does not figure at all in Smil’s assessment of
the global environmental and social consequences of the shift to mechanized, monocrop
farming that has been reliant on the extensive
use of chemical fertilizers and irrigation.
Smil’s direct and informed descriptions of the
scientific-technological transformations that are
the focus of much of his considerable corpus of
scholarly work ought to enhance the prospects
of Transforming the Twentieth Century for
adoption as a textbook for courses on technological innovation and its impact on economic,
environmental, and social change. Particularly
useful in this regard are his consistently provocative, often well-considered, and substantial reflections on key shifts in a diverse range of
extraction, manufacturing, and communication
technologies as well as the advances in scientific
understanding associated with them. But depending on one’s pedagogical inclinations,
Smil’s highly interpretive handling of his many
case studies and his persistent interjection of
judgments that are at times highly contentious,
such as his prosecutorial treatment of Microsoft’s capture of the market for personal
computer software or his conclusion that the
effects of the nuclear arms race were ultimately
benign, are likely to affect its appeal for classroom use. These concerns may well be heightened by his harshly negative assessments of the
uses to which influential technologies, particularly those intended for mass consumption—
such as television, transistorized audio devices,
and the internet— have been put. Even if one
sympathizes with these strictures, they are often
delivered in abbreviated, curmudgeonly asides
that have the simplistic, imbalanced quality of
the sound bites that have contributed significantly to the decline in media standards that
Smil finds so troubling.
Although Smil concludes Transforming the
Twentieth Century with an engaging chapter
weighing “Accomplishments and Concerns”
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and provides striking comparisons throughout
the study of, for example, increases in productivity, levels of dependence on inanimate fossil
fuels, or per capita energy consumption and indexes of social well-being, there is little sustained analysis of broader historical factors. His
case studies of the genesis and development of
technologies in different sectors and his general
thesis that the twentieth century was overwhelmingly one of innovations based on inventions of the half century preceding World War I
rather than new creations are rarely connected to
prevailing economic, political, or sociocultural
forces. In addition, he simply assumes rather
than seeks to account for the synergy between
scientific breakthroughs and technological advances that was essential for the processes that
are the focus of his inquiry. Smil explicitly refuses to address issues relating to the extent to
which technology drives history, despite the fact
that his stance on this vital question appears to
be implicitly confirmed by his repeated return to
the transformative power of improved machines
and often ingenious techniques for generating
ever-greater amounts of energy from inanimate
sources. These lacunae may leave many historians of science and technology less than satisfied with Smil’s ambitious survey of a century
of unprecedented, but often troubling, change.
But we are all in his debt for this smart, incisive
compendium of the breakthroughs and global
repercussions associated with these critical human endeavors.
MICHAEL ADAS
Kaushik Sunder Rajan. Biocapital: The Constitution of Postgenomic Life. xi ⫹ 343 pp.,
bibl., index. Durham, N.C.: Duke University
Press, 2006. $84.95 (cloth); $23.95 (paper).
Kaushik Sunder Rajan’s Biocapital: The Constitution of Postgenomic Life elucidates the
mechanisms through which hubristic biomedical
researchers, technology-savvy entrepreneurs,
and federal bureaucrats drove each other into a
global frenzy of promise and expectation in the
1990s. Biocapital therefore provides historians
of very recent science and technology a valuable
resource in their efforts to push analyses of the
heady dot-com years beyond the superficial.
Developed from Sunder Rajan’s 2004 MIT
STS dissertation, Biocapital takes an ethnographic approach to the problem of demystifying the biotech sector’s fervor during the late
1990s. The author, who is trained in biochemistry as well as anthropology, clarifies complex
scientific ideas and even more complex scien-
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tific rituals. He is not content, though, with mere
description and explication; he applies what he
has observed in biotech start-ups and regulatory
bodies in both the United States and India to an
effort to inform discussion of the theoretical
tools—particularly those provided by Karl
Marx— employed in the social sciences and humanities.
Sunder Rajan begins by defining his ambitious concept of “biocapital.” He posits that a
new form of capitalism has emerged as a consequence of economies transformed by information technology fusing with biomedical research
that has also been transformed by computers. In
the biocapitalistic system—as with other components of the NASDAQ boom—value is derived not from goods or services but, rather,
from potential; wealth is therefore generated by
the expectation of profitable production or service. What sets biocapitalism apart, though, are
its ties to the discourses of biology, medicine,
and spirituality. It is such ties that compel investors, be they individuals, major corporations,
or governments, to devote so many resources so
unquestioningly to what amounts to mere hope.
To shed light on how entrepreneurship, epistemological frameworks, scientific practices,
and the always-heated public discussion of life
itself shaped one another, Sunder Rajan explores how two societies, the United States and
India, each constructed the moral and ritualistic
systems that would support biocapitalism. In the
United States he focuses on start-up genomics
companies, while in India he explores larger,
government-sponsored endeavors. Although he
often juxtaposes the two societies’ approaches
to biotechnology, he also takes pains to point
out that U.S. and Indian ventures are often intermingled and depend heavily on each other.
This makes analysis tricky, and the reader must
exert considerable effort to keep up with Sunder
Rajan as he demonstrates how globalized, capitalized biomedical research complicates the
central claims of popular models of society,
namely those derived from Marx, Weber, and
Foucault. The reward, however, is understanding: first, that excitement about biotech’s potential has radically altered epistemology, ideology,
and scientific and economic institutions worldwide; second, that expectation of new biomedical insights and technologies can be as transformative as their advent and spread.
Each chapter approaches the power of expectation, particularly the prospect of profitably altering life, from a different angle. In the book’s
first part, “Circulations,” Sunder Rajan explores
the flow of knowledge, tools, and anticipatory
excitement through the political, economic, and

scientific landscapes of the United States and
India. Examining the United States, the author
demonstrates how big pharmaceutical corporations, small genomics firms, and governmental
entities created and navigated biotechnology’s
legal terrain. By focusing on the dispute over
patents, he clarifies the complex and often counterintuitive alliances, such as those between
large pharmaceutical corporations and anti–
gene patenting activists, that form within networks of exchange.
Sunder Rajan’s coverage of India raises
thorny questions about the relationship between
biotechnology and the legacy of colonialism.
Drawing from extensive observations of Indian
biotech projects and their sponsors, he explains
how the promise and prestige of biotechnology
lured India into largely abandoning its ideological commitment to appropriating medical and
agricultural technology for the benefit of its own
and the world’s impoverished people. By casting India’s biotechnology sector as a “constituent” of that of the West, the author highlights the
tension between the goals of pro-capitalist Indian governments and those of their often antiWestern, anti-capitalist citizenries.
The book’s second section, “Articulations,”
seeks to clarify the mechanisms of the speculative hype propelling biotech’s growth. Sunder
Rajan shows that biotechnologists often employed—and believed—the messianic rhetoric
one finds in discussions of life’s fundamental
nature and purpose. We find, for example,
Randy Scott, cofounder of Incyte Genomics,
toasting the genomics community: “Because
they aren’t in genomics for themselves, they are
in it for Life” (p. 57). The author argues that in
Scott’s case, as well as those of PXE International’s cofounder Patrick Terry and Human Genome Project head Francis Collins, there was a
confluence of the zeal for genomics research and
evangelical Christianity. In India, where millenarian excitement was more subdued, biotech
was cast as the means to create a new, “modernized” national identity without addressing the
nation’s poverty.
Biocapital culminates in its final chapter,
where Sunder Rajan surveys GeneEd, a Bay
Area start-up formed in 1997 by scientists of
Indian descent. GeneEd, which specializes in
providing e-learning courses to biotechnology
companies, serves as a locus for the many forces
Sunder Rajan has hitherto described. Although
the GeneEd survey is deep and enlightening, the
author does not explicitly state the connections
between what he observed in California and the
fascinating theoretical claims of his earlier chapters. A book-length guided tour of GeneEd,
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where the author could point out how the quotidian activities of the company exemplify the
claims made in Biocapital, would be of great
use.
Historians reading Biocapital must bear in
mind that it is more a work of anthropology than
of history. As an anthropologist, Sunder Rajan
relies on personal observations and casual statements that can be acquired only through immersion in the culture he is studying. Thus, there are
many cases where the author’s claims cannot be
easily corroborated. Worse, from the historian’s
perspective, he supports arguments by drawing
from individuals and indeed whole organizations whose identities he has deliberately kept
anonymous. These important caveats aside, Biocapital has more than enough interesting verifiable claims to make it essential reading for anyone studying biotechnology and other
contemporary hype-driven fields like nanotechnology and alternative energy.
JOSEPH NOVEMBER
Liba Taub; Frances Willmoth (Editors). The
Whipple Museum of the History of Science: Instruments and Interpretations, to Celebrate the
Sixtieth Anniversary of R. S. Whipple’s Gift to
the University of Cambridge. xx ⫹ 492 pp.,
illus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2006. £35 (cloth).
In 1944 Robert Stewart Whipple, former chairman of the Cambridge Scientific Instrument
Company, presented his rich collection of more
than a thousand scientific instruments and fifteen hundred books to the University of Cambridge. This generous gift, including an 8-inch
reflecting telescope from William Herschel and
first editions from Newton and Christiaan Huygens, marked the founding of the Whipple Museum of the History of Science. Right from the
start, the intention was that the museum would
be more than “a repository of scientific objects,”
and there was to be a link with “the allied wider
and fundamental question of the future position
of the History of Science as a subject of study
and research in the University” (p. 1). To this
very day, the integration of teaching, learning,
and research, based on a highly accessible and
adequately documented collection, has been the
museum’s driving principle. The Whipple Museum, housed since 1958 in the former Laboratory of Physical Chemistry in Free School Lane,
and with a collection that now totals some six
thousand objects, wants to do more than arrange
exhibitions; it is an active part of the Depart-
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ment of the History and Philosophy of Science
of the University of Cambridge.
To mark the sixtieth anniversary of the
Whipple Museum, twenty-one authors who
have or have had close ties with the museum
have contributed to The Whipple Museum of the
History of Science: Instruments and Interpretations. Part 1 of this anthology concerns the history of the museum. In the selection of original
documents that open the book, we find Rupert
Hall, who in 1948 became the first paid (parttime) curator, complaining bitterly in the annual
report of 1951 about the cramped housing of the
museum. More than half a century later, he
fondly recalls unpacking chests of instruments,
his first explorations of the collection, and the
liberating relocation to Free School Lane.
In Part 2, eighteen authors review specific
instruments or books from the museum collection, reflect on special exhibitions held by the
museum, or consider methodological or historiographic issues. The editors have completely
refrained from imposing any further structure on
the book, and the contributions are presented
alphabetically according to the authors’ names.
Therefore, it is pure chance that in Chapter 13
(of all numbers) Robert Jenks reveals, after careful research, that what was always thought to be
a sixteenth-century Venetian silver globe is
probably a nineteenth-century English fake.
This case is a fine illustration of how an incorrect designation, made on the basis of a superficial examination by an uncritical eye, can survive for decades. At the same time, Jenks’s
detective work shows that inauthentic instruments can sometimes tell us more than objects
whose provenance is beyond doubt.
Robert Whipple donated instruments and an
accompanying set of books, and several authors
emphasize how fortunate that combination can
prove to be. Jim Bennett, curator of the Whipple
Museum from 1979 to 1994, illustrates this
point with an analysis of Edward Worshop’s
Discovery of Sundry Errours (1582), a book that
contains one of the oldest advertisements from
an English instrument maker. In her contribution on so-called “Newtonian” orreries, Liba
Taub, the present curator, politely but emphatically demonstrates how art historians can make
considerable errors in their interpretations of
instruments if they consider only textual and
pictorial evidence.
How cross-fertilization can help the history of
science is most powerfully demonstrated by the
Cambridge Latin Therapy Group, a research
seminar that in the academic year 2002/2003
brought a group of paleography and Latin students of various abilities together with experts
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and novices in the study of scientific instruments. The outcome of this interaction was that
a cardboard model of a navicula (a small portable sundial, shaped like a ship, which can be
used at any latitude) provided the group with a
very plausible explanation for what had to that
point been an obscure passage in a text about
this instrument. And when, at an auction on 30
October 2002, the Whipple Museum acquired a
sundial bearing a Rojas projection, with a series
of instructions in Latin, the group’s efforts to
translate this led them to realize that part of the
instrument (a slender pointer on the sliding cursor) was missing. The subsequently completed
instrument again inspired a correct translation.
“Despite all their recent talk of the importance of ‘material culture,’ concludes the Latin
Therapy Group in its delightful contribution to
the anthology, “historians of science outside the
domains of technology and museums have
rarely paid close attention to the nitty-gritty of
the production, distribution and uses of instruments; and, though there are splendid exceptions, historians of instruments and technology
have tended to concentrate all too exclusively on
the nitty-gritty. A further and equally unfortunate division within the history of science is that
between the producers of critical editions and
translations of sources, and those who base their
historical narratives on those sources, all too
often treating the sources as ‘given,’ as the unproblematic fruits of the exertions of expert
under-labourers” (p. 281). Merely absorbing this
message makes reading the Whipple anthology
a worthwhile activity.
DIRK VAN DELFT
Charles Thorpe. Oppenheimer: The Tragic Intellect. xvii ⫹ 384 pp., illus., bibl., index. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006. $37.50
(cloth).
Historical studies on J. Robert Oppenheimer
have not yet quite approached the scale of the
Darwin or Einstein “industries,” but the American physicist’s centenary in 2004 has coincided
with a remarkable outpouring of excellent scholarship on his life and times. Most prominently,
Kai Bird and Martin Sherwin’s 2005 biography,
American Prometheus: The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer (Knopf ), won
both critical and popular acclaim as a captivating chronicle of its subject. Charles Thorpe’s
Oppenheimer is a quite different book, yet it
provides a worthy and even necessary complement to the Pulitzer winner.
Thorpe, a scholar in science and technology

studies, calls his book a sociological biography
that aims to account not only for Oppenheimer’s
life but also for “the making of social, institutional, and cultural forms” that both shaped and
were shaped by Oppenheimer’s actions. Thus, in
contrast to the predominantly narrative form of
the Bird and Sherwin volume, Thorpe’s is much
more analytical, aptly deploying a number of
dialectical concepts such as individual identity
and collective norms, charismatic leadership
and collaborative fashioning, vocational duty
and broader social responsibilities, to explain
Oppenheimer’s views and behavior from childhood to the atomic bomb. Although original
archival research and oral history interviews are
an important part of the book, its strength is not
in adding new biographical detail but, rather, in
situating Oppenheimer at “a nodal point at
which competing cultural tendencies converged
and intersected” (p. 18).
Oppenheimer emerges from Thorpe’s study
as a tragic figure, not only in terms of his persecution during his infamous security clearance
case in 1954 but also in the sense that he lived a
life of contradiction: even though he held an
idealistic view of the potential of science, he
eventually adopted a “soldierly ethic of duty,”
driven in part by a profound psychological insecurity, toward the military leadership during
World War II and the national security state
during the ensuing Cold War (p. 197). In one of
the most riveting chapters (Ch. 4) of the book,
Thorpe details how Oppenheimer (and others)
used scheduling as a way to discipline the Los
Alamos laboratory toward the goal of delivering
an atomic bomb, brushing aside moral and political questions as a waste of time or worse. In
an October 1944 letter to General Leslie Groves,
military leader of the Manhattan Project, Oppenheimer denounced “the fallacy of regarding
a controlled test as the culmination of the work
of this laboratory” (p. 149).
In many ways, Thorpe is more critical than
Bird and Sherwin in evaluating Oppenheimer’s
actions and influence, especially during the
postwar years. For example, in November 1945
Oppenheimer declared in his famous farewell
speech at Los Alamos that it was “good” for
scientists to make discoveries and “turn over to
mankind at large the greatest possible power to
control the world,” because it was in the nature
of science and because that power might bring
forth “a new spirit in international affairs.”
While Bird and Sherwin regard the speech as a
warning against American unilateralism, Thorpe
sees it as an attempt to justify the making and
use of the atomic bomb and “a defense of the
administration.” By appealing to scientists to
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focus on their apolitical “vocational ideals,” Oppenheimer, according to Thorpe, helped make
science a neutral instrument in service to the
American Cold War strategy (pp. 177–178).
Likewise, in examining the H-bomb debate,
Thorpe faults Oppenheimer for his failure “to
sustain a principled rejection of the H-bomb”
and for advocating, instead, the deployment of
tactical nuclear weapons as an expedient alternative (p. 199). Unfortunately, Thorpe does not
explore in more depth why, given his identification with the national security state, Oppenheimer would oppose the H-bomb in the first
place. (The book mentions Oppenheimer’s remnant faith in arms control and the influence of
James Conant only in passing.) Did Oppenheimer oppose the H-bomb, for example, in part
owing to his “misplaced pride about the device
he was responsible for producing,” as his rival in
the debate, Edward Teller, claimed (Teller,
Memoirs [Perseus, 2001], p. 372), or was this
explanation more revealing about Teller’s view
toward the H-bomb than Oppenheimer’s toward
the atomic bomb? In any case, Thorpe’s analysis
of Oppenheimer’s thinking in this period suggests that his opposition to the H-bomb on moral
and political grounds may have been an aberration rather than an exemplification of his views
on the proper—and narrow—role of scientists in
matters of policy. Ironically, however, it was
this incident that became a key element in Oppenheimer’s 1954 security case, leading not
only to the denial of his clearance but also to the
official discrediting of a broader social and political role for scientists—which Oppenheimer
had actually been somewhat uneasy with.
Thorpe’s analysis of Oppenheimer’s later years
suggests a further irony: Oppenheimer, as an antiCommunist liberal intellectual, underwent a conservative, not radical, self-refashioning following
his humiliating 1954 security case. A believer in
cultural elitism, he became deeply involved in the
Congress of Cultural Freedom (secretly funded in
part by the CIA), which sought to promote liberal
pluralism in the world; he was wary of Einstein’s
open criticism of McCarthyism; and he lamented
the fragmentation of American culture and society
during the Vietnam War era. Like many other
American scientists, Oppenheimer had faith in the
identity of the ideals of science and of American
democracy; but he could not reconcile the liberal
vision of science with its potential for mass violence, as represented by Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Overall, Oppenheimer is a refreshingly critical analysis of both the physicist’s life and the
gradual integration of science into the apparatus
of the state that he facilitated. While not everyone will agree with Thorpe’s sometimes harsh
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critique of his subject, most will find the book
thoughtful and well written, built on rich
sources, cogent arguments, and original insights. Like the works of Steven Shapin,
Thorpe’s former mentor at the University of
California, San Diego, and others, this book
demonstrates once again the promise of sociologically informed historical studies of science
and technology.
ZUOYUE WANG
Keith Wailoo; Stephen Pemberton. The Troubled Dream of Genetic Medicine: Ethnicity and
Innovation in Tay-Sachs, Cystic Fibrosis, and
Sickle Cell Disease. x ⫹ 249 pp., index. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006.
$21.95 (paper).
The title of this book is not very informative
about its content. Its main objective is to contrast the therapeutic approaches successively
proposed during the last forty years for three
major genetic diseases: Tay-Sachs (TS) disease,
cystic fibrosis (CF), and sickle cell (SC) disease.
This objective is not fully original, since it is
very close to that of Troy Duster’s Backdoor to
Eugenics (Routledge, Chapman & Hall, 1990).
However, new information has been included
because of the time elapsed since this earlier
publication: for instance, the description of new
treatments for SC disease, both bone marrow
transplantation and drugs such as 5-azacytidine
and hydroxyurea; and discussion of the problems raised by the extension of the strategies
used to reduce the incidence of TS disease in the
Jewish community to other, less severe, genetic
diseases. The case of CF, with the hopes and
disillusionment resulting from the first attempts
at genetic therapy, was also absent from Duster’s book.
The central argument is also different.
Whereas Duster positioned the new therapeutic
approaches in relation to the eugenic objectives
of the past, Keith Wailoo and Stephen Pemberton aim to demonstrate that, in the case of each
of these diseases, different historical experiences shaped the sensibility, representations,
and attitudes of the different groups involved:
patients, doctors, associations, the public, industrialists. The main factor was the position, real
or imagined, that the three ethnic groups mainly
affected by these diseases—Jews in the case of
TS, “white people” for CF, and African Americans for SC— have within American society.
The Troubled Dream of Genetic Medicine offers interesting information and pertinent discussions on the reasons for the successes and
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failures of the different therapeutic attempts,
which came in rapid succession, for these three
diseases. It raises important issues, such as the
major role of financial interests and the irresponsibility of premature announcements of success.
This book certainly constitutes a good reference
point from which to appreciate the present
promise of stem cell therapies. Good examples
of the permanent and perilous trade-offs between risks and advantages that any new therapeutic approach offers are given. For all these
reasons, the book deserves to be read by a large
public—and in particular by those who are in
charge of, or concerned with, decisions about
health politics.
But I am only partially convinced by the central argument of this book: the major place of
the ethnic dimension in the contrasted histories
of these three diseases. In particular, I was not
convinced that the “white” or “Caucasian” nature of CF was fundamental in explaining the
evolution of therapies. The distinct nature of
these diseases—the age of the patients, the seriousness and diversity of the symptoms, the
existing ways to improve patients’ conditions
and to alleviate their pain—is probably more
important in explaining the contrasting results:
the successes and failures of the therapeutic approaches to these diseases have not been so
different in other countries, where the ethnic
landscape is obviously very different.
One weakness of this book is the vagueness
of the expressions used to describe the new
therapeutic approaches. “Genetic therapy” has
different meanings, designating the use of recombinant proteins, the addition of functional
copies of a gene when the endogenous copies
are nonfunctional, or the “dream” of substituting
a functional copy of a gene for a nonfunctional
one. Enzyme replacement and gene replacement
therapies are confounded, as are the uses of
chemical drugs and recombinant proteins. The
most serious problem is the recurrent use of the
expression “gene for disease” to designate the
specific form of a gene associated with a disease. It is a pity that, in a book that could serve
as a reference in a field where sensationalized
“information” prevails, the authors did not pay
more attention to the correctness of the expressions they used.
Moreover, the text is highly repetitive, and
the organization of the book could have been
improved. The reader has the feeling that the
entire manuscript was not carefully read after
the different chapters were put together. The
presence of a glossary and the insertion of additional documents is welcome. Nevertheless, a

short general bibliography would have been useful for the lay reader.
MICHEL MORANGE
Elizabeth Siegel Watkins. The Estrogen Elixir:
A History of Hormone Replacement Therapy in
America. ix ⫹ 351 pp., notes, index. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007. $45
(cloth).
Ever since the distinguished seventy-two-yearold French-American-Mauritian physiologist
Charles-Edouard Brown-Séquard announced in
1889 that he had “rejuvenated” himself with
injections of testicular extracts from dogs and
guinea pigs, the sex glands and their secretions
have been thought to hold the secret, if not of
eternal youth, then at least of youthful vitality.
Many medical procedures (of which “monkey
gland” transplants were only the most colorful)
were introduced in the early twentieth century to
combat aging and debility by boosting the gonadal secretions. Simultaneously, there was
much serious research on endocrine functions,
and virtually all the major hormones had become available in chemically pure forms by the
end of World War II. Inevitably, researchers and
clinicians now attempted to use these hormonal
preparations for rejuvenation—menopausal
women, in particular, were singled out for attention, and to this day numerous middle-aged
women receive long-term hormone replacement
therapy (HRT).
In her informative study, Elizabeth Siegel
Watkins chronicles the history of hormone replacement therapy for women in America. She
begins with a chapter on the isolation and commercial production of estrogen and related sex
hormones around the time of World War II. The
“explosion of estrogen products,” she argues,
marked “the beginning of a new age, in which
medical views and cultural circumstances converged to create a climate in which female aging
became the target of treatment” (pp. 30 –31).
Concurrently, medical and cultural attitudes toward menopause were changing fast. The New
York gynecologist Robert Wilson famously
called for long-term hormone replacement to
keep women “feminine forever”—menopause,
he and many others claimed, was not a natural
condition but a deficiency disease that ought to
be treated with sex hormones. Supported by
physicians and encouraged by the pharmaceutical industry, HRT became routine for increasing
numbers of older women in the United States.
The pharmaceutical industry, predictably,
played a big role in this medicalization. The

This content downloaded from 132.177.229.130 on February 16, 2018 08:24:25 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

BOOK REVIEWS—ISIS, 99 : 1 (2008)

leading manufacturer of estrogen in the United
States spent a million dollars a year to advertise
the product, and by the mid-1970s it had become
one of the five most prescribed drugs in the
nation. Watkins explores the mechanics and
forms of advertising estrogen products to doctors and consumers at length, demonstrating the
ways in which shifts in medical and cultural
attitudes were related to changes in the publicity
campaigns. The increasing prominence of feminist health campaigners challenging the medicalization of the menopause prevented any uncontested imposition of HRT on American
women, and the twists and turns of medical
opinion on the association of estrogens with
cancer, osteoporosis, and cardiovascular disorders ensured, in any case, that no medical consensus on the desirability of long-term HRT
endured unrevised for long.
Even the old clinical conviction that estrogen
“protected” against cardiac disease was undermined by late twentieth-century research, and
Watkins shows that similar, if less dramatic,
perturbations have long characterized the fortunes of HRT in America. These shifts in medical views were reflected in debates on regulation and advertising within Congress and the
Food and Drug Administration. Watkins chronicles these in instructive detail; but even more
absorbing are her analyses of the diverse reactions of women themselves, especially the differences between groups of feminists on the
subject of hormone replacement and the ways in
which these differences were sharpened or reduced by the often unexpected findings of medical research.
The Estrogen Elixir is an important and welldocumented contribution to the historiography
of twentieth-century American medicine. Its
careful analysis of the diversity of attitudes with
which American women and their physicians
approached the question of hormone replacement is particularly valuable. One could, of
course, always ask for more. The initial chapter,
on early twentieth-century glandular and hormone research, could have said more about the
preoccupation with ovarian functions; and the
importance of “rejuvenation” in the history of
endocrinology, always denied by clinicianhistorians, could have been brought out more
clearly. More important, Watkins does not say
much about the ways in which the science of
hormones, although rooted in cultural concepts
of the body, gender, and aging, eventually undermined and partially redefined those very concepts. Also, it might have been wise not to
confine the book exclusively to female HRT.
While it is true that HRT has largely been pre-
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scribed for women in the second half of the
twentieth century, the early twentieth-century
precursors of HRT were almost entirely for
men; moreover, a new push by the pharmaceutical industry to medicalize the male menopause
(the so-called andropause) has been under way
from the 1990s. Analyses of these oscillations in
scientific, medical, and cultural attitudes toward
gender, aging, and pharmaceutical intervention
would have enriched the book considerably. In
spite of its lack of interest in such intellectual
and cultural questions, however, The Estrogen
Elixir is a significant work on the social history
of American medicine and a major contribution
to the growing literature on hormonal therapeutics and research.
CHANDAK SENGOOPTA
Weimin Xiong; Kedi Wang. He cheng yi ge
dan bai zhi: Jie jing niu yi dao su de ren gong
quan he cheng [Synthesize a protein: The story
of total synthesis of crystalline insulin project in
China]. (Zhongguo jin xian dai ke xue ji shu shi
yan jiu cong shu.) 194 pp., figs., bibl., app.,
index. Jinan: Shandong jiao yu chu ban she
[Shandong Education Press], 2005. $25 (paper).
In 2000 the Institute for the History of Natural
Science in Beijing launched a major research
initiative, which has resulted since 2004 in at
least twenty published monographs constituting
the series “Research on the History of Science
and Technology in Modern China.” Especially
notable is the excellent coverage of the period
since the Communist revolution of 1949, which
previously suffered from severe neglect. As a
whole, the series authors actively engage with
the international field of science and technology
studies. Together with the new journal East
Asian Science and Technology Studies, published in Taiwan, this marks an exciting new
period of East Asian research on themes of interest to Isis readers.
This contribution to China’s exciting new research into the recent history of science tells the
much celebrated but poorly understood story of
synthetic insulin. In 1966, Chinese scientists announced that they had synthesized biologically
active bovine insulin and thus achieved the first
successful protein synthesis. Since then, this accomplishment has served as a testament to socialist China’s scientific capabilities. Through
interviews, published sources, and previously
unavailable archival documents, the authors
provide the fullest account to date of this historic research.
The book covers the initial decision in 1958

This content downloaded from 132.177.229.130 on February 16, 2018 08:24:25 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

232

BOOK REVIEWS—ISIS, 99 : 1 (2008)

to research insulin synthesis; the subsequent
mobilization of almost a thousand researchers in
close to ten disparate research institutes; a comparison of U.S., German, and Chinese research;
media propaganda on the significance of the
achievement; and the question of why the research has never been awarded a Nobel Prize
(an honor no China-based research has yet received). The appendix offers transcribed interviews with key participants.
The authors’ most important contribution is
their analysis of a specific Mao-era “style” of
scientific research, characterized by heavy planning, an emphasis on collaboration, a military
“flavor,” secrecy, and extensive mobilization of
human resources. Using a slogan common during the Great Leap Forward, they dub this style
“the great armies do battle” (dabingtuan
zuozhan) and conclude that at least with respect
to insulin synthesis it was a failure. While the
researchers succeeded in synthesizing insulin,
the pressures burned out many young talents,
the obsession with secrecy impeded communication of significant intermediate results, and the
extraordinary resource deployment cost China
opportunities in many other, more important research areas.
Weimin Xiong and Kedi Wang also offer a
fascinating discussion of the Nobel Prize issue.
On several occasions, foreign scientists advocated for the nomination. But in 1966, with the
beginning of the Cultural Revolution, people
feared the political taint of associating with foreign institutions. And in 1972 and 1975 Chinese
officials nixed nominations because Alfred Nobel was the inventor of dynamite (and thus a
warmonger) and claimed that China did not
need “capitalist prize money.” When in 1978
political conditions were more favorable, the
researchers faced the challenge of nominating
no more than three scientists (the Nobel limit)
for a project in which at least thirty played key
roles. They initially forwarded eight names and
intentionally included one woman—not because
she was among the top eight but in order to
recognize the significant number of women who
had participated. (These two issues—the individualist bias of the Nobel Prize and the question of gender in socialist Chinese science—
deserve somewhat more attention than the
authors give them.) In the end, they nominated
just one scientist, Niu Jingyi, but he still did not
receive the prize. The authors boldly assert a
conclusion unlikely to be popular in China: although impressive, the research was not up to
Nobel Prize standards. The researchers failed to
recognize a point of key significance: that low-

level protein structures determine high-level
ones.
At times Xiong and Wang’s prose appears to
reflect the nationalism of their subject matter.
They often use the first person plural, as in “Our
work was the most meticulous, and our evidence
was the strongest. Without hesitation . . . we can
proclaim: our country was the first in the world
to synthesize insulin!” (p. 101). But elsewhere
they step outside such sentiment and explain its
historical significance. Especially powerful is
their critique of the nationalistic motivations of
Chinese insulin researchers: “They were not
conducting research, but waging a war. They
were fighting for China’s honor!” (p. 95). (Importantly, however, they note that many Chinese
scientists, like their U.S. counterparts, did believe in science for its own sake, despite outward denunciations of this attitude as bourgeois.) Ultimately, I found the combination of
empathy and criticism compelling.
I do wonder whether the authors reflected
with any amusement on their own participation
in a research project (the book series) that in its
scale, pace, and mobilization of resources is a
bit reminiscent of the Mao-era research style
they analyze so well. Given the project’s enormous contribution, this could be only the nicest
kind of joke. Xiong and Wang take a subject
many have wanted to understand much better
and offer an account that is at once satisfying
and provocative.
SIGRID SCHMALZER
f

Sociology and Philosophy of Science

Evan Selinger; Robert P. Crease (Editors).
The Philosophy of Expertise. vi ⫹ 421 pp., figs.,
index. New York: Columbia University Press,
2006. $49.50 (cloth).
This volume assembles fifteen previously published essays in order to explore the conceptual
grounds of epistemic authority, especially given
the practical necessity of deference and trust on
the part of nonexperts. The first such collection
to treat expertise from a philosophical standpoint, it exposes a topic that appears ripe for
continued inquiry. This much is implied in the
stated purpose of the volume: to identify the
“key issues and indispensable features” (p. 1)
necessary for any philosophically comprehensive framework. Insofar as expertise is a defining feature of the modern world, and yet a concept whose problematization can be traced to
Plato’s early dialogues, the fact that classical
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philosophy and science studies “avoid addressing the issue” (p. 214) itself warrants attention.
Not surprisingly, the book’s contributions traverse a range of epistemological, social, and
political issues. In a straightforward and telling
move, the volume is organized into three sections, corresponding to the elements of a social
taxonomy: those who provide expertise, those
who “consume” it, and the relationship between
these two “parties” (p. 5). Thus, Part 1 considers
the relationship between experts and nonexperts
and largely involves individual and institutional
capacities to integrate expert advice. Alvin
Goldman surveys basic philosophical challenges
posed by the expert/lay divide, particularly in
the case of conflicting expert accounts. In this
section, as well, Scott Brewer critiques the U.S.
legal system’s ability to arbitrate among experts,
and Stephen Turner assesses the dilemmas
posed for the modern liberal state in deploying
knowledge as opposed to privileging ideology.
The essays in Part 2 delve into the constitution of experts and expertise. For instance, the
chapters by Hubert Dreyfus and Julia Annas,
both of which consider apprenticeship, respectively contrast education with distance learning
and modern epistemological assumptions with
ancient alternatives. Finally, Part 3 centers on
the remaining term in the relationship, treating
the nonexpert critique and negotiation of expertise in view of its “impacts” (p. 6). This section
includes Paul Feyerabend’s provocative “How
to Defend Society against Science” and Don
Ihde’s closing chapter, which criticizes the expert/lay divide—a concept that not only frames
but permeates much of the book—as overly dichotomous.
In several ways, the volume hints that one
reason expertise has not received more disciplinary attention may have to do with its disciplinarily untidy implications. In the case of philosophy, the conception of expertise as
“embodied cognition” (p. 194) opens the door
not only to phenomenological analysis but, by
extension, to its treatment from sociological perspectives—a point emphasized both by likening
the book’s divisions to social actor categories
and by its sociological contributions. In “The
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Third Wave of Science Studies: Studies of Expertise and Experience,” H. M. Collins and Robert Evans propose that science studies has so far
consisted of a first wave, which conceded scientific authority its claims to knowledge and
truth, and a second wave, which demystified
scientific authority. They propose that a third
wave of science studies would do well to attend
to the “pockets” (p. 54) of “experience-based
expertise” (p. 42), found outside the core groups
of certified experts, that can and ought to participate in technological decision making.
For scholarship more generally, inquiry into expertise may raise contextual questions about the
relevance of the scholar’s own expertise. This
could perhaps be termed the tar-baby effect. Reflexive occasions are accordingly found in the
book, most notably in the case of Collins and
Evans, who task sociologists with the need to take
their own expertise seriously (p. 43) and suggest “a
duty to make history as well as reflect on it” (p.
45). In this light, John Hardwig’s claim that “rationality sometimes consists in refusing to think
for oneself” (p. 328) would appear to reside
snugly within the first wave of science studies.
One is tempted to note other instances of the tarbaby effect, such as Brewer’s proposal that the
same person will need to possess legal authority
and scientific epistemic competence if the U.S.
legal system is to “satisfy its own just intellectual
aspirations” (p. 149) and Peter Singer’s suggestion
that if moral philosophers are not generally “better
suited” than nonphilosophers to reach “the right, or
soundly based, moral conclusions . . . one might
wonder whether moral philosophy was worthwhile” (p. 189).
The Philosophy of Expertise is worthwhile
because of the subject matter, because it contains a number of engaging chapters, and because the contributions tend to engage one another. While the organization involves overlaps
and may invite the reader to second-guess placement of some of its chapters, this is only a minor
distraction. Overall, this stimulating collection
is crisply introduced and thoughtfully compiled,
and it succeeds in setting the stage for the next
wave of studies of expertise.
ERIK FISHER
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